NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5049-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.R.W.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted May 29, 2018 – Decided June 6, 2018
Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No.
15-11-1243.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Tamer Lerer, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Laura Sunyak,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the October 24, 2016 Law Division
order denying her appeal of the denial of her pre-trial
intervention (PTI) program application. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 and
R. 3:28. We affirm.
I
In July 2015, defendant, then age nineteen, admitted to police
that she violently killed the family dog. The night before, she
"went to bed with an 'impulse' to kill the [dog]." The following
morning, she gave the dog oxycodone, which made him lethargic but
did not kill him. Several hours later, she bludgeoned the dog's
head with a shovel, and, when that proved unsuccessful, she
repeatedly struck his head with a hammer until he died. She
initially hid the dog in a refrigerator, but buried him a day
later with assistance from a friend.
Defendant told police that she "had impulses . . . to
hurt/kill someone" but probably would not act on them because she
felt guilty about killing the dog. She added that "part of the
thrill" of the crime was "being able to perform the act, clean the
crime scene, and get away with it" before her father returned home
from work. She stated that "she wanted to be famous and listed
names of serial killers she wished to be like." After her arrest,
she was involuntarily committed after a crisis team determined
that she was a threat to herself and others.
Defendant was indicted on charges of third-degree animal
cruelty, third- and fourth-degree weapons possession, and fourth-
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degree evidence tampering. Thereafter, she sought admission into
the PTI program.
During her interview, she told probation that she killed the
dog during a "psychotic episode" when she "was mentally ill and
using drugs instead of her prescribed medications." Her
psychiatric history before the offense included multiple inpatient
hospitalizations and two suicide attempts. After the offense, she
was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and gender
identity disorder and hospitalized at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital
for two months. Upon discharge to the county jail, she was placed
in solitary confinement because she reportedly "fear[ed] she
w[ould] kill other inmates in her sleep."
The program director recommended enrollment into PTI, noting
that the crime was defendant's first offense, and that a
"combination of her mental health problems, drug use, and hormone
treatments may have contributed to the behavior." In August 2016,
the prosecutor rejected defendant's PTI application. The
prosecutor's statement of reasons reflects consideration of her
individual circumstances, including her age, education, employment
history, substance abuse and mental health history, physical
health, and the "heinous" nature of her first offense. The
prosecutor emphasized that defendant "suffers from a variety of
physical and mental health ailments that require intensive levels
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of management and treatment" and has substance abuse issues "that
would likely also require intensive levels of treatment to cure."
Defendant appealed, contending "[t]he apparent heinousness
of the crime has clouded the State's objective analysis of the
case," and the prosecutor "failed to consider all of the relevant
factors" and "considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors,"
which "amounted to a clear error in judgment." She stressed
difficult life circumstances culminating in "a temporary psychotic
break" during which she committed the crime. She highlighted her
compliance with mental health treatment and stability since the
incident, along with her "genuine remorse."
On October 24, 2016, the court denied defendant's appeal. It
found that "the State thoroughly considered the relevant factors"
and was "not required to interpret the relevant factors in the
same manner the defendant would as long as it does not clearly err
in judgment." It held that defendant failed to demonstrate that
the State patently and grossly abused its discretion in any way.
Subsequently, defendant pled guilty to one amended count of
fourth-degree animal cruelty and the remaining charges were
dismissed. The court sentenced her to probation for two years.
This appeal followed.
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II
Defendant contends, as she did in the Law Division, that the
denial of her PTI application constituted a patent and gross abuse
of discretion because the State: (1) failed to consider all
relevant factors; (2) "considered her mental health issues in an
inappropriate manner"; and (3) committed "a clear error in
judgment" by denying PTI "given that [defendant] was in the throes
of a mental health crisis when she committed th[e] offense."
Initially, a reviewing court "must presume that all relevant
factors were considered and weighed prior to a prosecutorial veto"
until a defendant proves otherwise. State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84,
94 (1979). That said, "the statement of reasons must demonstrate
that the prosecutor has carefully considered the facts in light
of the relevant law." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 584 (1996).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the required presumption
coupled with the statement of reasons in this case supports the
trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor considered all
relevant factors and made a proper individualized assessment of
defendant's circumstances. She simply disagrees with the end
result, and that alone is insufficient to warrant reversal.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor should have
weighed her significant mental health history as favoring
admission into PTI instead of rejection. However, as the trial
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court correctly concluded, the law does not require the prosecutor
to consider a statutory factor in the manner that defendant would
prefer it to be considered. Indeed, it requires only that the
prosecutor give due consideration to each statutory factor, and
that was done here. See id. at 585-86 ("Notably, nowhere does the
statute attempt to instruct the prosecutor on the relative weight
to be assigned these several criteria. . . . [I]t clearly intended
to leave the weighing process to the prosecutor . . . ."). Again,
defendant's contention is unavailing, as her disagreement with the
prosecutor's decision fails to establish that a patent and gross
abuse of discretion occurred. Because defendant failed to meet
the heavy burden required to prove any of her contentions under
Bender, 80 N.J. at 93, we are constrained to affirm. Any arguments
not specifically addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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