STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. STEVEN MCCOY (10-01-0066 AND 10-02-0153, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5366-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STEVEN MCCOY, a/k/a KUKO, K, AMOS
CRUDUP, QUAADIR CRUDUP, STEVEN
G. MCCOY, QUAADIR ROYAL, and RED,

Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________

Submitted May 23, 2018 — Decided June 12, 2018

Before Judges Koblitz and Manahan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment Nos.
10-01-0066 and 10-02-0153.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Kevin G. Brynes, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).

Camelia A. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Christopher W. Hsieh,
Chief Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Steven McCoy appeals from the July 19, 2017 order

denying his application for post-conviction relief (PCR) without
an evidentiary hearing. Defendant pled guilty in connection with

two early morning shootings five days apart in 2009. Both victims

were seated in a car when shot. Although originally charged with

murder and attempted murder, he pled guilty to first-degree

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), and second-degree

aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). He received the

maximum sentence permissible under the plea agreement: an

aggregate sentence of thirty years subject to an 85% parole

disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

7.2. Defendant argues that his defense attorney was ineffective

by not arguing thoroughly in mitigation at sentencing, not

providing defendant with the discovery and not negotiating a more

favorable plea agreement. We affirm substantially for the thorough

and well-substantiated reasons placed on the record by Presiding

Judge Marilyn C. Clark on July 19, 2017.

After defendant was sentenced, he appealed the length of the

sentence. We affirmed by order on September 28, 2012.1 In this

appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I: THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS
GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, PAR.
10 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.

1
We heard the matter at a sentence only argument panel pursuant
to Rule 2:9-11.

2 A-5366-16T1
 A. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE
FACTS AND PROVIDE DISCOVERY TO THE DEFENDANT,
THEREBY DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE.

B. THE PLEA AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID BECAUSE
THE DEFENDANT WAS PRESSURED BY TRIAL COUNSEL
TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT HAVING
SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE FACTS OF HIS
CASE.

C. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO MAKE A COMPLETE
SENTENCING ARGUMENT AND RECORD, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THE COURT OF INFORMATION RELEVANT
TO THE SENTENCING DECISION.

POINT II: THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the

federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,

459 (1992). Under Rule 3:22-2(a), a criminal defendant is entitled

to post-conviction relief if there was a "[s]ubstantial denial in

the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the

Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of

the State of New Jersey . . . ." "A petitioner must establish the

right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence."

Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459 (citations omitted). "To sustain that

burden, specific facts" that "provide the court with an adequate

basis on which to rest its decision" must be articulated. State

v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

3 A-5366-16T1
 Claims of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel

are well-suited for post-conviction review. See R. 3:22-4(a)(2);

Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460. In determining whether a defendant is

entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of

counsel, New Jersey courts apply the two-prong test articulated

by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 658-60 (1984). Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463; see State v. Fritz,

105 N.J. 42, 49-50 (1987).

Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a "defendant

must show that counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. Under the second prong, a defendant must

demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different." Id. at 694.

Defendant acknowledged under oath at his guilty plea hearing

that his defense lawyer had reviewed the "State's evidence" with

him. He also expressed his satisfaction with counsel. As Judge

Clark noted, at the age of thirty-three, defendant has already

accumulated an extensive criminal record.

Defense counsel mentioned defendant's four children in his

sentencing argument. In spite of defense counsel's efforts, the

sentencing court found no mitigating factors and three aggravating

4 A-5366-16T1
factors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1. Judge Clark further discussed how

defendant's claim that he shot the victims out of fear due to gang

involvement was not a mitigating factor, nor would it have changed

the sentence imposed. A PCR evidentiary hearing was not necessary

under these circumstances. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462 (holding

evidentiary hearings are necessary only "if a defendant has

presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction

belief").

Affirmed.

5 A-5366-16T1