NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4598-16T3
DEIRDRE K. HARTMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
COMMISSION (PERC), and
P. KELLY HATFIELD, Individually
and in her official capacity as
Chair of PERC,
Defendants-Respondents.
Submitted July 9, 2018 – Decided July 20, 2018
Before Judges Carroll and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-
2534-14.
Attorneys Hartman, Chartered, attorneys for
appellant (Mark A. Gulbranson, Jr., on the
briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondents (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Kimberly Ann
Eaton, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Deirdre K. Hartman brought suit against her
employer, the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) and
its Chair, P. Kelly Hatfield.1 Pertinent to this appeal, plaintiff
asserted a claim against defendants alleging disparate pay based
on gender discrimination in violation of the Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Specifically,
plaintiff contended that in her capacity as Co-Deputy Director of
PERC's Unfair Practices Section (UPR), she was paid less for the
same work than her male Co-Deputy Director, Jonathan Roth.
In Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 96 (1990),
our Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether two female
employees suffered unlawful discrimination when they received
lower wages than male employees performing comparable work. The
Court held that a female complainant can establish a prima facie
case of pay discrimination under the LAD if she "can demonstrate
that unequal pay was given for the performance of work that is
substantially equal to that performed by male employees." Id. at
110. In such instances, "the burden [then] shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that the difference in pay was justified." Id. at
102.
[O]nce a prima facie case has been
established, a defendant must establish by
1
The State of New Jersey was also named as a defendant in
plaintiff's complaint.
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preponderance of evidence one of four
affirmative defenses in order to avoid
liability. It must prove that the wage
disparity is the result of (i) a seniority
system, (ii) a merit system, (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production, or (iv) a differential based
on any factor other than sex.
[Ibid. (internal citation omitted).]
In the present case, after discovery was complete, both
plaintiff and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On
June 9, 2017, Judge Kay Walcott-Henderson conducted oral argument,
rendered a cogent oral opinion, and granted summary judgment to
defendants. Citing Grigoletti, the judge agreed with defendants
that plaintiff "failed to make a prima facie case of gender
discrimination because plaintiff and Roth did not perform
substantially equal work." Consequently, defendants were not
required to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
pay disparity.
The judge found that Roth's compensation was based on his
Civil Service position of Hearing Examiner (HE) 1, which was a
higher Civil Service position and entailed different duties than
the Public Employment Relations Specialist (PERS) 1 position held
by plaintiff. The judge also found it undisputed that Roth and
another male employee "did not receive promotions or pay raises
when appointed to the position of Deputy Director." Finally, the
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judge rejected as "inadmissible hearsay" plaintiff's contention
that other Deputy Directors were paid a salary commensurate with
that of the HE 1 Civil Service position even though they lacked
the HE 1 job title.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in
dismissing her complaint and granting summary judgment to
defendants. Specifically, plaintiff contends the court erred in
finding she failed to establish a prima facie case of wage
discrimination as a matter of law. Plaintiff further contends
none of the four affirmative defenses identified in Grigoletti
apply so as to insulate defendants from liability under the LAD.
We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de
novo, employing the same legal standard as the trial court.
Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015) (citing Davis v.
Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014)). Like the
trial court, we consider whether "the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520,
540 (1995).
We have carefully reviewed plaintiff's contentions and the
controlling legal principles and affirm substantially for the
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reasons expressed by Judge Walcott-Henderson in her June 9, 2017
oral opinion.
Affirmed.
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