NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5592-17T3
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A.W. HOLDINGS, LLC,
d/b/a BENCHMARK HUMAN
SERVICES and DOUGLAS
S. BEEBE,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
LESHONDRA ARMSTRONG,
a/k/a LESHONDA CHAQUE
ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.
_____________________________
Argued September 11, 2019 – Decided September 17, 2019
Before Judges Haas and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Docket No. DC-000307-
18.
Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Sarah Sakson Langstedt argued the cause for
respondents (Day Pitney LLP, attorneys; Craig M.
Gianetti and Alyssa R. Musmanno, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robert Triffin appeals from the June 29, 2018 order dismissing
his complaint against defendants A.W. Holdings, LLC and its president,
Douglas Beebe (collectively defendants) following a bench trial. We affirm
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Thomas C. Miller's
comprehensive written opinion issued that same date.
Defendants issued a check in the amount of $1018.29 to defendant
Leshonda Armstrong, who electronically deposited it with her bank, Affinity
FCU (Affinity). Armstrong also "intentionally or negligently sought to obtain
duplicate payment on the check" by submitting it to Friendly Check Cashing
Company (Friendly), which also paid her $1018.29.
In turn, Affinity and Friendly submitted the check for payment to Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., the bank on which it had been drawn by defendants. In the
process, the check passed through the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Federal
Reserve), which identified the "duplicate item." The Federal Reserve paid the
check as submitted by Affinity because it had been received first. The Federal
A-5592-17T3
2
Reserve then dishonored the check submitted by Friendly, marked the duplicate
item "REFER TO MAKER[,]" and returned it to Friendly unpaid.
Triffin later purchased the dishonored check from Friendly, which
assigned its right to seek payment of the check to him. Triffin then filed a
complaint against defendants and Armstrong seeking to recover the full amount
of the check, together with certain fees he allegedly incurred in the course of
seeking payment, together with pre-judgment interest. Defendants filed an
answer to the complaint, but Armstrong did not.1
Judge Miller conducted a one-day bench trial at which Triffin was the only
witness. Both parties submitted additional documentary evidence.
In a thorough written decision, Judge Miller ruled that based on the
circumstances presented, Triffin was not entitled to payment on the dishonored
check from defendants. As the judge noted, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c) plainly
states that "[i]f a draft is accepted by a bank, the drawer is discharged, regardless
of when or by whom acceptance was obtained." Here, defendants' check was
clearly "accepted by a bank" when Armstrong deposited it in her bank, or when
Friendly deposited it with its bank. Thus, defendants, as the "drawer" of the
1
Armstrong also did not appear at the trial.
A-5592-17T3
3
check, had no further obligation to pay on the check a second time to Tr iffin.
Accordingly, the judge dismissed Triffin's complaint against defendants with
prejudice.2
On appeal, Triffin asserts that the judge erred in dismissing his complaint
against defendants, and presents the following contentions:
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN HE IGNORED THE DISPOSITIVE
PROVISIONS OF N.J.S.A. 12A:3-308(b), AND
DISMISSED TRIFFIN'S N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414 CLAIM
AGAINST A.W. HOLDINGS.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN HE ASSUMED THE DISPOSITIVE
FACT, THAT THE WELLS FARGO BANK
PREVIOUSLY PAID THE A.W. HOLDINGS CHECK
THAT TRIFFIN'S ASSIGNOR SUBMITTED FOR
PAYMENT.
POINT THREE
ON ITS FACE[,] THE PURPORTED WELLS FARGO
LETTER THAT TRIAL JUDGE MILLER
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE OVER TRIFFIN'S
OBJECTIONS WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS A SELF-
2
At the same time, Judge Miller determined that Armstrong, "[a]s an endorser"
of the instrument, who "was paid twice for the face amount of the check, even
though she [was] only entitled to be paid that amount once[,]" was liable to
Triffin for the face amount of the check, plus pre-judgment interest.
A-5592-17T3
4
AUTHENTICATING DOCUMENT UNDER N.J.R.E.
803(C)(6) . . . TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE
MATTERS ALLEGED THEREIN.
We review the factual findings made by a trial judge to determine whether
they are "supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Such
findings made by a judge in a bench trial "should not be disturbed 'unless they
are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" Id. at 483-84
(quoting Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b.,
33 N.J. 78 (1960)). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the
legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995).
Applying these standards, we discern no basis for disturbing Judge
Miller's reasoned decision, and we are satisfied that Triffin's arguments are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-5592-17T3
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