NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2661-16T3
BEZALEL GROSSBERGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
SUPERIOR COURT, and
OCEAN COUNTY,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________
Submitted August 21, 2018 – Decided September 11, 2018
Before Judges Sumners and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County.
Bezalel Grossberger, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Bryan E. Lucas, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from a December 19, 2016 order by Ocean County
Assignment Judge Marlene Lynch Ford denying his application to file a
complaint against the State of New Jersey. We affirm.
By way of background, on December 4, 2015, prompted by plaintiff's pro
se frivolous applications 1 in Weinstein v. Grossberger, Docket Number OCN-
C-85-12, Chancery Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr. ordered, in pertinent part, that
any future filings by plaintiff in Ocean County "shall be marked 'received' and
date stamped, but not filed, absent an order" by the Assignment Judge. A month
later, Judge Ford entered an order on January 7, 2016, pursuant to Judge
Hodgson's order, denying plaintiff's ability to file a complaint because it did "not
raise any new issues or claims that have otherwise been disposed of by the
[c]ourt [in OCN-C-85-12], and therefore shall not be accepted for filing by the
Clerk of the Superior Court." Thereafter, on November 4, 2016, Judge James
Den Uyl entered an order not accepting all "motions and applications submitted
for filing" by plaintiff in OCN-C-85-12 and three other matters, and referred
them to Judge Ford.
1
All of plaintiff's applications mentioned in this opinion have been pro se
filings.
A-2661-16T3
2
The subject matter of this appeal occurred on December 19, 2016, when
Judge Ford denied, without oral argument, plaintiff's application to file a
complaint against the State of New Jersey, Superior Court, Ocean County, which
was submitted to the court in November or December 2016.2 In her order, the
judge referenced Judge Hodgson's order and explained that the proposed action
was "part of a continuing series of frivolous and vexatious applications to the
[c]ourt."
On appeal, plaintiff contends that Judge Ford's order denies him access to
the courts; that the judge does not have the power to reject his pleading; that
"[t]here is nothing before the [judge] that may provide basis in fact or law to
substantiate the rejection of [the] proposed complaint"; and that the court clerk
is required to docket his complaint. Plaintiff's other contentions are difficult to
understand, but appear to allude to his claims in OCN-C-85-12.
Under Rule 1:4-8(b)(3), the trial court on its own initiative can impose
sanctions upon a pro se party for filing frivolous litigation. In Rosenblum v.
Borough of Closter, 333 N.J. Super. 385, 395-97 (App. Div. 2000), we held that
where traditional sanctions have failed to deter a litigant from his pattern of
bringing repetitive, meritless, and harassing actions, an assignment judge may
2
The record is not clear when plaintiff submitted his complaint.
A-2661-16T3
3
enjoin the litigant's bringing of a further action. The power to enjoin prospective
harassing litigation must be "exercised consistently with the fundamental right
of the public to access to the courts in order to secure adjudication of claims on
their merits." D'Amore v. D'Amore, 186 N.J. Super. 525, 530 (App. Div. 1982).
With these principles in mind and based upon our review of the record,
we affirm essentially for the reasons expressed in Judge Ford's order. We find
insufficient merit in plaintiff's arguments to warrant extensive discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only that plaintiff's proposed
complaint challenges the court's ability to require the assignment judge to
review his submissions prior to acceptance by the clerk's office for filing. Not
only does the court have such right as noted above, but also the complaint is in
essence an appeal of Judge Hodgson's December 4 order, which is only within
the powers of this court to adjudicate. R. 2:2-3. Furthermore, plaintiff's time to
appeal that order is well beyond the forty-five day period to do so. R. 2:4-3.
Affirmed.
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