2019 WI 85
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2017AP1247-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Thomas D. Vaitys, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
Thomas D. Vaitys,
Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST VAITYS
OPINION FILED: August 22, 2019
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
2019 WI 85
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2017AP1247-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Thomas D. Vaitys, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant, AUG 22, 2019
v. Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Thomas D. Vaitys,
Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
revoked.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Pending before the court is a report and
recommendation filed by Referee Richard M. Esenberg. The report
recommends that we accept Attorney Thomas D. Vaitys' petition
for consensual license revocation, order him to pay restitution,
and revoke his license to practice law in Wisconsin. Attorney
Vaitys is the subject of an Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
disciplinary complaint alleging that he committed 19 counts of
professional misconduct in several client matters. He is also
No. 2017AP1247-D
the subject of two pending grievances that have not yet been
fully investigated by the OLR.
¶2 We agree that both revocation and restitution are
appropriate, and we agree that Attorney Vaitys shall pay the
costs of this proceeding, which are $4,703.85 as of July 10,
2019.
¶3 Attorney Vaitys was admitted to the practice of law in
Wisconsin in 2004. He currently resides in Sonora, California.
He has not previously been subject to professional discipline.
His law license has been suspended, however, for failure to pay
State Bar dues, failure to provide a required trust account
certification, and for failure to comply with CLE reporting
requirements.
¶4 On June 28, 2017, the OLR filed a disciplinary
complaint charging Attorney Vaitys with 19 counts of
professional misconduct. Referee Esenberg was appointed on July
24, 2017. On September 18, 2018, Attorney Vaitys filed a
petition for consensual license revocation pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule (SCR) 22.19.1
1 SCR 22.19 provides:
(1) An attorney who is the subject of an
investigation for possible misconduct or the
respondent in a proceeding may file with the supreme
court a petition for the revocation by consent or his
or her license to practice law.
(2) The petition shall state that the petitioner
cannot successfully defend against the allegations of
misconduct.
(continued)
2
No. 2017AP1247-D
¶5 Attorney Vaitys states that he cannot successfully
defend himself against the professional misconduct alleged in
the complaint or the pending investigations, and states he will
make appropriate restitution. On September 18, 2018, the OLR
filed a recommendation, supporting Attorney Vaitys' petition.
(3) If a complaint has not been filed, the
petition shall be filed in the supreme court and shall
include the director's summary of the misconduct
allegations being investigated. Within 20 days after
the date of filing of the petition, the director shall
file in the supreme court a recommendation on the
petition. Upon a showing of good cause, the supreme
court may extend the time for filing a recommendation.
(4) If a complaint has been filed, the petition
shall be filed in the supreme court and served on the
director and on the referee to whom the proceeding has
been assigned. Within 20 days after the filing of the
petition, the director shall file in the supreme court
a response in support of or in opposition to the
petition and serve a copy on the referee. Upon a
showing of good cause, the supreme court may extend
the time for filing a response. The referee shall file
a report and recommendation on the petition in the
supreme court within 30 days after receipt of the
director's response.
(5) The supreme court shall grant the petition
and revoke the petitioner's license to practice law or
deny the petition and remand the matter to the
director or to the referee for further proceedings.
3
No. 2017AP1247-D
¶6 The referee issued a report on January 8, 2019,
recommending revocation and restitution.2 No appeal has been
filed in this matter, so our review proceeds pursuant to
SCR 22.17(2). We revoke Attorney Vaitys' Wisconsin law license
effective the date of this order.
¶7 The first 12 counts of the OLR's disciplinary
complaint arise from Attorney Vaitys' representation of T.A.
T.A. is an individual with a "wide range of cognitive and
comprehension difficulties, including difficulty reading and/or
understanding written information." In February 2012, T.A.
hired Attorney Vaitys and Attorney Thomas Napierala, a lawyer
with another firm, to set aside a mediation agreement and
settlement that T.A. had entered in a Milwaukee County Circuit
Court case involving the estate of T.J.3 If they succeeded in
setting aside the settlement, the two lawyers would then
commence litigation to establish that T.A. was entitled to
2
The OLR's complaint and a summary of the pending
investigations are attached to the petition for consensual
revocation as Appendices A and B. The OLR later advised the
referee that it had determined that W.A. was partially
reimbursed and is entitled to restitution of $100, rather than
the previously sought $500. By order dated May 14, 2019, this
court remanded the matter to the referee for additional factual
findings relating to restitution. The referee filed a
supplemental report on June 24, 2019, from which neither party
has appealed.
3
This court reprimanded Attorney Napierala for professional
misconduct in connection with his representation of T.A. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Napierala, 2018 WI 101, 384
Wis. 2d 273, 918 N.W.2d 893.
4
No. 2017AP1247-D
inherit the T.J. estate. If not, they intended to appeal and,
perhaps, seek review in this court. The legal work was to be
paid from settlement funds that T.A. had received from the T.J.
estate (the Probate Award). Work commenced in February of 2012,
but no written fee agreement was signed until November 2012.
¶8 The fee agreement limited what the lawyers could
charge for appellate work. It established a $25,000 "Appellate
Fund" trust account. Fees and costs related to this appellate
work were only to be paid from the Appellate Fund, not from the
remainder of the Probate Award. The balance of the Probate
Award was to be held in Attorney Vaitys' IOLTA trust account.
It was agreed there would be an accounting of any other work
previously performed for T.A. Other than the anticipated
appeals, the fee agreement covered no other matters or any
subsequent work on the T.J. estate matter. With respect to non-
appellate work, the fee agreement provided that one-third of all
fees would be paid to Attorney Vaitys, and two-thirds would be
paid to Attorney Napierala. Work performed by Attorney
Napierala was to be billed to and the charges approved by
Attorney Vaitys.
¶9 On November 26, 2012, Attorney Vaitys received a check
for $161,269.23 representing the settlement funds from the T.J.
estate. Attorney Vaitys deposited the funds in his general
IOLTA trust account. He then transferred $25,000 to the
Appellate Fund trust account.
¶10 Thereafter, Attorney Vaitys failed to keep proper
records of disbursements, commingled funds, improperly withdrew
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No. 2017AP1247-D
funds from both the Probate Award in his general IOLTA trust
account and from the Appellate Fund trust account,
misrepresented account balances, converted funds, improperly
billed, made then-prohibited internet banking transactions,
failed to make a proper accounting, and failed to file a timely
reply brief. Essentially, Attorney Vaitys improperly took a
substantial portion of T.A.'s funds and kept T.A. in the dark
about the balance of funds held by Attorney Vaitys and the
charges against them.
¶11 Based on the foregoing, the OLR alleged that Attorney
Vaitys' handling of the T.A. matter violated a number of the
rules of professional conduct, as follows:
Count One: By failing, prior to November 12, 2012, to
communicate in writing to T.A. the scope of the
representation and the rate and basis of Attorney
Vaitys' fees and expenses, Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1).4
4 The referee emphasized that this failure applied not only
to work on the T.J. estate matter performed prior to November
12, 2012, but also to subsequent work unrelated to the appeals
and not covered by the November 12, 2012 Fee Agreement.
SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) provides:
The scope of the representation and the basis or
rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will
be responsible shall be communicated to the client in
writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer
will charge a regularly represented client on the same
basis or rate as in the past. If it is reasonably
foreseeable that the total cost of representation to
the client, including attorney's fees, will be $1000
or less, the communication may be oral or in writing.
Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or
(continued)
6
No. 2017AP1247-D
Count Two: By failing to clearly and accurately
communicate with T.A. about the specific amounts
Attorney Vaitys disbursed from T.A.'s funds, the total
amount of fees Attorney Vaitys believed were due and
owing, and the total amount of T.A.'s funds remaining
in the trust accounts, so as to provide T.A. with an
accurate understanding of Attorney Vaitys' handling of
his funds and the total amount of such funds in
Attorney Vaitys' possession, Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3)5 and SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).6
Count Three: By converting T.A.'s funds to his own
use or benefit, Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:8.4(c). 7
Count Four: By charging T.A. $275 per hour for
services that were not reasonably billable to T.A.,
Attorney Vaitys violated SCR 20:1.5(a).8
expenses shall also be communicated in writing to the
client.
5 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides: "A lawyer shall keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter."
6 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4)provides: "A lawyer shall promptly comply
with reasonable requests by the client for information."
7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation."
8 SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge,
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(continued)
7
No. 2017AP1247-D
Count Five: By using T.A.'s funds to pay obligations
to other clients or third parties, thereby failing to
safeguard and hold those funds in trust, Attorney
Vaitys violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).9
Count Six: By failing to take reasonable steps to
ensure that Attorney Napierala's billing statements
were accurate before paying the same from T.A.'s
funds, thereby failing to safeguard and hold those
funds in trust, Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:1.15(b)(l).
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
9 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides:
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in
connection with a representation. All funds of
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm
in connection with a representation shall be deposited
in one or more identifiable trust accounts.
8
No. 2017AP1247-D
Count Seven: By failing to provide T.A. with
accurate, written accountings upon request, Attorney
Vaitys violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(2).10
Count Eight: By making multiple internet banking
transactions related to either T.A.'s appellate trust
account or his IOLTA trust account, at a time when
such transactions were prohibited, Attorney Vaitys
violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)c.11
Count Nine: By failing to timely file T.A.'s reply
brief or to timely file for an extension of time in
which to file the reply brief, Attorney Vaitys
violated SCR 20:1.3.12
Count Ten: By holding himself out as trustee of
T.A.'s special needs trust, when no such trust existed
and Attorney Vaitys was not trustee of any trust
related to T.A., Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:8.4(c).
Count Eleven: By failing to cooperate in the OLR's
investigation of the grievance, including making
misrepresentations to the OLR during the investigation
and by willfully failing to fully and fairly disclose
10 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S.
Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1,
2016). Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to
July 1, 2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the
supreme court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1,
2016.
Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(2) provided: "Upon final
distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client
or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, the
lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding
the property."
11 Former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)c. provided: "A lawyer shall not
make deposits to or disbursements from a trust account by way of
an Internet transaction."
12 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client."
9
No. 2017AP1247-D
all facts and circumstances pertaining to his alleged
misconduct after having been notified by the OLR of
the matter, Attorney Vaitys violated SCR 22.03(2)13 and
SCR 22.03(6),14 enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).15
Count Twelve: By making misrepresentations to the OLR
during the OLR's initial evaluation of these
grievances, Attorney Vaitys violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
¶12 The remaining seven allegations in the complaint
relate to misconduct that the OLR identified in the course of
investigating the T.A. grievance. These include accounting
anomalies affecting other clients, and misrepresentations that
13 SCR 22.03(2) provides:
Upon commencing an investigation, the director
shall notify the respondent of the matter being
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the
investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a
request for a written response. The director may
allow additional time to respond. Following receipt
of the response, the director may conduct further
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer
questions, furnish documents, and present any
information deemed relevant to the investigation.
14SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted
in the grievance."
15SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6),
or SCR 22.04(1)."
10
No. 2017AP1247-D
Attorney Vaitys made to the OLR in an effort to hide his
misconduct. The OLR audited Attorney Vaitys' banking records
during the period he represented T.A. and identified at least
seven occasions between February 6, 2013 and February 12, 2014
when Attorney Vaitys made other internet banking transfers from
the Appellate Fund trust account or general IOLTA trust account
to his business account. These transactions were prohibited at
the time.
¶13 During the investigation, Attorney Vaitys represented
to the OLR that billing statements were supported by
contemporaneously created ledgers that he claimed to have gone
over with T.A. on a monthly basis. Attorney Vaitys later
admitted that these statements and ledgers were fabricated to
conceal his misuse of T.A.'s funds.
¶14 Attorney Vaitys also misrepresented the terms of the
fee agreement, falsely stating that it provided for up to
$43,000 in fees and costs for appellate work, and falsely
claiming that he obtained T.A.'s authorization for every
disbursement when he had not.
¶15 In addition, during the investigation, Attorney Vaitys
procured an affidavit from Attorney Napierala stating that
certain funds were not converted because he and Attorney Vaitys
had an agreement by which Attorney Vaitys was authorized to
offset these amounts against amounts owed to him by Attorney
Napierala. However, Attorney Napierala later told the OLR that
while there was such an agreement, it did not exist between
11
No. 2017AP1247-D
November 2012 and May 2014 when the funds at issue were
converted.
¶16 As noted, T.A. was not the only client affected by
Attorney Vaitys' misconduct. The OLR found irregularities in
legal matters related to former clients A.H., C.S.M., Y.E., and
M.B. On numerous occasions, Attorney Vaitys received funds in
which clients or a third party had an interest and failed to
notify them; failed to promptly deliver to clients or third
parties the funds to which they were entitled; or improperly
transferred funds from his trust account into his business
account, recorded the transaction as something else, and then
never disbursed the funds to the owner. He also deposited funds
belonging to clients and third parties into his business account
rather than his IOLTA trust account or failed to hold client
funds in his trust accounts. For example, in regards to A.H.,
Attorney Vaitys deposited client funds to his business account
to avoid overdrafts of his business account, thereby converting
A.H.'s funds.
¶17 The C.S.M. matter involved efforts to collect on a
$1,417,204.38 judgment involving the receipt of multiple
garnishment checks, of which 66.7 percent would belong to
C.S.M., 16.65 percent would belong to Attorney Napierala, and
16.65 percent to Attorney Vaitys. Attorney Vaitys repeatedly
failed to promptly deliver received funds to C.S.M. and Attorney
Napierala. Sometimes, he deposited the money in his business
account and used all of the money for other purposes and never
paid it to the rightful owner. On other occasions, he deposited
12
No. 2017AP1247-D
funds belonging to C.S.M. and Attorney Napierala in his trust
account but did not keep it there, transferring it to his
business account or reserve line. The referee observed that
amounts were not large——generally in the low to mid-hundred
dollar range——but the occasions were frequent.16
¶18 These allegations gave rise to seven additional counts
of misconduct:
Count Thirteen: By converting client and third party
funds to his own use or for the use of other clients
or third parties, Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:8.4(c).
Count Fourteen: By depositing client and third party
funds into his Business Account, thereby failing to
safeguard and hold client and third party funds in
trust, Attorney Vaitys violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).
16Initially, it appeared that Attorney Vaitys might owe
restitution to C.S.M. However, the OLR did not seek restitution
in this matter, explaining that "[C.S.M.] agreed in a writing
provided to OLR that Attorney Vaitys was entitled to retain the
funds in question" apparently to cover his fees and costs. See
OLR's Restitution Statement at 2. The referee did not reach a
different conclusion or recommendation. No restitution is
ordered to C.S.M.
It also appeared that Attorney Vaitys might owe restitution
to Y.E. The referee observed that Attorney Vaitys' trust
account records showed that, of $30,000 in settlement funds,
$19,000 were disbursed to Y.E. and $11,000 were retained by
Attorney Vaitys, when in fact, he disbursed $15,000 and retained
$15,000. By order dated May 14, 2019 we remanded this matter to
the referee to determine whether Y.E. might be entitled to
restitution. The referee filed a supplemental report on June
24, 2019, confirming that he did not recommend restitution with
respect to Y.E. The parties clarified that the apparent
discrepancy was due to an error in a ledger, not an actual
conversion of funds. No restitution is ordered to Y.E.
13
No. 2017AP1247-D
Count Fifteen: By depositing personal funds into his
IOLTA trust account, Attorney Vaitys violated
SCR 20:1.15(b)(l).
Count Sixteen: By causing Attorney Napierala to sign
an affidavit containing false information, Attorney
Vaitys violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
Count Seventeen: By failing to provide clients and
third parties with written notice of his receipt of
funds in which they have an interest and by failing to
promptly deliver to clients and third parties the
funds that they were entitled to receive, Attorney
Vaitys violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).17
Count Eighteen: By making multiple internet banking
transactions related to the IOLTA trust account at a
time when such transactions were prohibited, Attorney
Vaitys violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)c.
Count Nineteen: By making misrepresentations to the
OLR during the course of its investigation of OLR
Matter No. 2016MA1162, including by presenting an
affidavit to the OLR that contained a false assertion,
Attorney Vaitys violated SCR 22.03(2) and
SCR 22.03(6), both enforceable under the Rules of
Professional Conduct via SCR 20:8.4(h).
¶19 In addition to the allegations in the OLR complaint,
when Attorney Vaitys filed his petition, the OLR was
investigating two additional grievances filed by clients W.A.
17 Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provided:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.
14
No. 2017AP1247-D
and M.B. The W.A. grievance involved neglect of a client
matter. The OLR seeks restitution in this matter. The M.B.
grievance also involved allegations of carelessness and neglect,
but the OLR did not seek restitution for M.B.
¶20 When reviewing a report and recommendation in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding, we affirm a referee's findings
of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We review the referee's conclusions
of law on a de novo basis. Id. We determine the appropriate
level of discipline given the particular facts of each case,
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefitting
from it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI
34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶21 Attorney Vaitys admits that he cannot defend against
the allegations of the complaint or the pending grievances,
explains that he is represented by counsel and understands the
rights he is giving up, and agrees that his law license should
be revoked and that he should be ordered to make restitution to
T.A., to Attorney Napierala, and to W.A. The OLR supports
Attorney Vaitys' petition. The referee determined, based on
Attorney Vaitys' petition and the OLR's response, by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence, that Attorney Vaitys has
engaged in serious misconduct, and he recommends that we accept
the petition, order restitution, and revoke Attorney Vaitys'
license to practice law.
15
No. 2017AP1247-D
¶22 The referee observes that what is disturbing about
this matter is not simply the exceedingly careless trust
accounting, but the "way in which Attorney Vaitys seemed to
regard a vulnerable client as a 'cash cow'——someone whose
settlement funds could be used for legal fees without regard to
whether the legal services were worth it." The referee cites
several cases in support of his conclusion that revocation is
appropriate here, despite Attorney Vaitys' lack of prior
professional discipline. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Mularski, 2010 WI 113, 329 Wis. 2d 273, 787
N.W.2d 834.
¶23 Conversion of client funds may warrant revocation even
where, as here, the attorney does not have a prior history of
discipline. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Wynn, 2014 WI 17, 353 Wis. 2d 132, 845 N.W.2d 663 (granting
petition for consensual license revocation filed by an attorney
who admitted he used his law practice to misappropriate over
three-quarters of a million dollars from dozens of clients);
Mularski, 329 Wis. 2d 273.
¶24 Like Attorney Vaitys, Attorney Mularski had not been
subject to prior discipline, but he used client money for his
own purposes, commingled funds, made misrepresentations,
fabricated documents in an effort to exonerate himself, and his
trust account was in utter disarray. He was charged with 13
counts of misconduct in three client matters and was subject to
eight pending grievance investigations. We granted his petition
for consensual license revocation and revoked his law license.
16
No. 2017AP1247-D
¶25 The seriousness of Attorney Vaitys' misconduct
demonstrates the need to revoke his law license to protect the
public, the courts, and the legal system from the repetition of
misconduct, to impress upon Attorney Vaitys the seriousness of
his misconduct, and to deter other attorneys from engaging in
similar misconduct. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Arthur, 2005 WI 40, ¶78, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910. We
have also specifically observed that "clients that are
vulnerable especially require protection from those who abuse
their professional position to enrich themselves." In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krombach, 2005 WI 170, ¶39, 286
Wis. 2d 589, 707 N.W.2d 146 (citing In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gilbert, 227 Wis. 2d 444, 474, 595
N.W.2d 715 (1999)).
¶26 We grant Attorney Vaitys' petition for revocation by
consent. See SCR 22.19. We also accept the referee's
recommendation regarding restitution, as modified by his
supplemental report filed June 24, 2019. Attorney Vaitys is
ordered to pay $69,867.46 to T.A. This amount of restitution is
consistent with the terms of Attorney Vaitys' petition for
revocation by consent, and the OLR's restitution statement filed
January 10, 2019. Attorney Vaitys is also ordered to pay
$2,130.05 to Attorney Thomas Napierala, and $100 to W.A.
¶27 Finally, we direct Attorney Vaitys to pay the costs of
this proceeding which are $4,703.85 as of July 10, 2019.
Attorney Vaitys has provided no reason for this court to deviate
from its usual practice of imposing full costs. SCR 22.24(1m).
17
No. 2017AP1247-D
¶28 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for revocation by
consent is granted and the license of Thomas D. Vaitys to
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this
order.
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent he has not
already done so, Thomas D. Vaitys shall comply with the
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked.
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thomas D. Vaitys is ordered
to pay $69,867.46 to T.A., $2,130.05 to Attorney Thomas
Napierala, and $100 to W.A. Thomas D. Vaitys shall reimburse
his former clients T.A. and W.A. before satisfying his
restitution obligation to Attorney Napierala.
¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a condition of any
future petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law
in Wisconsin, Thomas D. Vaitys will be required to prove that he
has made restitution to or settled all claims of all persons
injured or harmed by his misconduct, including reimbursement to
the State Bar of Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection
for all payments made by that fund, or, if restitution has not
been made, Thomas D. Vaitys will need to explain his failure or
inability to do so. See SCR 22.29(4m).
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Thomas D. Vaitys shall pay the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $4,703.85 as
of July 10, 2019.
18
No. 2017AP1247-D
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation.
19
No. 2017AP1247-D
1
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Thomas D. Vaitys
Combined Opinion