IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1094
Filed September 11, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF Z.R.,
Minor Child,
F.D., Mother,
Appellant,
S.R., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, Mary L. Timko,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother and father each appeal a juvenile court order terminating their
parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Lisa K. Mazurek of Miller, Miller, Miller, P.C., Cherokee, for appellant
mother.
Martha A. Sibbel of Law Office of Martha Sibbel, PLC, Carroll, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anna T. Stoeffler, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
T. Cody Farrens of Farrens Law Firm, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Greer, J., and Vogel, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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VOGEL, Senior Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal a juvenile court’s order terminating
their parental rights. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to
support termination of the mother’s parental rights, and the court properly denied
her request for an extension of time. Because the father waived all claims
concerning the termination of his parental rights, we conclude his parental rights
were properly terminated. We affirm on both appeals.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
F.D., mother, and S.R., father, are the parents of Z.R., born in 2018. The
parents have long histories of substance abuse and domestic violence. The
mother’s parental rights to three older children have been terminated—one just
weeks before Z.R. was born.1 Z.R. was removed from the parents’ care shortly
after birth and placed with a family who had adopted one of the child’s half-siblings
and was the adoptive placement for another one of Z.R.’s half-siblings. The Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) has been involved with the parents and
continued providing services. The child was adjudicated to be in need of
assistance (CINA), pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n)
(2018).
After the child’s removal, the parents continued using methamphetamine on
a near daily basis. In September 2018, the father was arrested and jailed on drug
charges. The mother entered a substance-abuse treatment program and began
participating in supervised visitation. She continued her relationship with the
1
Additionally, the mother voluntarily gave up custody of a fourth child.
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father. At times she reported extensive domestic violence and at other times
denied any violence in her relationship with the father. The father also denied
domestic violence and did not participate in offered services. The father was
incarcerated during much of the CINA proceedings and had only one visit with the
child.
On January 4, 2019, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate the
parents’ rights. The hearing was held over the course of five days: January 25,
February 6, March 5 and 22, and May 13. After hearing the testimony and
considering the extensive record, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d), (g), (h), (i), and (l) (2019), and the
father’s rights under section 232.116(1)(a), (d), (e), (g), (h), and (i). The court
denied the parents’ request for an extension of time, stating, “The court cannot find
that [the child] will be able to be returned to either parent’s care within a six-month
time frame, let alone within a reasonable amount of time.” The court concluded
termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interests. The mother and
father have separately appealed.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d
764, 773 (Iowa 2012). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means there are no
serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn
from the evidence.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted).
Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36,
40 (Iowa 2014).
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III. Mother
A. The mother claims there is not sufficient evidence in the record to
support termination of her parental rights to this child and faults the court for
considering her past behavior with prior terminations. She states this child could
have been returned to her care. She notes each of the subsections used to
terminate her parental rights requires a finding the child could not be returned to
her care at the time of the termination hearing or could not be returned within a
reasonable period of time. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d), (g), (h), (i), (l).
The juvenile court found “by clear and convincing evidence that [the child]
cannot be returned to either parent’s custody today.” The court noted the mother
had not progressed beyond supervised visitation. The court concluded, “There
needs to be a period of consistency in addressing all of these issues before [the
mother] can even begin unsupervised visits let alone return of custody of [the child]
to [the mother].” We agree with the court’s conclusions. The mother was still
attending a substance-abuse treatment program and had just started to address
her mental-health problems. Furthermore, she had not addressed the domestic
violence in her relationship with the father. We determine the child could not be
safely returned to the mother’s care at the time of the termination hearing.
B. In the alternative, the mother requests an additional six months to
work on reunification with the child. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (citing Iowa Code
§ 232.104). The court may continue the placement of a child for an additional six
months based on a “determination that the need for removal of the child from the
child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id.
§ 232.104(2)(b).
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As noted above, the juvenile court found an additional six-month time frame
would not alter the continued need for removal of the child. At the termination
hearing, the DHS caseworker testified:
Q. Do you think an additional period of time would change
anything in this case? A. I do not believe so because [the mother]
has had four years that I’ve been involved in her life and the
circumstance continues to circle back to the same issues.
....
Q. Why not? A. As I said, [the mother] has never shown
stability for a length of time. She has easily diverted back to past
behaviors, and I don’t believe that she is able to internalize what is
needed to raise a child safely.
Also, a DHS report from April 30, 2019, stated:
Everything [the mother] does is co-dependent. She thinks right now
in the moment she may be vested. If given the choice to make a
decision right now of her husband or her child, [she] could not pick.
When [the father] gets out and his patterns [could be] the same as
before. The idea in her head is having a nice big happy family when
he gets out of prison. . . . The way she talks about the baby is not
nurturing & comfort[ing]. . . . [She] is guarded and is rough around
the edges. She is a survivor & takes care of herself. She lacks the
nurturing instinct. . . . All efforts are surface level and [her therapist]
thinks she goes through the motions. [Her therapist] does not see
that she is sincere to change her life style. She is on a long road to
recovery as she is [a] 2nd generation addict.
The mother’s current progress was carefully considered by the court, but
the court could not, for the safety of Z.R., turn a blind eye to the mother’s years of
demonstrated inability to sustain any progress for more than a short period of time.
DHS has provided the mother with services for many years in relation to her older
children. We agree with the juvenile court; the evidence does not show the mother
would be able to meet this child’s needs such that the need for removal of the child
will no longer exist at the end of an additional six-month period. See id.
6
Therefore, we determine the juvenile court properly denied the mother’s
request for a six-month extension of the case. It would not be in the child’s best
interests to further delay permanency.
We affirm the juvenile court’s decision terminating the mother’s parental
rights.
IV. Father
The father does not raise any arguments on his own behalf, but he claims
the child should be returned to the mother’s care or the mother should be given an
extension of time. In an appeal of a juvenile court order terminating parental rights,
each parent “need[s] to advance their own reasons on appeal why, considering the
juvenile court’s findings regarding their individual strengths and weaknesses, their
separate parental rights should not be terminated.” In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454,
460 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). A parent does not have standing to bring an argument
on behalf of the other parent “in an effort to ultimately gain a benefit for himself,
that is, the reversal of the termination of his parental rights.” In re K.R., 737 N.W.2d
321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). We do not consider the father’s arguments claiming
the court improperly terminated the mother’s parental rights.
Because the father does not raise any claims concerning the termination of
his parental rights, we conclude his parental rights were properly terminated and
we affirm the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.