NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2277-16T4
IN THE MATTER OF EDMUND ANSARA,
CITY OF MILLVILLE, DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
________________________________
Argued April 25, 2018 – Decided August 31, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Manahan.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket Nos. 2016-4183 and 2016-
4255.
Michael J. Confusione argued the cause for
appellant Edmund Ansara (Hegge & Confusione,
LLC, attorneys; Michael J. Confusione, of
counsel and on the brief).
Stephen D. Barse argued the cause for
respondent City of Millville (Gruccio, Pepper,
De Santo & Ruth, PA, attorneys; Stephen D.
Barse, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent Civil Service Commission
(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General,
on the statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Edmund Ansara was a police officer in the City of
Millville Police Department. He appeals from the Final
Administrative Action (FAA) of the Civil Service Commission
(Commission) issued December 21, 2016, that upheld the action
taken by the appointing authority, City of Millville, terminating
his employment based on two removals effective April 26, 2016 and
May 26, 2016. The Commission based its decision on an independent
evaluation of the record developed before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). The Commission thereafter accepted and adopted the
Initial Decision of the ALJ which found sufficient evidence to
sustain the disciplinary charges filed against appellant related
to two separate incidents of misconduct on September 22, 2014, and
October 11, 2014.
Appellant urges this court to reverse the Commission's
decision. He argues the findings made by the ALJ were not
supported by substantial credible evidence. He also claims the
City of Millville did not demonstrate good cause to impose the
ultimate disciplinary sanction of removal. After reviewing the
appellate record, we conclude there is no legal basis to disturb
the Commission's decision and affirm.
I
A
On September 22, 2014, the Millville Police Department
received a call alleging domestic violence. For reasons not
disclosed in the record, the dispatcher "held the call for eighteen
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minutes" before directing appellant and Officer Catherine Shipley
to respond to the call for assistance involving a possible domestic
violence incident at a private residence. The incident arose from
a verbal argument between C.G. and his girlfriend, M.M.1 The
dispute had ended by the time appellant and Officer Shipley arrived
at the residence. The occupants, a man and two women, all
expressed their dissatisfaction about the length of time it took
for the officers to respond.
In the hearing before the ALJ, Officer Shipley testified that
M.M. "was sitting on the stairs" and appeared "[t]hat she had been
crying." C.G. told the officers "that he could have killed [the
two women] by the time it took [the officers] to get there."
Officer Shipley testified that C.G. was uncooperative and refused
the officers' request to produce identification. However, Officer
Shipley also made clear that none of the occupants threatened her
or appellant verbally or at any time intimated the use of physical
force against the officers or each other.
At the hearing before the ALJ, C.G. testified that when
appellant asked him to produce identification, he told him that
his identification card was in his truck. He then sat on the
couch and began searching through his cellphone for a digital copy
1
Because this incident involved domestic violence, we use initials
to protect the privacy of the people involved. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
3 A-2277-16T4
of his identification. C.G. conceded that he did not explain to
the officers what he was doing with his cellphone. At this point,
appellant crossed the living room and moved closer to C.G. At the
time, C.G. did not have anything other than his cellphone in his
hands; Officer Shipley testified she was not concerned that C.G.
possessed a weapon.
When C.G. stood up, appellant moved toward him and placed him
in handcuffs.2 According to Officer Shipley, it was unclear to
her why appellant decided to handcuff C.G. However, she assisted
appellant in detaining him because C.G. was not initially
compliant. The two officers brought C.G. to the floor to subdue
him while they handcuffed him. Appellant escorted C.G. in
handcuffs to the front lawn of the residence near the police patrol
car. Appellant kept C.G. handcuffed for approximately ten minutes.
Appellant finally removed the handcuffs to permit C.G. to retrieve
his identification credentials from his car that was parked in
front of the residence.
Appellant asked Officer Shipley to charge C.G. with a
disorderly persons offense. She refused. Appellant then charged
C.G. with committing a disorderly persons offense. C.G. did not
2
According to C.G., appellant "lunged from the front door . . .
[s]lamming handcuffs onto my right wrist. Breaking my phone in
the interim[, he s]lamm[ed] me to the floor."
4 A-2277-16T4
become aware that he had been charged with this offense until he
received in the mail the summons to appear in municipal court.
Officer Shipley believed something "wasn't right" with the way
appellant acted that day, and reported the incident to Sergeant
Duffield. Officer Shipley did not believe C.G.'s conduct presented
a physical threat to herself or appellant and testified that
appellant erred in placing him in handcuffs.
Detective William Loteck was an investigator in the Internal
Affairs Division. In his testimony before the ALJ, Detective
Loteck characterized appellant's police report describing what
occurred on September 22, 2014, as "not factual. Specifically
that C.G. was . . . asked several times for his I.D. That it
appeared C.G. pushed Officer Shipley's left arm. [Appellant] also
stated that C.G. was taken to his knees to be handcuffed."
(emphasis added).
On September 29, 2014, C.G. and M.M. filed an Internal Affairs
complaint against appellant for excessive use of force and false
arrest. Millville Chief of Police Jody Farabella and Internal
Affairs Detective Brian Starcher also testified before the ALJ
concerning this incident.
B
At approximately 3:22 p.m. on October 11, 2014, appellant
responded to a private residence in the City of Millville. Upon
5 A-2277-16T4
his arrival, appellant was met by C.W., a civilian dispatcher in
the Millville Police Department, and his nephew R.W. C.W. was
present during this entire incident. In the police report of the
incident, appellant wrote:
[R.W.] said he has lived here for more than
three years. [R.W.] said he has a key for the
bottom lock, which is different than the
deadbolt, which they never used, but [T.H.]
is now using it. [R.W.] said the front door
lock is different, as this residence used to
be two apartments.
Appellant was unable to unlock the back door with the key.
Appellant did not take any action to confirm R.W. actually resided
at the house, such as asking him to produce his driver's license
or any other documentation showing proof of residence. Ironically,
if he had asked R.W. to produce his driver's license, appellant
would have discovered R.W. resided with his mother in a different
municipality.
Despite not having any competent evidence to corroborate
R.W.'s allegations, appellant told R.W. that he "cannot stop [R.W.]
from entering his residence." According to appellant's police
report, R.W.
then text messaged [T.H.] that he was going
to break out a window to enter the house. She
immediately called [R.W.].
[T.H.] said she was not going to let [R.W.]
get anything until he gives her the DJ
equipment in his possession because it is
6 A-2277-16T4
hers. [Appellant] requested she get his
clothes for work but she continued to yell
that she bought everything, nothing is his,
and he does not live there.
Despite the obvious civil character of this dispute,
appellant stood by while R.W. "made entry by breaking a glass part
of the back door and unlocked the dead bolt." (Emphasis added).
Against the expressed wishes of the person in possession of the
residence, T.H., appellant followed R.W. into the residence and
watched while R.W. entered the bathroom and "began to collect
articles of clothing scattered on the room floor." T.H., described
by appellant as a "female [T.H.], came downstairs yelling while
holding an infant in her arms."
According to appellant, T.H. "immediately got in my face
. . . ." Appellant handcuffed T.H. in her kitchen and arrested
her. At the hearing before the ALJ, appellant was asked: "And can
you explain to me . . . what action [T.H.] was doing to make you
arrest her?" Appellant responded: "She was -- had her fingers
very close to my face." Appellant admitted that he pushed T.H.'s
head against the counter while he arrested her for the disorderly
persons offense of resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a).
Appellant placed T.H. in the rear of his patrol car, handcuffed.
While T.H. was inside appellant's patrol car, Sergeant
Duffield arrived at the scene. According to appellant's police
7 A-2277-16T4
report, Sergeant Duffield attempted to speak to T.H. but she did
not respond. Internal Affairs Sergeant Starcher investigated the
incident. He viewed the video recording of the incident taken by
the video camera in appellant's patrol car. Sergeant Starcher
testified that the video recording shows that Sergeant Duffield
never attempted to speak with T.H. While T.H. was detained in the
patrol car, appellant reentered the residence several times to
obtain some of R.W.'s clothing. T.H. told appellant that R.W. had
her DJ equipment in his car. Appellant told her that he could not
help her retrieve the equipment; she would have to pursue the
matter through the Sheriff's Office.
T.H. filed an internal affairs complaint against appellant.
Internal Affairs Investigator Sergeant Starcher discussed the
matter with appellant's supervisor, Lieutenant Ed Zadroga.
Sergeant Starcher was concerned about "a possible pattern"
involving Fourth Amendment violations by appellant. Sergeant
Starcher decided not to interview T.H., and referred the matter
to the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office based on
inconsistencies he discovered in appellant's police report. T.H.
pled guilty to resisting arrest before the Millville Municipal
Court.
8 A-2277-16T4
II
Our review of a final decision of a State administrative
agency is limited. Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v.
N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007). "An
administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be
sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the
record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). This court
accords the agency's decision substantial deference "even if [it]
would have reached a different result in the first instance." Id.
at 28. "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable rests upon the person
challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J.
Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006).
To determine whether reversal of the agency determination is
warranted, we must consider:
(1) whether the agency's action violates
express or implied legislative policies, that
is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether
the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based
its action; and (3) whether in applying the
legislative policies to the facts, the agency
clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made on a
showing of the relevant factors.
9 A-2277-16T4
[Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)
(citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39
N.J. 556, 562 (1963)).]
This deferential standard also applies to decisions relating to
employee discipline and punishment, including termination.
Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28; see also In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 486
(2007).
The record developed before the ALJ is replete with competent
evidence of appellant's unfitness to be a police officer.
Appellant's conduct in both incidents reflects a disregard for the
rule of law coupled with a disturbing pattern of abusive behavior
in the exercise of his authority. The arguments attacking the
validity of the Commission's decision lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).
We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the
Commission, as reflected in the ALJ's Initial Decision.
Affirmed.
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