RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3340-16T1
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT L.F.
__________________________________
Argued May 21, 2018 - Decided August 6, 2018
Before Judges Messano, Accurso and O'Connor.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, Docket No.
ML-00040043.
Jesse M. DeBrosse, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
L.F. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Jesse M. DeBrosse, on the brief).
Matthew T. Spence, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent State of New
Jersey (Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County
Prosecutor, attorney; Matthew T. Spence, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
L.F. was convicted of rape1 in Pennsylvania in 1992, 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3121, before the Legislature amended the
registration provisions of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23,
to add subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), described more fully
in our opinion in In re G.H. and In re G.A., ___ N.J. Super. ___
(2018), also issued today, making the lifetime registration
requirements "permanent [and] irrevocable" for certain
offenders. G.H., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 2) (quoting
In re State ex rel. C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 66 (2018)).
Following the completion of his sentence, L.F. moved to New
Jersey and registered under Megan's Law on June 12, 2001. The
Camden County Prosecutor's Office classified him as a Tier I
offender. L.F.'s 1992 convictions represent his sole brush with
the law. In 2017 he moved to be relieved of his obligation to
register under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). Although acknowledging L.F.
had been offense-free for more than fifteen years following his
release from prison, thereby permitting him to apply for relief
from his registration requirements under subsection (f), the
trial judge denied the application on the basis of subsection
1
L.F. was also convicted in the same proceeding of simple
assault, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, involuntary
deviant sexual intercourse, indecent assault and indecent
exposure. The State concedes, "for Megan's Law review
purposes[,] that [L.F.'s] actions consist of a 'sole sex
offense.'"
2 A-3340-16T1
(g). Specifically, the court found L.F.'s Pennsylvania rape
conviction similar to one for sexual assault under New Jersey
law, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), as both criminalize sexual
penetration with the use of force, thus rendering him ineligible
to apply to terminate his registration obligation under
subsection (g)'s ban for those offenders convicted of sexual
assault pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1).
L.F. appeals from the court's March 2, 2017 order denying
his application to terminate his registration requirements. He
argues the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) applies only to
convictions for "sexual assault pursuant to paragraph (1) of
subsection c. of N.J.S.[A.] 2C:14-2" and not to out-of-state
offenses.
We deem that argument to be without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), in
light of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3)'s inclusion of out-of-state
convictions for offenses similar to those enumerated in
subsection N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2) as sex offenses "[f]or the
purposes of this act," requiring the offender to register under
Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1). See In re R.B., 376 N.J.
Super. 451, 464 (App. Div. 2005) (explaining that "so long as
the conviction being compared to a Megan's Law enumerated
offense contains the same essential elements, and the underlying
3 A-3340-16T1
purposes of the crimes are consonant, the conviction should be
considered similar to the Megan's Law enumerated offense for
purposes of requiring sex offender registration in New Jersey"),
overruled in part on other grounds by In re T.T., 188 N.J. 321,
334 (2006); see also Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 330 (2009)
(discussing the maxim of statutory construction calling for
interpreting sections of a statute included within the same Act
by reading them in pari materia).
Having concluded, however, in G.H. that the retroactive
application of subsection (g) to those convicted of sex offenses
prior to its effective date in 2002 was not the intent of the
Legislature and would, in any event, be manifestly unfair if
applied to such offenders,2 slip op. at 28, we reverse the trial
court's March 2, 2017 order and remand for a hearing on L.F.'s
application to be relieved of his obligation to register under
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).
Reversed and remanded.
2
Because the record makes clear that L.F. registered in New
Jersey prior to the effective date of subsection (g), we need
not consider whether the holding of G.H. applies to those
offenders with out-of-state convictions which pre-date enactment
of subsection (g) who moved to New Jersey after its effective
date.
4 A-3340-16T1