NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4930-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALEXANDER M. ANTONIADES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided June 6, 2018
Before Judges Koblitz and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Sussex County, Indictment No.
10-01-0022.
Wilentz, Goldman and Spitzer, PA, attorneys
for appellant (Darren M. Gelber, of counsel
and on the brief).
Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Gregory R. Mueller,
First Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Alexander M. Antoniades appeals from the June 15,
2017 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)
without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant argues his lawyer should
have presented evidence of his extensive psychiatric history in
mitigation of the sentence. Although we agree this may have been
preferable, we accept the sentencing judge's evaluation that it
would not have affected the sentence imposed for aggravated
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4. We affirm.
Defendant was originally charged with murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1) or (2), as well as numerous drug-related charges. In
exchange for his plea of guilty to aggravated manslaughter, all
other charges were dismissed, the State agreed not seek an extended
term and a sentence on a violation of probation on an unrelated
charge was to run concurrent. Although the State indicated it
would seek a thirty-year sentence, defendant was permitted to
argue for a lesser term.
Defendant admitted he stabbed his girlfriend twice with a
knife in her apartment in March 2009. He stole her possessions.
Two days after the killing, defendant called the police to report
a murder and initially denied his involvement. Two of the victim's
friends reported that defendant told them she died of a drug
overdose. Defendant had previously been convicted of a federal
bank robbery and possession of drugs. Defendant was forty-eight
years old and the victim was twenty-seven years old.
Defendant was sentenced to thirty years in prison with an
eighty percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release
2 A-4930-16T3
Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We affirmed his appeal, which raised an
excessive sentence argument only, by order dated December 10,
2012.1
On this appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I: COUNSEL RENDERED CONSTITUTIONALLY
INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION BY FAILING TO
APPROPRIATELY PRESENT AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF A MITIGATION OF SENTENCE ARGUMENT.
"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the
federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,
459 (1992). Under Rule 3:22-2(a), a criminal defendant is entitled
to post-conviction relief if there was a "[s]ubstantial denial in
the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
the State of New Jersey . . . ." "A petitioner must establish the
right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence."
Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459 (citations omitted). "To sustain that
burden, specific facts" that "provide the court with an adequate
basis on which to rest its decision" must be articulated. State
v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).
Claims of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
are well suited for post-conviction review. See R. 3:22-4(a)(2);
1
The matter was heard at a sentence only argument panel, Rule
2:9-11.
3 A-4930-16T3
Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460. In determining whether a defendant is
entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, New Jersey courts apply the two-prong test articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 658-60 (1984). Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463; see State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 49-50 (1987).
Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a "defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687. Under the second prong, a defendant must
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Id. at 694.
Privately-retained defense counsel submitted a ten-page pre-
sentencing memorandum seeking a ten-year sentence, the minimum
under the plea agreement. Although acknowledging defendant's
prior criminal history, counsel argued that this killing was
"aberrant conduct" due to his unfortunate childhood that created
a "mentally unbalanced and drug-addled individual" who had a
"troubled mind." Defendant claimed that the victim wanted to
commit suicide due to her addiction and he killed her because he
thought she could not get into heaven if she killed herself.
Counsel attached four letters from family and a friend attesting
4 A-4930-16T3
to defendant's non-violent past, as well as a letter from
defendant. The State at sentencing presented the judge with a
copy of the autopsy report indicating the victim fought back and
was beaten as well as stabbed.
Counsel argued the following statutory mitigating factors
applied: (3) he acted under a strong provocation; (4) grounds
existed to justify his behavior; (8) it was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur; and (11) imprisonment would
entail excessive hardship due to defendant's "advanced liver
disease." See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 (b). The sentencing judge found
defendant to be remorseful, but found no mitigating factors. On
the judgment of conviction the judge noted that defendant was on
various medications including "Respital (hearing voices)" and
"Pax[i]l (depression)."
At the PCR hearing, which took place before the sentencing
judge, defendant produced voluminous documents supporting the
argument that he had a lengthy history of serious psychiatric
disorders. The judge noted that he had been aware that defendant
told the police when questioned that he suffered from bipolar
disorder. At sentencing, defense counsel had also brought out in
his lengthy oration that defendant suffered from many "physical
and mental afflictions." He spoke of defendant's "mental
5 A-4930-16T3
instability," apart from his drug abuse, when urging the judge to
find mitigating factor (4).
At the PCR hearing, defendant submitted a report from a
psychiatrist who reviewed defendant's medical records. The
psychiatrist noted defendant's psychiatric disorders, including
bipolar disorder and depression, as documented in the records,
beginning in 2000. The doctor diagnosed defendant as suffering
from "[c]hronic [s]evere [b]ipolar [d]isorder with predominant
symptoms of chronic depression and episodic symptoms of psychotic
auditory hallucinations." He was also suffering from
polysubstance abuse and chronic adjustment disorder of adult life.
He determined through a "retrospective review of records" that
defendant had a "severe and debilitating psychiatric affliction."
The judge found that had this detailed psychiatric material
been presented to him at sentencing, his decision would not have
changed. The judge agreed that defense counsel perhaps should
have submitted a psychiatric report, but noted that defendant's
undisputed condition did not change the judge's analysis of the
mitigating and aggravating factors. The judge pointed to specific
references defense counsel made to defendant's psychiatric
conditions at sentencing.
The judge concluded that even if defendant had proven the
first prong of the Strickland test, that defense counsel's
6 A-4930-16T3
presentation was defective, defendant failed under the second
prong. The psychiatric report and records would not have changed
the judge's findings or sentencing decision. We respect the care
the judge took to review and analyze defendant's PCR presentation
and agree that defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his right
to effective representation.
Affirmed.
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