DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 18-AA-318
KATARINA STRAUGHN, PETITIONER,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT,
and
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, INTERVENOR.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
Compensation Review Board
(CRB-16-18)
(Submitted February 12, 2019 Decided June 11, 2019 *)
Krista N. DeSmyter and Kevin H. Stillman were on the brief for petitioner.
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L.
AliKhan, Solicitor General, and Stacy L. Anderson, Acting Deputy Solicitor General
at the time the statement was filed, filed a statement in lieu of brief for respondent.
Sarah O. Rollman and Mark H. Dho were on the brief for intervenor.
Before THOMPSON and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON,
Senior Judge.
MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Petitioner Katarina Straughn challenges an order
denying her claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
*
The decision in this case was originally issued as an unpublished
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. It is now being published upon the court’s
grant of intervenor’s motion to publish.
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I.
This case has previously been before this court. Straughn v. District of
Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 176 A.3d 125 (D.C. 2017). The following
summary of the underlying circumstances is largely taken from our earlier opinion.
In September 2014, while working for intervenor Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (WMATA), Ms. Straughn hit her right knee against a metal
beam. She sought medical treatment at a hospital that day for severe pain in her
right knee. Ms. Straughn started seeing Dr. Rida Azer in October 2014 for treatment
of her right-knee pain. Dr. Azer initially diagnosed Ms. Straughn with a right-knee
contusion. Dr. Azer subsequently concluded that Ms. Straughn had “an avulsion
tear of the medial lateral ligament with traumatic synovitis.” An October 2014 MRI
test contradicted Dr. Azer’s diagnosis, indicating that there was no ligament tear and
that Ms. Straughn instead suffered from chondromalacia and mild arthritis.
Ms. Straughn visited Dr. Azer several more times over the next few months
with continued complaints of right-knee pain. Starting in January 2015, Dr. Azer
suggested arthroscopic surgery as an option for Ms. Straughn. In July 2015, Dr.
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Azer diagnosed Ms. Straughn with a possible tear of the right-quadriceps tendon.
Dr. Azer opined that the tear was caused by Ms. Straughn’s September 2014 injury.
Ms. Straughn underwent another MRI in July 2015. In August 2015, Dr. Azer noted
that Ms. Straughn’s July 2015 MRI was unchanged from the previous MRI, showing
chondromalacia and arthritis. Dr. Azer continued to diagnose Ms. Straughn with a
“[r]ight knee contusion” and suggest “diagnostic and therapeutic arthroscopy” along
with a probable reconstruction of a torn quadriceps. Dr. Azer also concluded that
Ms. Straughn was medically unable to work during a period including December 5,
2015, to January 4, 2016.
Dr. David Johnson examined Ms. Straughn in June 2015 at WMATA’s
request. He initially suspected that there might be a quadriceps tear, but he
recommended against arthroscopy because that procedure would not identify such
an injury. After reviewing the MRIs, Dr. Johnson opined that Ms. Straughn’s
symptoms were the result of arthritis that preexisted the workplace incident; that
because there was no difference in her condition between the two MRIs, the
workplace incident did not accelerate her preexisting arthritis; that although the
workplace incident might have temporarily exacerbated the symptoms of her
preexisting arthritis, any such exacerbation had resolved by November 2014; and
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that there was no quadriceps injury or any other type of injury that warranted
arthroscopic surgery.
Ms. Straughn filed a claim seeking temporary total disability benefits from
December 5, 2015, to January 4, 2016; authorization for arthroscopic surgery to her
right knee; and payment of related medical expenses. At a hearing, Ms. Straughn
testified that she had no knee pain before the September 2014 accident and that she
continued to suffer knee pain at the time of the hearing.
The ALJ denied Ms. Straughn’s claim, concluding that Ms. Straughn had
failed to carry her burden of establishing a causal link between her workplace injury
and either her claimed temporary disability or the proposed arthroscopic procedure.
Ms. Straughn sought review before the Compensation Review Board (CRB), which
affirmed. In 2017, we vacated and remanded the CRB’s order. Straughn, 176 A.3d
at 128-29. We concluded that the ALJ reasonably relied on Dr. Johnson’s findings
and reasonably discounted the treating physician’s medical opinion. Id. at 128. We
held, however, that the ALJ had erred by failing to address Ms. Straughn’s testimony
that she had not suffered right-knee pain before the September 2014 injury, and we
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 128-29.
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In January 2018, the ALJ issued an order on remand denying Ms. Straughn’s
claim. Ms. Straughn again sought review by the CRB, which affirmed.
II.
We review a decision of the CRB to determine whether the decision was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” Reyes v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 48 A.3d 159, 164 (D.C.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although our review in a workers’
compensation case is of the decision of the CRB, not that of the ALJ, we cannot
ignore the compensation order which is the subject of the CRB’s review.” Placido
v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 92 A.3d 323, 326 (D.C. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We review credibility determinations of an ALJ to see
whether they are “supported by substantial evidence on consideration of the entire
record.” Rocha–Guzmán v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 170 A.3d
170, 177 (D.C. 2017).
Ms. Straughn first argues that the ALJ erred on remand by failing to
adequately address and weigh Ms. Straughn’s testimony. We disagree. “An ALJ’s
assessment of credibility should consider the testimony in light of its rationality, [its]
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internal consistency, and the manner in which it hangs together with evidence of the
record.” Rocha–Guzmán, 170 A.3d at 177 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). That is what the ALJ did. The ALJ specifically addressed Ms. Straughn’s
testimony that she never had any problems with her right knee before September
2014. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Ms. Straughn’s testimony on that point was
contradicted by medical evidence in the record, including x-rays showing results
consistent with prior trauma, such as an old MCL sprain; evidence of preexisting
Pellegrini-Stieda disease; and evidence of preexisting arthritis and chondromalacia.
We are not persuaded by Ms. Straughn’s challenges to the ALJ’s credibility
determination. It is true, as Ms. Straughn notes, that the ALJ did not specifically
refer to Ms. Straughn’s demeanor and appearance while testifying. Demeanor is
potentially relevant to credibility. E.g., In re K.C., 200 A.3d 1216, 1234 (D.C. 2019).
There is no requirement, however, that a factfinder always explicitly discuss
demeanor, even if -- as is inferentially true in this case -- the factfinder does not view
the witness’s demeanor as significant in assessing the witness’s credibility.
Moreover, contrary to Ms. Straughn’s contention, we do not understand the ALJ to
have adopted Dr. Johnson’s evaluation of Ms. Straughn’s credibility. Rather, the
ALJ considered Dr. Johnson’s medical findings, as well as other medical evidence
in the record that contradicted Ms. Straughn’s testimony. After weighing the
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contrary medical evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Ms. Straughn’s
testimony was not sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
her requested medical benefits were causally related to the work incident.
Finally, Ms. Straughn argues that there was no basis for the ALJ to accept Dr.
Johnson’s medical opinions over those of Dr. Azer, because Dr. Johnson’s medical
evaluation was nonsensical. We agree with the CRB, however, that this argument
is foreclosed because it was decided adversely to Ms. Straughn in our earlier
decision. Straughn, 176 A.3d at 128.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the CRB.
So ordered.