NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3595-16T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRANDON C. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted May 24, 2018 – Decided June 12, 2018
Before Judges Reisner and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment No.
09-04-0733.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Janet A. Allegro, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella,
Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Shiraz
Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Brandon C. Jackson appeals from a November 30, 2016
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We
affirm.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of the following offenses:
second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-
degree aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(7); two counts of third-degree aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); two counts of third-
degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). After merger, the trial court sentenced
defendant to a term of eight years in prison, subject to the No
Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for second-degree
aggravated assault on one victim, and a consecutive term of four
years, two years to be served without parole, for third-degree
aggravated assault on a second victim.
We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct
appeal. State v. Jackson, No. A-0503-12 (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2015).
Defendant then filed a PCR petition asserting multiple claims,
including an assertion that his trial attorney failed to interview
witnesses and failed to effectively negotiate a plea agreement.
In an oral opinion issued on November 30, 2016, Judge James M.
Blaney rejected all of defendant's PCR arguments. He noted that
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some of the arguments were bald assertions, with no certifications
to support them, some were barred because they were already raised
and decided on direct appeal, R. 3:22-5, and others were barred
because they could have been raised on direct appeal, R. 3:22-4.
On this appeal, defendant raises only one of his PCR claims,
in the following point:
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT
HE FAILED TO RECEIVE EFFECTIVE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION.
(A) THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ARISING OUT OF
EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND PETITIONS
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.
POINT II: TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
INTERVIEW DEFENSE WITNESSES PRIOR TO TRIAL
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
We affirm for the reasons stated in Judge Blaney's opinion,
adding only the following comments. To establish a prima facie
case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must present
legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions." See
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
Defendant did not meet that standard here. He did not provide
certifications from any witnesses whom he claimed his attorney
should have interviewed sooner. Moreover, the one witness named
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in defendant's appellate brief – Chase Ruggiero – testified at the
trial. It is clear from the transcript of the first day of trial,
March 6, 2012, that defense counsel already knew the gist of
Ruggiero's possible trial testimony, because Ruggiero had
testified before the grand jury. Defense counsel had the grand
jury transcript and described the testimony on the record, in
defendant's presence.
Further, in his PCR petition, defendant did not certify that
he would have accepted a plea bargain, had he known sooner what
Ruggiero, or any other witness, was likely to say in trial
testimony. And the record would not support such a claim. On
March 6, 2012, the trial judge gave defendant one last chance to
accept a plea bargain, after defendant heard his attorney's
description of Ruggiero's grand jury testimony and the
prosecutor's description of the State's evidence.
In summary, defendant did not present a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance and was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).
Affirmed.
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