United States v. Malcolm Melvin

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-6733 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MALCOLM ROBERT LEE MELVIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. (4:11-cr-00079-RBH-1) Submitted: September 9, 2019 Decided: September 20, 2019 Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Malcolm Robert Lee Melvin, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Malcolm Robert Lee Melvin appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Melvin seeks to rely on the First Step Act to obtain expungement of the consecutive sentences imposed for his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) convictions. We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for a sentence reduction for abuse of discretion and the scope of the district court’s legal authority de novo. See United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2013). We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that it lacked the authority to grant Melvin’s request for a sentence reduction. The First Step Act did not alter the requirement that § 924(c) sentences run consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 2018). Although the First Step Act altered the circumstances under which 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offenses are subject to enhanced mandatory minimum sentences, see First Step Act § 403(a), 132 Stat. at 5221-22, Congress expressly limited the retroactivity of that provision to offenses for which sentence was not yet imposed as of the First Step Act’s date of enactment, First Step Act § 403(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. As Melvin was sentenced years before the First Step Act’s enactment date, that provision does not apply to him. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 2