J-S31025-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOPHER RICHARDSON
Appellant No. 1598 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered October 17, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0009495-2014
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and McLAUGHLIN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2019
Christopher Richardson (“Richardson”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on October 17, 2018 in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County. Richardson contends the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing a sentence of ten to twenty years’ incarceration following
Richardson’s entry of an open guilty plea for third-degree murder,
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). Upong review, we affirm.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:
On July 5, 2014, [Richardson] was charged with one count of
criminal homicide under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a) and one count of
robbery, inflicting serious bodily injury, under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3701(a)(1)(i). On February 21, 2017, pursuant to a plea
agreement, the Commonwealth amended the general criminal
homicide charge to third degree murder (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c))
and withdrew the count of robbery. [Richardson] entered a plea
of guilty to the sole count of third degree murder. A pre-sentence
report was ordered. On May 15, 2017, [Richardson] was
J-S31025-19
sentenced to serve ten (10) years to twenty (20) years in a state
correctional institution with 1,045 days of credit for time served.
[Richardson] filed an appeal from that order of sentence on July
28, 2017. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ultimately reversed
and remanded this matter for resentencing on the basis that this
court did not state on the record whether [Richardson] was RRRI
eligible.
On October 17, 2018, this court re-sentenced [Richardson] to
serve ten (10) to twenty (20) years in a state correctional
institution, found that he was not RRRI eligible, and gave him
credit for time served in the amount of 1,566 days. [Richardson]
filed post-sentence motions, which were denied.
[Richardson] timely filed his notice of appeal on November 9,
2018. On December 4, 2018, [Richardson] filed his concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal wherein he raised the
following issue: the trial court abused its sentencing discretion
because it failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including
the protection of the public, the gravity of the underlying offense,
and the character, personal history, and rehabilitative needs of
[Richardson] as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9721(b).
Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/18, at 1-2 (some capitalization omitted).
At Richardson’s guilty plea hearing the parties stipulated to the following
facts:
On July 5, 2014, at approximately 11 a.m., [Richardson] called
911 from the Sunoco located on 533 Brookline Boulevard. He told
the dispatcher that the person he was living with at the time, Alan
Krupitzer, the victim in this case, who was age 75, was either
stabbed or shot and appeared to be dead.
Officers responded to the Sunoco and made contact with
[Richardson]. [Richardson] took the police to 2329 Pioneer
Avenue, where the [Richardson] was staying with Krupitzer, and
told the police that Krupitzer was on the ground bleeding but that
he didn't know what happened to him.
Medics arrived on the scene and pronounced Krupitzer dead at
11:16 a.m. [Richardson] was then transported to Pittsburgh
-2-
J-S31025-19
police headquarters, where he waived his Miranda rights and
agreed to provide a statement.
Initially [Richardson] denied having any involvement in the death
of Krupitzer but then admitted that he had asked Krupitzer for
money so he could buy himself some beer.
[Richardson] further stated that when Krupitzer denied having any
money, that he had checked Krupitzer’s pockets for money and
Krupitzer pushed him away. [Richardson] then stated that he got
a knife and stabbed Krupitzer multiple times in the stomach and
the heart.
An autopsy was performed on the body of Alan Krupitzer. The
autopsy revealed multiple sharp force injuries of the trunk, to
include a stab wound to the shoulder, two stab wounds to the
chest and three stab wounds to the back. The cause of death was
determined to be multiple stab wounds of the trunk.
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Notes of Testimony, Plea Hearing, at 6-7).
As noted above, Richardson filed this appeal from the judgment of
sentence imposed on October 17, 2018 following remand from this Court.
Richardson asks us to consider one issue:
I. In again sentencing Mr. Richardson to 10-20 years’
incarceration, whether the trial court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria,
including the protection of the public, the gravity of the
underlying offense, and the character, personal history, and
rehabilitative needs of Mr. Richardson, as required by 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
As this Court recently reiterated:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the
discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may
reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on
-3-
J-S31025-19
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord
the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the
best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or
indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.
Commonwealth v. Nevel, 203 A.3d 229, 247 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted)). With respect to a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of sentence, we recognized:
“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a
sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for
permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d
1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 628 Pa. 627, 104
A.3d 1 (2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary
aspects of a sentence.” Id. We conduct this four-part test to
determine whether:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at
the time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2)
the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the
appellant set forth a concise statement of reasons relied
upon for the allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a substantial question
for our review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 679, 86 A.3d 231
(2014). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he
sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a
provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the fundamental
norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge,
77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citations
omitted), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 648, 91 A.3d 161 (2014).
-4-
J-S31025-19
Id. at 246.
The record confirms that Richardson has complied with the first three
prongs of the test. He preserved the issue by raising it in a nunc pro tunc
post-sentence motion, which the trial court entertained but denied. He filed
a timely notice of appeal and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.
As to whether he has satisfied the fourth prong, even the Commonwealth
concedes he has raised a substantial question by asserting the trial court failed
to consider relevant sentencing factors. See Commonwealth Brief at 15-16
(citing Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
Therefore, we shall consider the merits of his claim.
Here, the trial court explained that it considered the evidence presented
at Richardson’s original sentencing and resentencing hearings. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/11/18, at 4. Importantly, the trial court had the benefit of a pre-
sentence report at the time of Richardson’s original hearing. As this Court
recently restated:
Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume
that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A
presentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. In
order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of engaging
in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that sentencers
are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or
systematic definitions of their punishment procedure. Having
been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing
court’s discretion should not be disturbed.
-5-
J-S31025-19
Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988)).
“Accordingly, ‘[w]here the sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence
report, it will be presumed that he was aware of relevant information
regarding appellant’s character and weighed those considerations along with
the mitigating statutory factors.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Fullin,
892 A.2d 843, 849–50 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In support of his assertion that the trial court abused its discretion,
Richardson relies on Commonwealth v. Ruffo, 520 A.2d 43 (Pa. Super.
1987) and Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Appellant’s Brief at 42-48. However, those cases are inapposite. Specifically,
in Ruffo, we vacated the judgment of sentence because the trial court failed
to consider any factor other than the nature of the crime. Similarly, in
Coulverson, we vacated the sentence as excessive and unreasonable, finding
the trial court focused on the victim’s impact statement and the severity of
the offense.
By contrast, as the Commonwealth notes, the trial court not only had
the pre-sentence report, it also had the benefit of information about
Richardson’s history by virtue of a report from Richardson’s psychiatric expert.
Commonwealth Brief at 21. In addition, the trial court heard the testimony of
four witnesses who were Richardson’s friends or family members as well as
testimony from Richardson himself. Id. at 21-22. Moreover, Richardson’s
-6-
J-S31025-19
counsel provided information relating to Richardson’s progress while in prison
after the first sentencing hearing. As the court explained,
While it is clear to this court that [Richardson] has been
participating in programs at his state correctional institution, and
commends [Richardson] for doing so, his participation does not
mitigate the violent act he committed on July 5, 2014 to such an
extent as would warrant a below-the standard range sentence.
The sentence of ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ total confinement
is slightly below the middle of the standard range of the
guidelines. This court detailed its reasons for imposition of this
sentence in its November 7, 2017 opinion, which stated as follows:
As stated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.
Super. 2010)[,] “where a sentence is within the standard
range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the
sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.”
Moury, 992 A.2d at 171.
Based upon the testimony presented at the sentencing
hearing, the contents of the pre-sentence report, and the
expert report of Dr. Barbra Ziv, this court found that a
sentence of total confinement was necessary given
[Richardson’s] inability to control his alcoholism while not
incarcerated and the gravity of the crime [Richardson]
committed. The crime committed by [Richardson] was
particularly violent considering [Richardson] stabbed Alan
Krupitzer in the abdomen with a knife, then returned to stab
him in the heart. The sentence guidelines submitted in this
matter detail that the standard range started at ninety (90)
months and ended at two hundred forty (240) months. This
court’s sentence of one hundred twenty (120) to two
hundred forty (240) months of total confinement fall[s] in
the middle of the standard range of the guidelines. As such,
it is presumed to be appropriate.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/18, at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted).
We find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s
imposition of a standard-range sentence of ten to twenty years in prison.
Richardson has failed to establish that the trial court “ignored or misapplied
-7-
J-S31025-19
the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill
will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision” in imposing its
sentence. Nevel, 203 A.3d at 247. Therefore, we will not disturb it.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/27/2019
-8-