RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4303-16T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.L.N.R.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
I.W.,
Defendant.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF
K.W., KH.R., and KI.R.,
Minors.
______________________________
Submitted October 16, 2018 – Decided October 22, 2018
Before Judges Fisher and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FG-09-0155-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Daniel A. DiLella, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Jessica A. Faustin, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
minors (Rachel E. Seidman, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.L.N.R. appeals a judgment that terminated her parental
relationship to three of her four children – Ki.R. (born in 2007), Kh.R. (born in
2012), and K.W. (born in 2014) 1 – entered after a two-day trial. We reject
defendant's arguments about the weight or sufficiency of the evidence and
affirm. 2
1
I.N., who was born in 2010, was placed in his father's custody.
2
The judgment also terminated defendant I.W.'s parental rights to Ki.R. I.W.
has not appealed nor participated in this appeal. The natural fathers of the other
two children were never identified.
A-4303-16T1
2
Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, custody and
control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); In re
Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). "The rights to conceive and
to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights . . .,' [that
are] 'far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and strengthening of
family life is a matter of public concern as being in the interests of the general
welfare. . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a); see also K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347.
But the constitutional right to the parental relationship is not absolute. N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014); N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's
interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009); In re
Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To effectuate these concerns, the
Legislature created a test for determining when a parent's rights must be
terminated in a child's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the
Division of Child Protection and Permanency prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following four prongs:
A-4303-16T1
3
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm . . .;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
See also A.W., 103 N.J. at 604-11.
The Division called a caseworker and two experts to testify about this
family and the circumstances that warranted the termination of defendant's
parental rights. Defendant neither testified nor called any witnesses.
Notwithstanding, she argues that the Division's proofs did not meet the clear and
convincing standard on all four of the prongs imposed by N.J.S.A. 30:4C -
15.1(a). We find insufficient merit in her arguments to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following
brief comments.
A-4303-16T1
4
In his oral decision, Judge Anthony V. D'Elia found the Division
demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that all four prongs supported
termination of defendant's parental rights by relying on the testimony of the
Division caseworker and two experts, all of whom he found credible and
persuasive. The judge found, among other things, that defendant's bipolar
affective disorder, depression, and substance abuse issues endangered the
children's well-being and that defendant was unable or unwilling to adequately
address these circumstances. The judge also determined that the Division made
reasonable efforts to assist defendant in combatting those concerns, but she had
not sufficiently responded, as revealed by her many missed appointments to
fully engage the opportunities the Division provided. In weighing all the
credible evidence, the judge concluded that termination of defendant's parental
rights would not do more harm than good.
Having carefully examined the record in light of the arguments posed, we
conclude that the judge's findings were supported by evidence he was entitled
to find credible and his findings are therefore deserving of our deference. N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012); Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We affirm substantially for the reasons set
forth by Judge D'Elia in his oral decision.
A-4303-16T1
5
Affirmed.
A-4303-16T1
6