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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-13997
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cr-00040-MTT-CHW-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMAD JACQUE WALLACE,
a.k.a. Anna,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(September 18, 2019)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jamad Wallace appeals his sentence of 120 months of imprisonment after
pleading guilty to possession of stolen firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The
government has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that in his plea
agreement, Wallace waived his right to appeal the sentence.
In Wallace’s plea agreement, he agreed to waive “any right to appeal or any
other court review” of his sentence, including through collateral attack, except for a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The waiver provision permitted appeal in
two narrow circumstances: (a) if the district court imposed a sentence that exceeded
the guideline imprisonment range as determined by the district court; or (b) if the
government appealed. Wallace initialed each page of the agreement, and the final
two pages were signed by the government, Wallace, and Wallace’s counsel.
The district court accepted Wallace’s guilty plea after conducting a plea
colloquy. During the plea colloquy, the court informed Wallace of the appeal waiver
and its exceptions. Wallace responded that he had no questions about the waiver
and that he freely and voluntarily gave up his right to appeal the sentence except as
set forth in the plea agreement. The prosecutor also mentioned that the parties had
discussed Wallace’s concerns about the appeal waiver “at length” when negotiating
the plea agreement.
Following the plea hearing, a probation officer prepared a presentence
investigation report (“PSR”), calculating a recommended guideline range of 100 to
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120 months of imprisonment. Wallace filed objections to the calculation of the base
offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and the application of an
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
At sentencing, the district court overruled Wallace’s objections and sentenced
him to 120 months of imprisonment, the statutory maximum, with half of that
sentence to run consecutive to an undischarged state sentence of life imprisonment.
Wallace now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in resolving the contested
guideline issues at sentencing.
We will enforce an appeal waiver that was made knowingly and voluntarily.
United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993). To prove that a waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show that (1) the district court
specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy; or
(2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full
significance of the waiver. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
We will enforce the appeal waiver in Wallace’s plea agreement. In response
to the government’s motion to dismiss, Wallace concedes that the district court
specifically questioned him about the waiver during the plea colloquy. And Wallace
confirmed to the court that he had no questions about the waiver and that he freely
and voluntarily gave up his right to appeal the sentence except as set forth in the plea
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agreement. Accordingly, the record shows that the waiver was made knowingly and
voluntarily. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. Nor does any exception to the waiver
apply. The sentence was within the guideline range as determined by the court, and
the government has not appealed.
Because the appeal waiver is valid and no exception applies, it bars Wallace
from challenging the district court’s resolution of guideline issues at sentencing. We
therefore GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss. At this time, we decline to
address Wallace’s claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel because the record
is insufficiently developed. See generally Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
504 (2003) (“[I]n most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct
appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.”).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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