NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3244-16T3
IN RE APPLICATION FOR
PERMIT TO CARRY A HANDGUN
OF CALVIN CARLSTROM
____________________________________
Submitted September 12, 2018 – Decided September 21, 2018
Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County.
Evan F. Nappen, attorney for appellant Calvin
Carlstrom (Louis P. Nappen, on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey
(Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Calvin Carlstrom appeals a Law Division judge's February 2,
2017 order denying his application to carry a handgun in his capacity as a
security guard for AMC Movie Theaters. We affirm.
In June 2016, petitioner applied for a permit to carry a handgun. On his
application, he listed his occupation as "Security Guard" and his employer as
"Global Security Services." He also submitted three endorsements to his good
moral character and behavior and his ability to exercise self-control, certificates
of various firearms training, and an employment application for a security guard
position. Additionally, petitioner submitted a letter from John DeVino, the
Director of Operations at Global Security Services, explaining that
Mr. Calstrom will be performing his duties at AMC
movie theaters in New Jersey. His duties include the
protection of life, as well as cash transfers in the
theaters. Large amounts of cash are moved across
common areas of the theaters requiring an armed escort.
Additionally, movie theaters have been included in
Homeland Security documents and press releases as
"soft targets" for terrorists and have been in the news
on several occasions recently for episodes of firearms-
related violence, necessitating an armed presence.
In October 2016, the Roselle Park Police Chief approved petitioner's
application. On February 2, 2017, after evaluating petitioner's application and
submissions, Judge William A. Daniel denied petitioner's application without a
hearing. In a supporting written statement of reasons, Judge Daniel, relying on
N.J.S.A. 2C:58–4(d) and the Supreme Court's decisions in In re Preis, 118 N.J.
564 (1990) and Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545 (1971), explained that
A-3244-16T3
2
petitioner's application did not establish any “justifiable need” for him to carry
a handgun. Judge Daniel stated:
In the instant case, no specific or serious threats or
previous attacks were cited to by the applicant in the
letter dated May 26, 2016. Applicant failed to establish
that he, in the course of his described employment, will
be subjected to a substantial threat of serious bodily
harm and that carrying a handgun is necessary to reduce
the threat of unjustifiable serious harm to any person.
In short, the applicant has failed to meet the rather
stringent requirements under our case law and, as such,
applicant's request for a permit to carry a handgun is
[denied].
We affirm, based on the sound reasons set forth in the Judge Daniel's
statement of reasons, adding only the following comments.
"[E]mployees of a private-security agency have [no] preferred right by
virtue of their status to obtain a permit to carry a gun.” Preis, 118 N.J. at 566.
Thus, petitioner was required to comply with N.J.A.C. 13:54–2.4, which
provides:
(d) Each application form shall also be accompanied by
a written certification of justifiable need to carry a
handgun, which shall be under oath and which:
....
2. In the case of employees of private detective
agencies, armored car companies and private
security companies, that:
i. In the course of performing statutorily
authorized duties, the applicant is subject
A-3244-16T3
3
to a substantial threat of serious bodily
harm; and
ii. That carrying a handgun by the applicant
is necessary to reduce the threat of
unjustifiable serious bodily harm to any
person.
We agree with Judge Daniel's conclusion that petitioner failed to establish a
"justifiable need" and we reject petitioner's claims that Judge Daniel applied
the incorrect standard in evaluating his application.
Petitioner also asserts he was denied due process. He argues he should
have been afforded a hearing and that the judge should have heard testimony
from the Roselle Park Police Chief regarding the reasons for granting the
permit. Petitioner has cited no authority to support his argument that a hearing
is required in matters involving perfunctory licensing applications or that t he
court must hear testimony from the chief of police who reviewed an
application. Significantly, he was afforded the opportunity to provide with his
application the information necessary to satisfy the statutory criteria.
Likewise, we find that petitioner's reliance on In re Cayuse Corp. LLC,
445 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 2016), is misplaced. In Cayuse, this court
addressed N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2, which deals with the retailing of firearms and has
different procedural requirements than N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. Id. at 84. Because
A-3244-16T3
4
Cayuse dealt with a different statute with different requirements than the
statute at issue in this case, we decline to extend its hearing requirement to
cases concerning applications under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.
In this case, the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 is clear as to when a hearing is
required. "Any person aggrieved by the denial by the chief police officer or
the superintendent of approval for a permit to carry a handgun may request a
hearing in the Superior Court . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(e). "If the
superintendent or chief police officer approves an application and the Superior
Court denies the application and refuses to issue a permit, the applicant may
appeal such denial in accordance with law and the rules governing the courts
of this State." Ibid. "When the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear
and unambiguous result, the interpretive process comes to a close, without the
need to consider extrinsic aids." State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011)
(citation omitted). Because the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(e) is clear as to when
a hearing is required, we reject petitioner's argument that Cayuse entitled him
to an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner’s contention that the statute as applied to him violates the
separation of powers doctrine is also unavailing. As our Supreme Court has
explained:
A-3244-16T3
5
So concerned is the Legislature about this licensing
process that it allows only a Superior Court judge to
issue a permit, after applicants first obtain approval
from their local chief of police. In this (as perhaps in
the case of election laws) the Legislature has reposed
what is essentially an executive function in the judicial
branch. We have acceded to that legislative delegation
because “[t]he New Jersey Legislature has long been
aware of the dangers inherent in the carrying of
handguns and the urgent necessity of their regulation,”
although we “might well have declined the
designation” because the “functions . . . were clearly
non-judicial in nature.” Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545,
553 (1971).
[Preis, 118 N.J. at 569.]
Finally, we find petitioner's argument that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4's "justifiable
need" standard violates the Second Amendment to be without merit. This
court has previously determined that New Jersey's "justifiable need" standard
comports with the United States Supreme Court's recent Second Amendme nt
decisions:
We cannot conclude that the Amendment or the Court's
recent decisions require this State to dismantle its
statutory scheme addressing the risks of misuse and
accidental use in public places devised long ago and
developed over many years. This scheme is crafted to
burden the exercise of the right to use handguns for
lawful purposes as little as possible, without
abandoning this effort to maintain order and safety in
public places.
A-3244-16T3
6
[In re Wheeler, 433 N.J. Super. 560, 617 (App. Div.
2013).]
We have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them to
be without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3244-16T3
7