NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0070-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARRYL JOINTER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted October 1, 2018 – Decided October 16, 2018
Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 16-05-0760.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Luisa M. Florez, Assistant Prosecutor, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Darryl Jointer, Jr. appeals his convictions for obstructing
administration of law or other governmental function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, and
resisting arrest. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
convictions.
We derive the following facts from the record on appeal. On January 5, 2016,
two Jersey City Police officers observed three men in the courtyard of the Arlington
Garden apartment complex and saw one of the men reach into the waistband of his
pants. The officers approached the men and asked them to show their hands, at
which point the men began to flee. The officers observed defendant throw a gun to
the ground as he fled. The officers chased defendant and arrested him.
On January 5, 2016, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment, including
charges for unlawful possession of a weapon, obstruction, and resisting arrest. On
February 8, 2017, a jury returned a verdict convicting defendant of obstructing
administration of law or other governmental function and resisting arrest, but
acquitting defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon.
On appeal, defendant challenges his obstruction and resisting arrest
convictions and contends the trial court improperly charged the jury as to each
offense. Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
either conviction. Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal
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principles, we conclude that the issues raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the
following brief comments.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court improperly "broadened" the jury
instruction on obstruction. Defendant notes that the indictment only charged
defendant with obstruction by fleeing, but the trial court's charge included not only
language on obstruction by fleeing, but also language on obstruction by
"intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle." We find no error
in the trial court's charge on obstruction, as the trial court tracked the language of
the Model Jury Charge. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal) "Obstructing
Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1)"
(approved Oct. 23, 2000); Estate of Kotsovska, ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221
N.J. 568, 596 (2015) (noting there is ordinarily a "presumption of propriety that
attaches to a trial court's reliance on the model jury charge"). The trial court further
instructed the jury that "[s]pecifically, the State alleges that the defendant committed
the act of fleeing after officers required that he show his hands." Defendant's
argument that the trial court was required to narrow the charge to omit acts other
than fleeing is without merit, as the trial court appropriately supplemented the model
charge by instructing the jury that the State alleged defendant committed obstruction
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by fleeing. See State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005) ("[I]nsofar as consistent with
and modified to meet the facts adduced at trial, model jury charges should be
followed and read in their entirety to the jury.").
Defendant also contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
obstruction conviction. He argues that because the jury acquitted defendant of the
charge of unlawful possession of a weapon, it rejected the evidence that defendant
had reached into his waistband and possessed a gun. Defendant contends this
evidence was necessary to convict defendant of the obstruction charge.
We reject defendant's argument. Inconsistent verdicts are permitted in New
Jersey. See State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44, 54-55 (2004). "[S]o long as the evidence
[is] sufficient to establish guilt on the substantive offense beyond a reasonable
doubt[,]" an inconsistent verdict will not invalidate a conviction. Id. at 55 (quoting
State v. Petties, 139 N.J. 310, 319 (1995)). In this case, the testimony of the two
responding officers supported that defendant reached into his waistband, fled from
police once officers ordered defendant to show his hands, and discarded a firearm as
he fled. The evidence before the jury was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was guilty of obstruction, regardless of the fact the jury
acquitted defendant on the possession charge.
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Defendant next asserts that the trial judge's response to two jury questions
about what constitutes effecting an arrest was improper. In fact, the trial judge's
statement that "the defendant must know he is being arrested, but if the arrest is
legal the police do not need to announce it" was agreed upon by the parties and
is explicitly set forth in comment 2 to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2. See Cannel, N.J.
Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 2 on N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2 (2018). The trial court's
response to the jury's questions is also supported by case law. See State v.
Ambroselli, 356 N.J. Super. 377, 384-385 (App. Div. 2003) ("[T]he State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant's conscious object to
prevent his arrest."); State v. Branch, 301 N.J. Super. 307, 321 (App. Div. 1997),
rev'd in part on other grounds 155 N.J. 317 (1998) (upholding resisting arrest
conviction where the facts showed that defendant knew he was being arrested
and nevertheless resisted). We therefore find that the trial judge properly
instructed the jury on the resisting arrest charge. We further conclude that the
testimony of the responding officers was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conscious objective was to
prevent his arrest by continuing to flee from police once he discarded the
firearm.
Affirmed.
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