In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-19-00192-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF K.L., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 108th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 91,275-E-FM, Honorable Douglas R. Woodburn, Presiding
September 3, 2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
The trial court terminated A.L.’s parental rights to her daughter, K.L.; A.L. appealed
from that judgment. Appointed counsel for A.L. filed a motion to withdraw, together with
an Anders1 brief in support thereof. In the latter, counsel certified that she diligently
searched the record and concluded that the appeal was without merit. Appellate counsel
also filed a copy of a letter sent to A.L. informing her of her right to file a pro se response.
A.L. was also provided a copy of the appellate record, according to counsel. By letter
dated July 31, 2019, this Court notified A.L. of her right to file her own brief or response
by August 20, 2019, if she wished to do so. To date, no response has been received.
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel
discussed two potential areas for appeal. They encompassed the sufficiency of the
evidence to support 1) at least one statutory ground upon which termination was based
and 2) the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Per our obligation
specified in In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (citing
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)), we too reviewed the
appellate record in search of arguable issues for appeal. None were found.
Furthermore, in conducting our review we observed that the multiple statutory
grounds upon which termination was based included subsections (D) and (E) of
§ 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. That observation coupled with the due
process concerns mentioned by the Supreme Court in In re N.G., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2019
Tex. LEXIS 465 (Tex. May 17, 2019) (per curiam) (involving a non-Anders setting) led us
to also conduct a sua sponte review of the record to determine whether those findings
were supported by the quantum of evidence mandated in In re N.G. They were. Yet, the
Anders brief filed by appointed counsel does not reveal whether counsel undertook a
similar review.
Counsel correctly observed that termination may be affirmed on any one statutory
ground found by the factfinder, assuming, of course, sufficient evidence supported that
ground. In re M.M., No. 07-19-00105-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7505, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 21, 2019) (mem. op.). Nonetheless, a parent may encounter other future
ramifications of a finding that termination was warranted on either (D) or (E), as explained
in N.G. And, if such findings lacked evidentiary support, question arises as to whether an
arguable issue exists pretermitting use of the Anders procedure, given those
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ramifications. Thus, counsel would best serve and safeguard the interests of his or her
client by conducting an evidentiary review of those findings when assessing whether the
appeal is meritless; counsel would also assist the court in efficiently and accurately
disposing of the appeal by illustrating that such a review were undertaken. See id. at *7
(wherein appointed counsel was asked to submit additional briefing).
Because our review of the record yielded no arguable issues, we concur with
counsel’s representation that the appeal is meritless. Accordingly, the judgment is
affirmed.
Finally, we also call counsel’s attention to the scope of an indigent parent’s right to
counsel. Such right encompasses the right to legal representation through the exhaustion
of appeals, which may include petitioning for review by the Texas Supreme Court. See
In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 26–27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). In explaining why counsel
filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw at bar, counsel told appellant: “[Y]ou have
the pro se right to seek review of the Court of Appeals’ decision from the Supreme Court
of Texas.” Telling a parent that he or she has a “pro se” right to seek further review
implies that counsel need not assist in that endeavor. So implying may be inaccurate in
view of P.M. Consequently, we take no action on counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
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