RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2816-16T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.N.R.,1
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF Z.I.R.,
A Minor.
_____________________________
Submitted January 31, 2018 – Decided July 26, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Manahan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County,
Docket No. FG-07-0220-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant M.N.R. (Daniel DiLella,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
1
We use initials and pseudonyms to identify the parties to
preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-
3(d)(12).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Michelle Cort-
Hourie, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor Z.I.R. (Melissa
R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant M.N.R. (Maureen) is the biological mother of Z.I.R.
(Zoe), a little girl now three years old. Defendant appeals from
an order entered by the Family Part terminating her parental rights
to Zoe.2 The Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(Division) first became involved in Maureen's life when she herself
was a child. The Division was compelled to act and protect Maureen
from the harm caused by her mother's serious substance abuse
problem.
Unfortunately, Maureen's quality of life and ability to
parent her own children has been significantly impaired by her
mental illness, which she has steadfastly refused to address and
treat. Maureen has had five children including Zoe. She has been
2
Defendant did not identify Zoe's biological father and
"consistently refused to disclose [his] name or any contact
information[. ]" Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-17(c), the Family
Part waived the need to provide services to this unknown
individual.
2 A-2816-16T3
unable to care for or parent any of them. She is homeless,
unemployed, and refuses to comply with the medical treatment
prescribed by the healthcare professionals who have diagnosed her
mental illness. The Division's involvement that led to this
guardianship trial began when Maureen's youngest child Zoe was
five months old.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) notified the Division that
Maureen reacted in a highly disruptive manner when she was informed
that her public assistance and subsidized housing had been
terminated. After investigating the matter, the Division executed
an emergency Dodd removal3 of Zoe. The child was placed in a
resource home where she continues to reside; her resource parent
is willing and ready to adopt her.
On December 26, 2014, the Division filed a verified complaint
and order to show cause seeking the physical and legal custody of
Zoe under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1. On February
9, 2015, on the return on the order to show cause, the Family Part
awarded the Division physical and legal custody of Zoe based on
defendant's long history with the Division, her serious mental
3
"A 'Dodd removal' refers to the emergency removal of a child
from the home without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act,
which, as amended, is found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. The Act
was authored by former Senate President Frank J. 'Pat' Dodd in
1974." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super.
593, 609 n.2 (App. Div. 2010).
3 A-2816-16T3
health problems, and unstable housing situation. At a fact-finding
hearing held on April 14, 2015, the court found:
[Maureen] has a long history with the Division
due to her refusal to comply with treatment
for her mental health diagnoses. This history
includes a substantiation in 2010 for neglect
due to her lack of mental health services, and
the termination of her parental rights to two
children and the kinship legal guardianship
of a third. The [c]ourt takes judicial notice
of . . . court documents from litigation
regarding [Maureen's] other children. During
the most recent investigation, [Maureen] again
admitted she had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, but that she had not taken her
prescribed medication nor complied with
therapy since at least 2008. When the
Division attempted to remove [Zoe] from her
care, [Maureen] became agitated and the police
had to be called to assist. [Maureen]
attempted to remove [Zoe's] clothes and did
not recognize [Zoe's] need to be warmly
dressed for the cold December weather. During
the [fact-finding] trial today, [Maureen]
again tried to justify her attempts to remove
the child's clothing during the removal. By
her continued lack of treatment for her
acknowledged mental health diagnoses,
[Maureen] failed to exercise a minimum degree
of care and placed [Zoe] at a substantial risk
of harm. In addition, [Maureen's] history
with the Division, and prior court findings
that she was unable to care for her children
due to untreated mental health diagnoses,
further supports a finding that any child
would be at risk of harm in her care.
Defendant did not appeal the Family Part's order finding she had
abused or neglected Zoe.
4 A-2816-16T3
After more than a year of active involvement with defendant
and her family, which included the provision of extensive services,
the Division commenced this guardianship action seeking the
termination of defendant's parental rights over Zoe. The matter
was tried before Judge David B. Katz over four non-sequential days
starting on January 4, 2017 and ending on January 17, 2017.
The Division presented expert witnesses who testified that
despite the variety of services provided to Maureen, which included
counseling, psychiatric evaluations, psychological evaluations,
parenting skills classes, family team meetings, supervised
visitation, and transportation, she was still not capable of
providing Zoe with a safe parenting environment. These witnesses
also testified that Zoe was closely bonded to her resource parent,
the child would suffer severe and enduring psychological and
emotional harm if that relationship were severed, and termination
of Maureen’s parental rights would not do more harm than good. On
February 23, 2017, Judge Katz delivered an oral opinion from the
bench stating the factual findings and conclusions of law that
warranted the termination of defendant's parental rights over Zoe.
On appeal, Maureen argues the trial judge erred by finding
the Division established, by clear and convincing evidence, all
four statutory prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We disagree and
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Katz in
5 A-2816-16T3
his comprehensive oral opinion. Although parents have a
fundamental constitutional right to raise their children, N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014),
that right is "tempered by the State's parens patriae
responsibility to protect children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 447 (2012). It is the court's duty
to intervene and protect children when they are exposed to a
physically hazardous environment or their psychological well-being
is seriously endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent. Ibid.
"The best-interests-of-the-child standard codified at N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a) 'aims to achieve the appropriate balance between
parental rights and the State's parens patriae responsibility.'"
R.G., 217 N.J. at 554 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 280 (2007)).
The scope of an appellate court's review of the trial court's
decision to terminate parental rights is limited. R.G., 217 N.J.
at 552. "[T]he trial court's factual findings should be upheld
when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence."
Ibid. "Concomitantly, reviewing courts should defer to the trial
court's credibility determinations." Ibid. "Moreover, by virtue
of its specific jurisdiction, the Family Part 'possess[es] special
expertise in the field of domestic relations' and thus 'appellate
courts should accord deference to [F]amily [Part] factfinding.'"
6 A-2816-16T3
Id. at 553 (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998)).
However, "'[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the
legal consequences that flow from established facts are not
entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 552 (quoting Manalapan
Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Here, the Division presented overwhelming evidence
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination
of defendant's parental rights over Zoe is warranted under the
standard codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The expert witnesses
presented by the Division testified that despite the services
provided to Maureen, she was still not capable of providing a safe
parenting environment for Zoe. These witnesses also testified
that Zoe has closely bonded to her resource parent; severing this
relationship would cause severe and enduring emotional and
psychological harm to the child. Finally, the record supports
Judge Katz's finding that termination of parental rights would not
do more harm than good.
Affirmed.
7 A-2816-16T3