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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3665-14T5
IN THE MATTER OF THE
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF J.S.,
SVP-24-99.
_______________________________
Submitted January 23, 2018 – Decided August 27, 2018
Before Judges Yannotti and Leone.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-
24-99.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant J.S. (Maritza Rodriguez,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent State of New Jersey (Melissa
H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Amy Beth Cohn, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
J.S. appeals from a February 6, 2015 order determining that
he continued to be a sexually-violent predator who must be civilly
committed in the Special Treatment Unit (STU) under the Sexually
Violent Predators Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. We
affirm.
I.
In 1986, J.S. caused a four-year-old girl to lick his penis
and caused her six-year-old brother to engage in sexual conduct.
J.S. pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
2(b), and was sentenced to four years of probation.
Also in 1986, J.S. repeatedly forced a four-year-old boy to
perform fellatio on him, and threatened to come back and kill him.
In 1992, the boy revealed J.S.'s conduct. In 1994 J.S. pled guilty
to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a),
third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), and third-
degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), and was sentenced
to seven years in the Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center (ADTC).
Meanwhile, in 1994 J.S. took pictures of a nude fifteen-year-
old girl. He pled guilty to second-degree and fourth-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and
(b)(5)(b), and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-3(b), and was sentenced to seven years in prison. The two
seven-year terms were concurrent.
When J.S. nearing the end of his criminal sentence in 1999,
he was evaluated at the Ann Klein Forensic Center (AKFC) and was
found not to satisfy the criteria for commitment to the AKFC. In
2000, the trial judge ordered J.S. to be civilly committed at the
Northern Regional Unit (NRU), the predecessor of the STU.
2 A-3665-14T5
The trial judge and other judges ordered that J.S. remain
committed to the STU in various annual reviews from 2002 through
2014. We affirmed the 2003 and 2007 orders committing J.S. to the
STU. In re Civil Commitment of J.S., No. A-4335-07 (App. Div.
Oct. 7, 2004); In re Civil Commitment of J.S., No. A-5712-06 (App.
Div. Jan. 8, 2008) (J.S. II). In J.S. II, we rejected J.S.'s
contention that he should be transferred from the STU to the AKFC
because it was safer and a more therapeutic setting. Id. (slip
op. at 8-9).
For the commitment review at issue here, the trial judge held
hearings on three days in 2014 and 2015. He heard testimony from
J.S., four experts, and the CEO of the AKFC, Dr. Glenn Ferguson.
The State's expert psychiatrist, Dr. Indra Cidambi, testified
that J.S. has pedophilic disorder; unspecified paraphilic
disorder; and an unspecified personality disorder with antisocial
features. She found they affect him emotionally, cognitively, or
volitionally. The State's expert psychologist, Dr. Tarmeen Sahni,
testified J.S. refused to be interviewed, but his file showed he
has pedophilia, sexually attracted to both genders, non-exclusive
type; paraphilia, not otherwise specified, with non-consent and
sadistic features; and personality disorder, not otherwise
specified, with schizotypal and antisocial traits. Both testified
3 A-3665-14T5
these mental conditions predispose J.S. to commit acts of sexual
violence.
J.S.'s expert psychiatrist, Dr. Gary Collins, testified that
J.S. has pedophilic disorder, non-exclusive type, sexually
attracted to both genders; conversion disorder; bipolar disorder;
and personality disorder, not otherwise specified. J.S.'s expert
psychologist, Dr. Timothy Foley, testified J.S. has pedophilic
disorder; and bipolar disorder with strong indication of
schizotypal personality disorder.
All of the experts agreed that, as a result of his mental
abnormalities or disorders, J.S. has serious difficulty
controlling sexually violent behavior, and that it was highly
likely he would reoffend if released. Based on their testimony,
the trial judge found that J.S. required continued civil
commitment. On February 6, 2016, the court ordered that J.S.
remain committed to the STU.
II.
J.S. appeals. He argues:
POINT ONE – THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE TREATMENT TO J.S. AS REQUIRED BY THE
SVPA AND THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT,
ALLOWING J.S. TO LANGUISH FOR FIFTEEN YEARS
WITHOUT PROPER PSYCHIATRIC CARE.
POINT TWO – J.S. MUST BE RELEASED BECAUSE HE
FEARS FOR HIS SAFETY AT THE STU DUE TO THE
SEVERE ABUSE THAT J.S. HAS TESTIFIED HE
4 A-3665-14T5
SUFFERED, WHICH J.S. STATED MAKES THE
CONDITIONS AT STU UNBEARABLE.
POINT THREE – J.S. MUST BE RELEASED BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT HE HAS NOT MADE ANY
PROGRESS IN HIS TREATMENT AT THE STU AND HE
IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS IN THE
FUTURE, RENDERING HIS CONTINUED COMMITMENT AT
THE STU PUNITIVE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We must hew to our "'extremely narrow'" standard of review
of a commitment hearing. In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J.
152, 174 (2014) (citation omitted). Appellate courts "give
deference to the findings of our trial judges because they have
the 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the
"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid.
(citation omitted). "So long as the trial court's findings are
supported by 'sufficient credible evidence present in the record,'
those findings should not be disturbed." Id. at 175.
Furthermore, "[t]he judges who hear SVPA cases generally are
'specialists' and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled to
'special deference.'" Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
"Accordingly, an appellate court should not modify a trial court's
determination either to commit or release an individual unless
'the record reveals a clear mistake.'" Id. at 175.
Under the SVPA, "[i]f the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the person needs continued involuntary commitment
as a sexually violent predator, it shall issue an order authorizing
5 A-3665-14T5
the involuntary commitment of the person to a facility designated
for the custody, care and treatment of sexually violent predators."
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). Three requirements must be satisfied to
classify a person as a sexually violent predator: (1) "that the
individual has been convicted of a sexually violent offense"; (2)
"that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder"; and (3) "that as a result of his psychiatric abnormality
or disorder, 'it is highly likely that the individual will not
control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend.'"
R.F., 217 N.J. at 173 (quoting In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J.
109, 130 (2002)); see N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.
Appellant's convictions of aggravated sexual assault and
sexual assault satisfied the "sexually violent offense"
requirement. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. The trial court found by
clear and convincing evidence that J.S. has serious difficulty
controlling sexually violent behavior, and that it was highly
likely that that he would reoffend if released. We see no basis
to disturb its ruling.
J.S. does not dispute that he satisfied the statutory standard
for continued civil commitment. Instead, he advances three
arguments why he nonetheless should be released from the STU into
the community.
6 A-3665-14T5
A.
J.S. argues he must be released because the STU has failed
to provide him with effective treatment. The State's experts
testified the STU has provided J.S. with individual therapy, group
therapy, and examinations by a psychiatrist. They testified J.S.
was still in Phase One of his treatment, but had attended a process
group earlier in 2014. The trial court found J.S. made some
progress until a psychotic episode in 2005, but made no progress
since then.
The experts disagreed on why J.S. had not made progress. The
State's experts testified that J.S. was malingering and had been
refusing treatment for most of his fifteen years at the NRU and
STU, and that he refused all forms of psychiatric treatment and
medication. J.S.'s psychiatric expert Dr. Collins agreed J.S. had
engaged in malingering.1 Nonetheless, J.S.'s experts asserted he
needed to undergo treatment at a psychiatric hospital and take
medication.
However, J.S. was sent three times to the AKFC, a psychiatric
hospital, and three times he was sent back to the STU. The AKFC
records stated as follows.
1
J.S.'s other expert, Dr. Foley, testified he did not see evidence
of malingering. The trial court stated: "Well, I guess he really
wasn't looking very hard."
7 A-3665-14T5
In 2006, J.S. was transferred to the AKFC after starving
himself for two weeks and expressing suicidal thoughts. Once
there, he resumed eating. However, he said he did not need any
psychiatric treatment, and he refused psychotropic medication. He
refused to walk and claimed he needed a wheelchair, but there was
no apparent physical basis for his claim. An AKFC psychiatrist
found J.S. was "feigning [a] physical condition in order to avoid
going back to the [NRU]." The AKFC sent J.S. back.
In January 2008, J.S. cut his wrist and threatened further
self-harm, and was sent to the AKFC. An AKFC psychiatrist noted
such circumstances were "associated with symptom simulation or
exaggeration to avoid . . . harsh incarceration." Once at the
AKFC, J.S. denied thoughts of self-harm and refused medication.
The AKFC psychiatrist concluded J.S. did not meet the criteria for
commitment to the AKFC and should be returned to the NRU.
In February 2008, J.S. refused to eat or drink for several
days and was sent to the AKFC. The AKFC psychiatrist noted that
such conduct was associated with trying to "avoid harsh
incarceration . . . by symptom manipulation or frank malingering,"
and that J.S. appeared "extremely manipulative and self serving
to remove himself from the treatment program at the [NRU]." Once
at the AKFC, J.S. denied thoughts of self-harm, and resumed eating
and drinking. J.S. again demanded a wheelchair, which was denied,
8 A-3665-14T5
and again was able to walk. He would not take recommended
medication and was manipulative toward the treatment team. As in
the prior two evaluations, an AKFC psychiatrist diagnosed J.S. as
having pedophilia, paraphilia, and depressive disorder. The AKFC
psychiatrist also diagnosed J.S. with "malingering," and found he
did "not exhibit any type of psychosis." The AKFC psychiatrist
concluded J.S. did not meet the criteria for commitment to the
AKFC, and returned him to the NRU.
Thus, as the State's experts testified, the AKFC records
showed that J.S. was malingering and refused psychiatric help or
medication on the three occasions he went to AKFC. Nonetheless,
J.S.'s experts requested that J.S. be conditionally discharged and
released into the community so he could be voluntarily committed
to a psychiatric hospital for appropriate treatment. However, Dr.
Collins doubted J.S. would take medication voluntarily, even if
released into the community. Dr. Foley testified it was his "hope"
that J.S. could develop a therapeutic relationship and take
medication, but would not disagree that "the only basis for [his]
opinion that it might happen anywhere else is [he] hope[d] it
would."
In his testimony, J.S. initially refused to answer whether
he would be willing to engage in psychiatric treatment. He
repeatedly noted he had been sent to other facilities that found
9 A-3665-14T5
he did not need psychiatric treatment. He testified he would not
take medications at AKFC or another facility and then return to
the STU. He then said: "Treatment is one thing. Medication is
last resort." He ultimately said he would agree to therapy and
try psychiatric treatment, but refused to say he would take
medication if recommended.
Dr. Collins suggested psychotropic medications could be
administered to J.S. without his consent. The trial court
conducted an extensive inquiry on whether it could order forced
medication. Dr. Ferguson testified that medication could only be
administered over objection if the person posed a substantial risk
of serious harm to self, others, or property. The court found
that J.S. did not meet that standard, and that it lacked the
authority to order forced medication. J.S. states he does not
appeal that finding.
The trial court also found as follows. "Without a doubt
[J.S.] would not comply with conditions [for] a conditional
discharge." "The problem with [J.S.'s] argument is that he's been
in [AKFC] three times, been offered medication three times, and
refused to take it three times." "I tried to get [J.S.] to
indicate if he were sent to [AKFC] he would take medication, and
he would not agree to that."
10 A-3665-14T5
The trial court also found "there is clearly some malingering
and manipulation" by J.S. However, the court believed that if he
were "just doing this deliberately as a malingerer, he would have
changed his tactic by now." The court concluded that, in addition
to the pedophilia and personality disorders testified to by the
State's experts, J.S. has "a mental illness, be it . . . a psychosis
or mood disorder or bipolar disorder," which the State's experts
ignored. The court found the State's experts mistakenly believed
J.S. would "change his mind and stop doing what he's been doing
for 10 years." The court found that "without the medication he's
going to continue on as he is now."
The trial court concluded: "I think it's the responsibility
of the STU to do something for him. They can't just take the
position they're taking now and let this go on for another 10
years. It's . . . not right. It's not ethical. And it's their
responsibility to come up with a plan to treat [J.S.]."
That responsibility rests not with the court but with the
agencies which run the STU.2 As the trial court recognized by its
2
"The Department of Corrections [DOC] shall be responsible for
the operation of any facility designated for the custody, care and
treatment of sexually violent predators, and shall provide or
arrange for custodial care of persons committed pursuant to this
act." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(a). "The Division of Mental Health
Services in the Department of Human Services shall provide or
arrange for treatment for a person committed pursuant to this act.
11 A-3665-14T5
order continuing J.S.'s commitment to the STU, J.S. has not shown
any legal basis for release into the community.
J.S. emphasizes that treatment is one of the goals of the
SVPA. "[T]he statute is designed to protect the public from
dangerous predators and to treat sex offenders who are, by
definition, suffering from a mental abnormality." In re Civil
Commitment of W.X.C., 204 N.J. 179, 188 (2010). However, we cannot
ignore that "[t]he Legislature enacted the SVPA to protect other
members of society from the danger posed by sexually violent
predators." In re Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J. 563, 570-71
(2009).
Our Legislature found that "[c]ertain individuals who commit
sex offenses suffer from mental abnormalities or personality
disorders which make them likely to engage in repeat acts of
predatory sexual violence if not treated for their mental
conditions." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(a). The Legislature found it
was "necessary to modify the involuntary civil commitment process
in recognition of the need for commitment of those sexually violent
predators who pose a danger to others should they be returned to
Such treatment shall be appropriately tailored to address the
specific needs of sexually violent predators." N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.34(b).
12 A-3665-14T5
society." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(c). Such modification was needed
because:
Under the existing involuntary commitment
procedure, persons are subject to commitment
if they are mentally ill and dangerous to
self, others or property. . . . The nature
of the mental condition from which a sexually
violent predator may suffer may not always
lend itself to characterization under the
existing statutory standard, although civil
commitment may nonetheless be warranted due
to the danger the person may pose to others
as a result of the mental condition.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(b) (emphasis added).]
The Legislature found it was "necessary to house involuntarily
committed sexually violent predators in an environment separate
from persons committed under [the general civil commitment
statutes] or otherwise confined." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(d).
"The Legislative findings clearly make paramount the SVPA's
intention to protect society through the 'commitment of those
sexually violent predators who pose a danger to others should they
be returned to society.'" J.M.B., 197 N.J. at 574 (quoting
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(c)). The Legislature's goal of protecting the
public by ensuring sexually violent predators are "confined in a
secure facility for control, care and treatment" is reflected
throughout the SVPA's provisions. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26; see
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.27(a); N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a), (g).
13 A-3665-14T5
"If the court determines at [an annual] review hearing that
involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator shall be
continued, it shall execute a new order" continuing his commitment
to such a secure facility. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. A conditional
discharge is only allowed if "the court finds that the person will
not be likely to engage in acts of sexual violence because the
person is amenable to and highly likely to comply with a plan to
facilitate the person’s adjustment and reintegration into the
community so as to render involuntary commitment as a sexually
violent predator unnecessary for that person." N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.32(c)(1). A person can be considered for unconditional
discharge only "if the person’s treatment team determines that the
person’s mental condition has so changed that the person is not
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if released." N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.36(a). As J.S. met none of those preconditions for
conditional or unconditional release, and instead met N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.35's requirements for continued commitment, the trial
court was required to order J.S. to remain at the STU.
J.S. notes New Jersey's general "civil commitment
jurisprudence has emphasized the importance of 'provid[ing] the
needed level of care in the least restrictive manner,' and not
infringing on an individual's 'liberty or autonomy any more than
appears reasonably necessary to accomplish' the State's goals of
14 A-3665-14T5
public safety and effective treatment." R.F., 217 N.J. at 180
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). J.S. argues the STU
has failed to provide effective treatment to him.
However, J.S. ignores his own refusal of psychiatric
treatment and medication, which are available to him at the STU.
Dr. Cidambi testified that "none of the psychiatrist[s] here at
the STU were able to follow up with [J.S.] psychiatrically because
[J.S.] has been refusing any kind of formal treatment . . . from
the psychiatrists here."
Dr. Ferguson testified that, unlike the AKFC, the STU was not
a "psychiatric hospital" as designated in Title Thirty. See
N.J.S.A. 30:4-160; see also N.J.S.A. 30:1-7. The trial court
asked if "in order to provide . . . an involuntarily committed
person psychiatric treatment, would [a facility] have to be a
designated psychiatric hospital?" Dr. Ferguson replied that "the
only exception would be for people who were involuntarily civilly
committed under a different statute like the Sexually Violent
Predator Act. That also calls for mental health treatment
including psychiatric treatment if . . . necessary."
Dr. Ferguson's testimony accurately reflects the SVPA. As
the trial court noted, the SVPA provides that "[a] psychiatrist"
may be included on an STU resident's "treatment team." N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.30(b). The treatment team "provide[s] treatment,
15 A-3665-14T5
supervision or other services at a facility designated for the
custody, care and treatment of sexually violent predators," namely
the STU. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. The SVPA regulations provide that
the STU's "'clinical staff'" includes "members of treatment teams"
and others who work in "psychiatry." N.J.A.C. 10A:35-1.4. Indeed,
the court noted that he found "diagnoses in [J.S.'s medical
records] by staff psychiatrists at the STU."3
Given J.S.'s refusal to accept the medication and psychiatric
treatment offered him at the STU, he has not shown that his
continued commitment at the STU somehow violates the treatment
goal of the SVPA.
B.
J.S. argues his continued commitment at the STU is punitive
and thus unconstitutional. However, our Supreme Court has
repeatedly "conclude[d] that the SVPA is neither punitive nor
unfair." W.X.C., 204 N.J. at 183; see J.M.B., 197 N.J. at 599-
601; State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 137-38 (2003). The Court
3
Nevertheless, the trial court stated "in order [for the STU] to
provide psychiatric care, I think it has to be a psychiatric
hospital." The court apparently based that belief on "the manual
that was promulgated by the [Administrative Office of the Courts]
and the Department of Human Services for judges." However, such
a manual cannot trump the SVPA and its regulations, or the
testimony of the witnesses before the court. In any event, any
issue is mooted by J.S.'s refusal of the psychiatric services
offered him at the STU, which would precede any psychiatric care.
16 A-3665-14T5
"recognized that by utilizing confinement as part of treatment,
the SVPA has some punitive impact." W.X.C., 204 N.J. at 189.
However, the Court found that "the SVPA reflects 'a reasoned
balance between the liberty interest of a [sex offender] in need
of treatment for emotional disorders and protection of the
citizenry.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). Because "the SVPA is
remedial and strikes an appropriate balance between the safety
interests of the public and the need to provide predators with
treatment," the Court rejected the argument it was punitive. Id.
at 189-90.
J.S. contends his lack of progress makes his commitment
punitive. However, "[i]n light of the important purposes that
statutes like the SVPA serve, [the Court has] cautioned courts to
proceed with care, reminding them 'that the most searching inquiry
is required before condemning honest laws that are free of punitive
intent and designed to protect society.'" Id. at 190 (citation
omitted). "[O]nly if there is a hidden punitive purpose to the
SVPA's delay in offering treatment can we say that it is
unconstitutional as applied." Id. at 201. J.S. has not alleged,
and the trial court did not find, any such hidden punitive purpose.
Moreover, J.S.'s constitutional claim fails because he
refused to accept psychiatric treatment or medication offered to
him at the STU. Our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in
17 A-3665-14T5
W.X.C. There, a sex offender argued the SVPA could not
constitutionally be applied to him because he had not been sent
to the ADTC to get sex offender treatment before being committed
to the STU. 204 N.J. at 187. The Court rejected his general
challenge to the SVPA, "declin[ing] to conclude that the SVPA is
transformed into a punitive, and therefore unconstitutional,
enactment merely because it applies to some individuals, like
defendant, who were not provided with specialized treatment prior
to civil commitment." Id. at 195.
W.X.C.'s as-applied challenge was based on the criteria for
admission into the ADTC. In addition to the ADTC requirements
"that the sex offender's behavior satisfies the dual criteria of
being repetitive and compulsive, the Legislature decided to narrow
admission into [the ADTC] further by requiring that the sex
offender also be amenable to treatment and willing to participate
in treatment." Id. at 197; see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a), (b),
(f), (h). The Supreme Court ruled the limitation of treatment to
the sex offender "who is willing to participate in treatment" was
appropriate and non-punitive. W.X.C., 204 N.J. at 198; see id.
at 198-202. "[T]he two new requirements of amenability and
willingness were intended to limit treatment at the ADTC to those
repetitive and compulsive sex offenders who are able to benefit
from it most." Id. at 197. "By excluding 'therapy refusers'"
18 A-3665-14T5
from the ADTC, "the ADTC would afford better treatment to those
most likely to benefit." Id. at 198 (citation omitted). The
Court held: "The operation of the SVPA is neither punitive nor
fundamentally unfair and we therefore reject defendant's arguments
that it is unconstitutional as applied to him and other offenders
like him." Id. at 202.
Similarly, the SVPA did not become punitive as to R.S. because
he was unwilling to accept the treatment available at the STU,
including psychiatric treatment and medication. Thus, we reject
his constitutional argument.
C.
J.S. also argues he must be released because he has suffered
severe abuse at the STU. In 2000 he was sent for treatment for a
broken jaw and hematoma on his head, in 2007 he was sent to the
emergency room after allegedly being punched in the eye and head,
and he alleged he was sexually assaulted in 2011. He also claimed
his property had been sabotaged and stolen. He claimed to fear
for his life. However, Dr. Cidambi testified that the STU had
taken protective action after J.S.'s 2011 allegation. Dr. Sahni
testified J.S.'s alleged fear of future assaults could be
malingering.
J.S. similarly alleged many of these incidents in J.S. II.
We noted "his complaints about safety at the STU were either
19 A-3665-14T5
unsubstantiated or had been reasonably addressed by STU staff."
Id. (slip op. at 8). We found the trial judge has also issued a
directive that "will reasonably address such concerns going
forward." Id. at 8-9. We concluded "J.S. never provided a basis
on which to justify his placement in any facility other than the
STU," and rejected his demand for transfer to the AKFC. Ibid.
If J.S.'s complaints were inadequate to justify his transfer
to the AKFC, they are certainly inadequate to justify his release
into the community. The record contains no evidence of assaults
since 2011. Security concerns should be addressed to the
appropriate authorities, but they are not a basis under the SVPA
for releasing J.S. into the community when it is highly likely
that that he will commit new acts of sexual violence if released.
Affirmed.
20 A-3665-14T5
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF J.S., SVP-24-99 (ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)
Combined Opinion