IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOSIAH WOODY, §
§ No. 543, 2018
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1705021877(N)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
SHANTELL NEWMAN, §
§ No. 586, 2018
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1705021865(N)
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: September 11, 2019
Decided: September 23, 2019
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 23rd day of September, 2019, having considered the briefs and the record
below,1 it appears to the Court that:
(1) In 2014, police investigated Shantell Newman for stalking her landlord,
Thomas Howard, and the landlord’s property manager, Phyllis Brown. The
investigation continued through February 2017. On February 7, 2017, Detective
Jennifer Escheman of the New Castle County Police Department applied for a
warrant to search 430 West 29th Street and listed Josiah Woody and Newman as
occupants. In the affidavit of probable cause supporting the warrant, Escheman
stated the following:
On August 22, 2014, Brown, the property manager of 205 Channing
Drive in Bear, DE, reported to NCCPD that she had received a call from
the property’s tenant, Newman. A male on the phone threatened to “kill
her,” and Newman followed with her own profanity-laced rant. Police
confirmed that the number used to call Brown belonged to Newman.
On September 7, 2014, Brown went to Delaware State Police Troop 2
after she received about fifty phone calls on her cell phone from a
blocked number. At the police station, Brown answered a call from the
blocked number and recognized Newman’s voice, who said “How does
it feel to know you and your kids will be dead by the close of business
tomorrow.”
On September 7, 2014, while at Troop 2, Brown received phone calls
from unknown men soliciting sex. Brown informed police that she
suspected Newman. She also viewed Newman’s Facebook page and
saw a picture of herself (Brown) on the profile page. The photo
provided a message that was sexually explicit, solicited sex acts, and
advised interested persons to contact Brown by her phone number listed
on the page.
On September 28, 2014, Wilmington Police responded to 408 South
Franklin Street for a terroristic threatening complaint made by Howard.
Howard told police that Newman posted several messages on Facebook
1
Because both appeals arise from the same trial and share questions of law, we have consolidated
them sua sponte for decision.
2
about taking Howard’s life. Howard printed these posts from
September 28, 2014, which include more profanity.
On October 5, 2014, NCCPD officers responded to 205 Channing Drive
for a complaint by Newman against Howard and Brown, who she said
had come to her door to ask for rent money which turned into a
profanity-laced exchange and inappropriate touching.
On October 6, 2014, police interviewed Howard and Brown who said
they were not at Newman’s residence on October 5, 2014. Police then
questioned Newman who said that neither Howard nor Brown were at
her residence on October 5, 2014.
On November 6, 2014, Brown reported to police that Newman knocked
at her door and, when Brown opened it, began swinging a blade at
Brown striking her. Brown reported that Newman also took Brown’s
purse.
Newman was incarcerated in Maryland from November 2014 until
April 11, 2016.
On October 9, 2016, Brown and Howard reported to Wilmington Police
a burglary that occurred that day at 408 South Franklin Street, a
property owned by Howard and managed by Brown. Brown told police
that when she unlocked the front door she heard what sounded like
people talking inside and saw the living room furniture had been tossed
around.
On October 10, 2016, Brown reported to Wilmington Police a trespass
complaint at 408 South Franklin Street. Brown reported that as she
entered the property, three unknown suspects fled out of the rear
kitchen door.
On October 17, 2016, Brown reported to police that she was sexually
assaulted by three masked individuals while she was checking on the
property at 408 South Franklin Street. Brown told officers that the men
told her that Newman sent them to kill her and Newman said that “you
didn’t get it the first time to keep your mouth shut.” Brown told officers
that one of the men put a handgun to her head and pulled the trigger,
but the weapon malfunctioned to the suspect’s surprise.
On January 9, 2017, Escheman learned that Newman was pregnant and
provided the Division of Family Services with an address of 430 West
29th Street.
3
On February 7, 2017, Escheman learned that Newman had been
transported by ambulance to St. Francis Hospital for labor and delivery
and that she provided 430 West 29th Street as her home address.2
(2) On February 7, 2017, a magistrate authorized the search of 430 West
29th Street. The search warrant sought any documentation and electronic devices,
particularly those that can connect to WiFi or access Facebook, used or intended to
be used for stalking. Escheman searched the residence on February 8, 2017. During
the search, they found recent mail addressed to both Woody and Newman. In the
basement of the residence, police found a loaded handgun on top of an air duct that
had a filed-off serial number, six rounds of ammunition, and one spent casing. While
the serial number was later recovered, due to the age of the gun, database searches
did not yield any information about the firearm. Woody’s and Newman’s DNA
matched DNA found on the handgun. Police then arrested Woody and Newman for
weapons charges.
(3) On January 10, 2018, Woody filed a motion to suppress the gun and
ammunition for lack of probable cause. The Superior Court denied the motion. At
trial during Newman’s cross-examination of the State’s forensics expert, the expert
testified that she could not say how the DNA got on the firearm, whether by direct
2
App. to Opening Br. at A115-18.
4
touching or secondary transfer. 3 On redirect, the Superior Court overruled
Newman’s objection and allowed testimony from the expert that the DNA on the
firearm was unlikely the result of secondary transfer.
(4) At the close of trial, Woody and Newman requested a jury instruction
to treat a statutory exemption from prohibiting possession of weapons with
obliterated serial numbers as an essential element of the crime rather than an
affirmative defense. The Superior Court declined and instructed the jury that the
exemption was an affirmative defense. The jury convicted Woody and Newman of
all charges. Newman then filed a motion for judgment of acquittal based on several
arguments, all of which the Superior Court denied.
(5) On appeal, Woody argues the Superior Court erred in denying the
motion to suppress, both Woody and Newman argue the Superior Court erred when
it decided that the manufacturing date exemption was an affirmative defense and not
an element of the crime, and Newman argues the Superior Court erred in allowing
certain expert testimony and denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
(6) Woody first argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because the search warrant lacked probable cause. He argues that the
police obtained the search warrant too long after the 2014 incidents to rely on them
3
Secondary transfer occurs when a person touches an intermediary surface, then the intermediary
surface touches the tested surface, leaving the person’s transferred DNA despite the person never
directly touching the tested surface.
5
to support probable cause, and there was no probable cause to believe that a crime
was committed based solely on the 2016 incidents.
(7) This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion.4 To the extent we examine the trial judge’s formulation and application
of law, we review de novo.5 To the extent the judge’s decision is based on factual
findings, we review for whether the trial judge abused their discretion in determining
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings.6 “Where the facts are
not disputed and only a constitutional claim of probable cause is at issue, we will
review the Superior Court’s application of the law of probable cause de novo.”7
(8) “Under the United States and Delaware Constitutions, ‘a search warrant
may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.’”8 Under the state statutes
dictating warrant requirements—11 Del. C. §§ 2306-07—we have “consistently held
that Sections 2306 and 2307 contemplate a ‘four-corners’ test for probable cause.”9
The four-corners’ test requires that the affidavit supporting a search warrant contain
facts adequate for a neutral judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense
has been committed and that seizable property would be found in a particular place
4
Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Del. 2008).
5
Id.
6
Id.; Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990).
7
Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006).
8
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (quoting Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 786 (Del. 2003)); U.S. Const.
Amend. IV; Del. Const. art. 1, § 6.
9
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811 (Del. 2000).
6
or on a particular person. 10 Whether there are adequate facts in the warrant
application requires a logical nexus between the items being sought and the location
to be searched.11
(9) To decide whether probable cause exists, the court applies a totality of
the circumstances test, favoring a commonsense interpretation over a hyper technical
one.12 “Thus, a magistrate may find probable cause when, considering the totality
of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.’”13 Additionally, a magistrate may draw
“reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in the affidavit.”14
(10) Here, the crime contemplated by the search warrant is stalking. Under
11 Del. C. § 1312, “[a] person is guilty of stalking when the person knowingly
engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person.” The statute defines
“course of conduct” to mean “3 or more separate incidents . . . in which the person
directly, indirectly, or through third parties . . . follows, monitors, observes, surveys,
10
Id.
11
Jones v. State, 28 A.3d 1046, 1057 (Del. 2011). The State argues that any appeal under the
logical nexus requirement was waived, while Woody argues that the right was preserved by
“couch[ing] [the argument] as a staleness concern.” Answering Br. to Woody at 22-23; Woody’s
Reply Br. at 3. Because probable cause requires a logical nexus, we will not apply plain error
review.
12
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296; Jones, 28 A.3d at 1057.
13
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (citations omitted); see also Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811 (“Probable cause
. . . exists if the affidavit sets forth facts that would permit an impartial judicial officer to reasonably
conclude that the items sought would be found in those locations.”).
14
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296.
7
threatens, or communicates to or about another.”15 Stalking is a felony of either class
G, F, or C dependent on the particular facts.16 The applicable statute of limitations
requires the prosecution to commence within 5 years after it is committed.17
(11) Woody argues that the 2014 incidents are too remote to qualify as an
incident under the definition of “course of conduct.” But, the Superior Court
concluded correctly that there is no law besides the statute of limitations that limits
the timeframe on the course of conduct within which stalking can be committed.
Thus, because five years had not passed since the 2014 incidents, the 2014 incidents
were properly included in the course of conduct necessary for a stalking offense.
(12) Woody does not dispute Newman’s involvement in the 2014 incidents,
and they alone are likely to give rise to a stalking allegation. Also, at least one of
the 2016 incidents may be reasonably inferred to be attributed to Newman because
of the masked man’s reference to her. The delay between events can be reasonably
attributed to Newman’s incarceration. 18 Such factual allegations in the affidavit
support a reasonable belief that a stalking offense had been committed.
(13) The search warrant sought electronic items related to the 2014 incidents
conducted by phone calls and social network postings and other incriminating
15
11 Del. C. § 1312(e)(1).
16
11 Del. C. § 1312(b)-(d).
17
11 Del. C. § 205.
18
As noted earlier, Newman was incarcerated in Maryland from November 2014 until April 11,
2016.
8
evidence related to the stalking offense which could be available on such devices.
The search warrant identified Newman’s current home based on her informing the
Division of Family Services and the hospital of her address.
(14) Woody argues that it is unreasonable to expect such devices to be in the
searched residence because Newman had moved since the 2014 incidents. This is
not, however, determinative of whether the items sought, like the electronics here,
are fairly probable to be found at the property to be searched. There is a fair
probability of discovery if there is a logical nexus between the items sought and
place to be searched. Personal electronics are generally valuable and held closely,
making it fairly probable, even if not certain, that they are kept in a personal and safe
location like one’s home. Thus, because there is a reasonable belief that an offense
has been committed and that seizable property would be found in the property to be
searched, the affidavit contains probable cause within its four corners.
(15) Woody argues next that the four-month delay between the events in
October 2016 and the search warrant application in February 2017 makes the
information too stale to support probable cause at the time the search warrant was
issued. “Probable cause must be based on current information, not conjecture, for
stale information will not support a finding of probable cause.”19 There must be
19
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 297 (quoting Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573 (Del. 1975)).
9
probable cause that the specified items “are presently on the premises.” 20
Magistrates and courts must consider factors like the “kind of property for which
authority to search is sought,” “whether the evidence sought is highly incriminating
or consumable and thus less or more likely to remain in one location,” and the
“statements of dates and times.”21
(16) The Superior Court considered whether the nature of the objects made
it reasonable to think that Newman would still be in possession of them. The devices
in question—electronic devices such as cellphones and computers—are the type of
things that someone would likely continue to maintain.22 This evidence is not easily
consumable, as deleted data can often be recovered by forensics and may be stored
by a third-party. Considering the nature of the evidence sought, the four-month
delay in obtaining the warrant is not sufficient to show a lack of probable cause.
(17) Woody and Newman both argue that the Superior Court erred when it
decided that 11 Del. C. § 1459(b) was an affirmative defense to be proved by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence rather than an essential element to be
20
Id. (emphasis in original).
21
Id.; see State v. Pulgini, 374 A.2d 822, 823 (Del. 1977) (finding that when the affidavit’s facts
indicate a course of conduct, rather than an isolated incident, the passage of time becomes less
significant).
22
Additionally, the devices may not need to be the same unique devices that originally created the
evidence sought. Such evidence may be stored on third-party sources, like Facebook or a cloud
storage service, and be present on a subsequent device owned by the same user.
10
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. We review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo.23
(18) 11 Del. C. § 1459 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) No person shall knowingly transport, ship, possess or
receive any firearm with the knowledge that the importer’s
or manufacturer’s serial number has been removed,
obliterated or altered in a manner that has disguised or
concealed the identity or origin of the firearm.
(b) This section shall not apply to a firearm manufactured
prior to 1973.
(19) 11 Del. C. § 305 is also relevant:
[w]hen this Criminal Code or another statute specifically
exempts a person or activity from the scope of its application and
the defendant contends that the defendant is legally entitled to be
exempted thereby, the burden is on the defendant to prove, as an
affirmative defense, facts necessary to bring the defendant within
the exemption.
(20) Section 305 applies here. The plain meaning of § 305 requires that if
the Criminal Code “specifically exempts a person or activity from the scope of its
application,” it is an affirmative defense. In this instance, § 1459(b) is a section of
the Criminal Code that specifically exempts an activity from the scope of § 1159(a).
The activity exempted is the possession of a firearm with the knowledge that the
serial number has been removed, obliterated, or altered and the firearm is
manufactured prior to 1973. Without the exemption, the activity would be criminal
23
Freeman v. X-Ray Associates, P.A., 3 A.3d 224, 227 (Del. 2010).
11
under the statute. Thus, § 305 requires the defendant to prove, as an affirmative
defense, the facts necessary to bring the defendant within the exemption—here, that
the firearm was manufactured before 1973.
(21) Woody and the State look to Lively v. State to support their respective
arguments.24 In Lively, this Court placed the burden on the defendant to establish
that he had a license to carry a concealed deadly weapon.25 This Court found that
the rule was based on the practical consideration that possession of a license was
best viewed as an affirmative defense because the existence of a license to carry was
a matter more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant and more readily
proven by him.26 Absent contrary legislative intent, the court construed the statute
consistently with the “time-honored rule.”27
(22) Here, there is no applicable time-honored rule regarding possession of
a firearm without its serial number. Additionally, the practical considerations are
different because another element of the crime—the serial number having been
removed, obliterated, or altered—often makes determination of the manufacture date
more difficult or impossible. Thus, Lively does not control—section 305 does. The
legislature contemplated the manufacture date when considering the application of
24
427 A.2d 882 (Del. 1981).
25
Id. at 884.
26
Id.
27
Id.
12
the crime. Instead of including it as an element in § 1459(a), it was separated into
an exemption clause. Section 305 controls such an exemption clause.
(23) Newman argues that under 11 Del. C. § 304, a statute must declare an
affirmative defense for one to arise, and § 1459(b) does not expressly declare itself
as one. But, this Court has held that § 304 “does not provide that it is exhaustive of
all affirmative defenses.” Rather, it merely states the burden of proof when there is
an affirmative defense.28
(24) In the alternative, Woody argues that the defense should be considered
a simple defense rather than an affirmative defense. Woody joined in Newman’s
original argument that the exemption be an element rather than a defense. Woody
did not, however, join in Newman’s alternative argument that it should be a simple
defense.29 Because Woody did not raise the issue below and Newman does not raise
it on appeal, we review for plain error.30
(25) Plain error review requires the error complained of be “so clearly
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial
process,” and the error must be “basic, serious and fundamental . . . and clearly
28
Bryson v. State, 840 A.2d 631, 636 (Del. 2003).
29
App. to Woody’s Opening Br. at A328 (Woody joins in Newman’s position on the “additional
elements as far as the 1973.” But, at that time, no argument regarding a simple defense had been
raised.); id. at A396-402 (Newman raises the simple defense as a new argument for the first time.
After argument, the court asks Woody’s attorney for any comment, to which he responds “No,
Your Honor.”).
30
Sup. Ct. R. 8.
13
deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”31
Because § 305 controls and § 1459(b) is an affirmative defense, the Superior Court
did not plainly err.
(26) Next, Newman argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in
allowing an expert to testify that the test results were unlikely the result of secondary
transfer. Newman claims that such testimony was not disclosed before trial and was
conjecture not based on any scientifically acceptable and reliable basis.
(27) “We review a Superior Court’s decision adjudicating discovery
violations for abuse of discretion.” 32 We review an evidentiary ruling allowing
expert testimony for abuse of discretion. 33 If the Superior Court abused its
discretion, then we must determine “whether the mistake constituted significant
prejudice so as to have denied the appellant a fair trial.”34
(28) Upon request, the State must disclose the identity of any expert witness
and the substance of the opinions to be expressed. Here, the State disclosed that it
intended to call a forensic DNA analyst, Bethany Kleiser, as an expert witness to
testify “consistent with the reports, opinions, and conclusions” of her analysis.35
31
Small v. State, 51 A.3d 452, 456 (Del. 2012) (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100
(Del. 1986)).
32
Taylor v. State, 982 A.2d 279, 280 (Del. 2008).
33
Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d, 723 (Del. 2013).
34
Barrow v. Abamowicz, 931 A.2d 424, 429 (Del. 2007) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
35
App. to Answering Br. to Newman at B-5.
14
Without objection on direct examination, Kleiser testified that she “would expect to
see a probably very low-level sample” resulting from secondary transfer, but she
“did not have low-level mixtures” in this case.36 On cross-examination, Newman
solicited testimony that Kleiser could not definitively conclude whether direct or
secondary transfer caused the DNA to be on the firearm. On redirect, Newman
objected to Kleiser’s statement that she thought secondary transfer was “unlikely”
because of the “great result.”37
(29) The Superior Court determined that Kleiser had already testified in
general terms on direct and that neither direct nor redirect testimony were outside
the scope of disclosure because Kleiser’s opinion testimony included the results, and
the results included the likelihood of secondary transfer. On cross-examination,
Newman solicited testimony about Kleiser’s opinion whether the DNA results were
from direct or secondary transfer. The redirect addressed the same issue: the
likelihood of the DNA results being from secondary transfer. The Superior Court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the redirect testimony on the issue raised
during cross-examination.
(30) Newman’s argument that the opinion was not based on scientific
analysis or principles lacks support in the brief and the facts. Newman did not object
36
App. to Newman’s Opening Br. at A061.
37
Id. at A069.
15
to Kleiser’s testimony about studies on secondary transfer38 or introduce alternative
evidence. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding it was based
on scientific principles.
(31) Newman also argues that the Superior Court erred in denying her
motion for judgment of acquittal. “We review ‘de novo a trial judge’s denial of a
criminal defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal to determine whether any
rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
could have found the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”39
(32) First, Newman argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the firearm was manufactured during or after 1973. But, as discussed
above, the State did not have to prove the manufacturing date because 11 Del. C.
§ 305 makes the manufacturing date exemption an affirmative defense.
(33) Second, Newman argues that the record evidence satisfies her burden
to prove an affirmative defense. Newman did not make this argument in the original
motion, 40 thus we apply plain error review. 41 The parties agree that the precise
manufacturing date remains unknown. While there is some evidence in Newman’s
38
See App. to Newman’s Opening Br. at A061.
39
Elmore v. State, 115 A.3d 1214, 2015 WL 3613557, at *2 (Del. June 9, 2015) (quoting White v.
State, 906 A.2d 82, 85 (Del. 2011) (emphasis removed)) (TABLE).
40
App. to Newman’s Opening Br. at A108-14.
41
Sup. Ct. R. 8.
16
favor, the Court must view the evidence in light most favorable to the State when
considering a motion for judgment of acquittal. Thus, a rational jury could have
found that the evidence, or lack thereof, did not support the affirmative defense that
the firearm was manufactured prior to 1973.
(34) Finally, Newman argues that the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the weapon had been defaced at the time Newman touched or
handled the gun and that Newman was aware of the filed-off serial number.
Newman did not address the substance of this argument in the briefing.42 Without
briefing on the merits, the arguments are waived.43
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
42
Newman’s Opening Br. at 14-15; see Newman’s Reply Br. (argument omitted).
43
Sup. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3).
17