RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1391-16T2
A.K.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C.K.,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________________
Argued June 5, 2018 – Decided June 19, 2018
Before Judges Fisher and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen
County, Docket No. FD-02-0173-16.
A.K. argued the cause pro se.
Angelo Sarno argued the cause for respondent
(Snyder Sarno D'Aniello Maceri Da Costa LLC,
attorneys; Angelo Sarno, of counsel and on the
brief; Lydia S. LaTona, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The parties brief marriage produced one child, Sylvia, 1 who
was born in July 2015. The month after the child was born,
plaintiff A.K. (Adam) filed this action seeking custody and
parenting time. Defendant C.K. (Carol) filed a counterclaim,
seeking sole legal custody, supervised parenting time for Adam,
and child support. Orders entered soon thereafter provided for
supervised parenting time and required mediation. A custody and
parenting-time evaluation was conducted by the Bergen Family
Center, and a plenary hearing was conducted over the course of
three days in April 2016. The trial judge rendered her oral
decision on May 3, 2016, and entered an order two days later that
granted Carol temporary sole legal custody and residential custody
of Sylvia; Adam was permitted supervised parenting time twice a
week and ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation. He was
also ordered to cease videotaping parenting exchanges.
A June 17, 2016 order appointed a supervisor of Adam's
parenting time. Four days later, plaintiff moved for modification
of the May 5 order to allow for joint custody and parenting time
or, alternatively, to allow plaintiff to bring evaluators and
therapists to supervised parenting time. As part of his
application, Adam sought the opportunity to elicit "new evidence
1
The names of the parties and their child used in this opinion
are fictitious.
2 A-1391-16T2
related to recent and past events in which [Carol] committed
blatant perjury on the witness stand during the previous plenary
hearing." On August 5, 2016, Adam filed another motion by which
he sought "full custody" based on his claim that Carol "is losing
touch with reality and will not show any co-parenting ability
going forward." These motions were denied on October 26, 2016, the
judge holding that Adam failed to demonstrate a substantial change
in circumstances since entry of the May 5 order.
Adam appeals the October 26 order,2 arguing:
I. THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY FAILING
TO FIND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS TO
WARRANT MODIFICATION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT REPORTS
PREVIOUSLY ORDERED ON MAY 3, 2016.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
PREJUDICING FUTURE APPLICATIONS BY NOT
ENTERING A FINAL ORDER ON EXISTING APPLICATION
BY DEFENDANT FOR COUNSEL FEES.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CEDED ITS RESPONSIBILITY
BY ABDICATING DECISION-MAKING TO A PREVIOUS
EVALUATOR OVER THE PREVIOUS JUDGE'S RULING
WHICH DID NOT CHOOSE TO ADOPT RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING [ONE-]YEAR WAITING PERIOD TO REMAIN
SUPERVISED PRIOR TO APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFF
TO COURT, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ERROR BY THE
COURT.
2
To the extent it may colorably be argued that finality had not
been achieved regarding the issues presented as of that time, we
grant leave to appeal out of time in order to resolve these fully
submitted issues.
3 A-1391-16T2
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENFORCE
EXISTING ORDERS OR ADDRESS OTHER ITEMS ON THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION.
We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Although it
may be that Adam made progress on the issues that prompted the May
5 order, we find no abuse of discretion in the judge's
determination that there had yet to be a "substantial" change in
the circumstances between the entry of that order and the June 21
modification motion.
Affirmed.
4 A-1391-16T2