NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0167-17T4
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND
SOCIETY, FSB, d/b/a
CHRISTIANA TRUST, not in
its individual capacity
but solely as trustee for
BCAT 2015-13ATT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANDREW J. CHOE,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MRS. ANDREW J. CHOE, his wife;
PARK PLACE AT PALISADES PARK
PHASE II CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION; PNC BANK,
SUCCESSOR TO MIDLANTIC
COMMERCIAL LEASING
CORPORATION; and JALBERT
PRODUCTIONS INC.,
Defendants.
_______________________________
Submitted June 6, 2018 – Decided June 28, 2018
Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
F-011349-16.
Park & Kim, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Kyungjoo Park, on the brief).
Knuckles Komosinski & Manfro LLP, attorneys
for respondent (John E. Brigandi, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Andrew Choe appeals from a March 17, 2017 order
denying his motion to vacate default and an August 1, 2017 final
judgment of foreclosure. We affirm.
We glean the following facts from the record. On December
21, 2006, defendant executed a promissory note and a purchase
money mortgage in the amount of $368,500 to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
securing a residential condominium unit located in Palisades Park,
New Jersey (the Property). The mortgage was assigned to Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation by assignment dated November 9,
2009, and recorded February 1, 2010. The mortgage was subsequently
assigned to Wells Fargo, N.A. by assignment dated July 21, 2105,
and recorded September 25, 2015. The mortgage was ultimately
assigned to plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, d/b/a
Christiana Trust, not in its individual capacity but solely as
Trustee for BCAT 2015-13ATT, by assignment dated August 7, 2015,
and recorded November 16, 2015.
2 A-0167-17T4
Defendant defaulted on his monthly payment obligations due
under the note and mortgage in August 2009. After conducting a
title search of the property in November 2015, plaintiff served
defendant with a Notice of Intent to Foreclose by certified mail
on February 17, 2016. Defendant failed to cure the default and
plaintiff instituted this action on April 22, 2016.
Plaintiff attempted to personally serve defendant at the
Property address on April 28, 2016, but a male tenant informed the
process server that defendant does not reside at the Property.
The tenant refused to provide any additional information regarding
defendant's whereabouts. Having failed to personally serve
defendant, plaintiff conducted a diligent inquiry to locate
plaintiff, which included a search of postal records, tax records,
voter registration records, and Department of Motor Vehicles
records. Those searches all indicated plaintiff resided at the
Property address.
On June 23, 2017, plaintiff filed a certification of non-
military service with the court, indicating defendant was not on
active duty service. Since no additional addresses were found for
defendant, plaintiff effectuated service by publication on July
7, 2016. Defendant failed to answer the complaint or file a
responsive pleading. On August 16, 2017, plaintiff filed a
certification of inquiry with the court, outlining the efforts
3 A-0167-17T4
made to locate defendant and stating defendant was unable to be
located for purposes of service.
On August 25, 2016, plaintiff filed a request to enter default
against defendant. On September 14, 2016, plaintiff sent a copy
of the request for default to the Property addressed to defendant.
On the same date, plaintiff sent a copy of the "Notice of Entry
of Final Judgment 'Notice to Cure'" letter to the Property address
via regular and certified mail. The court subsequently entered
default.
On January 26, 2017, plaintiff moved for entry of final
judgement. A copy of the moving papers was sent to defendant at
the Property address via regular and certified mail. Defendant
filed an appearance and opposition to the motion. Shortly
thereafter, defendant moved to vacate default. Plaintiff opposed
the motion.
The trial court denied defendant's motion on March 17, 2017.
In its written statement of reasons, the trial court stated:
A default may be set aside upon the
movant's showing of good cause. R. 4:43-3.
The [c]ourt is required to view an application
to vacate a default with great liberality.
See, e.g., DYFS v. P.W.R., 410 N.J. Super.
501, 508 (App. Div. 2009), rev'd on other
grounds, 205 N.J. 17 (2011). A finding of
good cause under [Rule] 4:43 requires the
[c]ourt to exercise sound discretion in light
of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. See O'Connor v. Abraham
4 A-0167-17T4
Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 129 (1975). However, when
the defendant takes no action to respond to
the foreclosure complaint and where the record
reflects no excuse for the defendant's
inaction, the [c]ourt will not grant relief
from an entry of default. US Nat. Ass'n v.
Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 469 (2012).
Also, before entry of default is set
aside, the defendant must, at the very least,
show the presence of a meritorious defense
worthy of judicial consideration. Local 478
v. Baron Holding Corp., 224 N.J. Super. 485,
489 (App. Div. 1988). "The requirement for
establishing a meritorious defense is
especially applicable in foreclosure cases."
Wells Fargo Bank[, N.A.] v. Wharwood, [No. A-
0135-14 (App. Div. Feb. 18, 2016) (slip. op.
at 5)]. Thus, a party's motion to vacate a
default must be accompanied by either an
answer to the complaint and Case Information
Statement or a dispositive motion pursuant to
[Rule] 4:6-2. R. 4:43-3.
Here, [d]efendant claims that he was
unaware of the foreclosure action against him,
because he never received the summons and
complaint and never received a notice of
intention to foreclose. However, [d]efendant
signed the certified green card accepting
receipt of the notice of intention to
foreclose. Also, when the process server
attempted to personally serve [d]efendant at
the mortgaged address, an individual at the
property informed the process server that
[d]efendant did not reside there and did not
provide any further information regarding
[d]efendant's residence. After conducting a
diligent inquiry with the motor vehicle
commission and the postmaster, [p]laintiff
could not find another address for [d]efendant
and thus served [d]efendant via publication.
Further, [d]efendant signed for the certified
mailing enclosing [p]laintiff's 14[-]day
letters at the mortgaged address prior to
5 A-0167-17T4
commencement, and [d]efendant did not deny
receipt of [p]laintiff's motion for final
judgment which was also sent to the mortgaged
address. Finally, [d]efendant has been in
default under the terms of his note and
mortgage since August 1, 2009. Thus, the
[c]ourt cannot accept that [d]efendant was
unaware of the instant foreclosure action.
Also, [d]efendant has failed to present
any meritorious defense. The only material
issues in a foreclosure proceeding are the
validity of the mortgage, the amount of
indebtedness, and the right of the mortgagee
to foreclose on the mortgaged property. Great
Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394
(Ch. Div. 1993). Also, [p]laintiff has
demonstrated standing as either possession of
the note or assignment of the mortgage
predating the complaint confers standing.
Deutsche Bank [Trust Co. Am.] v. Angeles, 428
N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2012). Here,
[p]laintiff has possession of the note and an
assignment predating the complaint. Thus,
[d]efendant fails to challenge any essential
element of [p]laintiff's right to foreclose.
On July 24, 2017, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion
to enter judgment. In its written statement of reasons, the trial
court found plaintiff submitted appropriate business records and
invoices to support its calculations of the amounts due, thereby
complying with Rule 4:64-2. As to the interest charged, defendant
contended plaintiff understated the amount of interest he owed by
$2355.74. Similarly, defendant contended plaintiff understated
the amount of late charges he owed. The trial court indicated it
6 A-0167-17T4
would not increase the amount of interest and late charges due
beyond the amounts set forth in plaintiff's proofs.
Defendant also contended plaintiff did not adequately support
the amount of real estate taxes and inspection fees claimed due.
The trial court rejected this argument, observing:
Defendant does not state what [d]efendants
believe that the amount due should be. Thus
[d]efendants fail to make a specific objection
to any of the amounts asserted as required
under [Rule] 4:64-9 nor have [d]efendants
supported the objections with any proof.
Defendants have only questioned the adequacy
of [p]laintiff's proofs. As [d]efendants did
not file any opposing proofs concerning the
amount due, [p]laintiff's calculations are
uncontested.
The Office of Foreclosure denied entry of judgment due to the
improper inclusion of a superior lien holder as a defendant. On
June 23, 2017, plaintiff re-filed its motion for entry of final
judgment, correcting the deficiency raised by the Office of
Foreclosure. Once again, defendant opposed the motion. On July
24, 2017, the trial court rejected defendant's objections, granted
the motion, and transferred the case to the Office of Foreclosure
as an uncontested matter. Final judgment was entered on August
1, 2017. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
STANDARD OF REVIEW: ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
7 A-0167-17T4
POINT II
THE CAUSE OF DELAY AND RESPONDING WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME SHOWN BY THE DEFENDANT WELL
QUALIFIES FOR EXCUSABLE NEGLECTS.
POINT III
AMPLE MERITORIOUS DEFENSES WERE SHOWN BY
DEFENDANTS: MERITORIUS DEFENSES DO NOT NEED
TO BE STRONG.
A. Defective service of process.
B. Fraudulent title search before
filing complaint warrants the
dismissal of complaint and sanction
against Plaintiff, its attorneys,
and its employees.
C. Amount Due Schedule for final
judgment is erroneous and
unsupportive enough to vacate the
judgment.
POINT IV
TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DISREGARDING EXCUSABLE NEGLECTS AND ARGUABLE
MERITORIOUS DEFENSES; THEREBY UNJUST,
OPPRESSIVE OR INEQUITABLE RESULTS WERE
SUBSTANTIATED.
We have carefully considered defendant's arguments in light
of the record and applicable legal standards and find them
unpersuasive. We affirm the denial of defendant's motion to vacate
default and the entry of final judgment substantially for the
reasons expressed by the trial court in its written decisions. We
add the following comments.
8 A-0167-17T4
Defendant received notice of the proceedings in this matter
consistent with due process. Notices were sent to the Property.
Plaintiff undertook diligent inquiry in an effort to ascertain
defendant's address in accordance with Rule 4:4-5. Plaintiff
accomplished service of process by publication in compliance with
Rule 4:4-5(a)(3).
The record also establishes plaintiff obtained a title search
of the Property before filing this action. The title search is
dated November 12, 2015. The complaint was filed on April 22,
2016.
As to defendant's objections to the amounts claimed due for
interest, late fees, realty taxes, and inspection fees, plaintiff
supplied all of the required documents at the time it filed its
motion pursuant to Rule 4:64-2, including an affidavit of amount
due with an attached schedule detailing those amounts. Defendant
did not provide any conflicting proof as to the amount of realty
taxes and inspection fees advanced by plaintiff. In light of the
substantial documentation supporting plaintiff's motion for entry
of judgment, we conclude that defendant's objection to the amount
claimed due for realty taxes and inspection fees lacks the
requisite specificity required by Rule 4:64-1(d)(3). See also
Mony Life Ins. Co. v. Paramus Parkway Bldg., Ltd., 364 N.J. Super.
92, 106 (App. Div. 2003) (concluding that no hearing was warranted
9 A-0167-17T4
where defendant failed to offer conflicting proof or establish a
contested fact to be resolved). Accordingly, no further
proceedings were required as to this issue.
Defendant also contends the amount claimed due for interest
is understated by more than by more than $13,000, and the amount
claimed due for late fees is understated because late fees were
assessed for only forty months, not the eighty-two months since
the default date. The judge imposed the lower amounts claimed due
by plaintiff. Consequently, the alleged error in the amount of
unpaid interest and late fees was harmless and to defendant's
benefit by reducing the redemption amount and the amount
potentially due in a subsequent deficiency action. A judgment
should not be set aside for harmless error. See Pellicer ex rel.
Pellicer v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 55 (2009) (recognizing
"even a large number of errors, if inconsequential, may not operate
to create an injustice" requiring a judgment to be set aside);
Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 412 (1994) (declining
to order a new trial in a civil case where the trial court's errors
were not shown to be harmful).
The record supports the trial court's finding that defendant
did not establish excusable neglect and did not present any
meritorious defense. We discern no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in denying defendant's motion to vacate default.
10 A-0167-17T4
Defendant's remaining arguments are of insufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
11 A-0167-17T4
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, ETC. VS. ANDREW J. CHOE (F-011349-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
Combined Opinion