J-A20042-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: G.H.W.-S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER : No. 416 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-0088a,
2018-0089a, CP-67-DP-0000306-2017,
CP-67-DP-0000307-2017
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.M.W.-S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER : No. 418 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-0088a
IN THE INTEREST OF: G.W.-S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER : No. 433 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000306-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.W.-S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER : No. 435 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
J-A20042-19
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000307-2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
Appellant, T.S. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered in the York
County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petitions for involuntary
termination of his parental rights to G.W.-S. (born in March 2016) and A.M.W.-
S. (born in June 2017) (“Children”),1 and the concurrent dispositional orders
which changed the goals to adoption.2 We affirm and grant counsel’s petition
to withdraw.
The trial court opinions accurately set forth the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Preliminarily, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw his representation
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d
____________________________________________
1 The court was not required to appoint separate legal-interests counsel for
Children due to their young ages. See In re T.S., ___ Pa. ___, 192 A.3d
1080 (2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1187, 203 L.Ed.2d 220
(2019) (establishing presumption that child three years of age or younger
cannot form subjective, articulable preference that would necessitate
appointment of separate legal counsel to advocate during termination
proceeding).
2 The termination decrees and goal change orders are dated February 7, 2019,
time stamped February 8, 2019, and entered on the docket on February 11,
2019. Father properly filed four separate notices of appeal, one for each child
regarding the goal change and one for each child regarding the termination of
parental rights. See Commonwealth v. Walker, ___ Pa. ___, 185 A.3d 969
(2018) (requiring as of June 1, 2018, separate notices of appeal from single
orders which resolve issues arising on separate trial court docket numbers).
This Court subsequently consolidated the appeals.
-2-
J-A20042-19
493 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349
(2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: 1) petition the Court for
leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the record,
counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; 2) file a
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of
his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional
points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at 173-79,
978 A.2d at 358-61. Substantial compliance with these requirements is
sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super.
2007).
In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing
requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw
representation:
Neither Anders nor McClendon3 requires that counsel’s
brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of
argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat,
what the brief must provide under Anders are references
to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.
* * *
Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
counsel’s references to anything in the record that arguably
supports the appeal.
____________________________________________
3 Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981).
-3-
J-A20042-19
Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:
[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361.
Instantly, appellate counsel filed a petition to withdraw. The petition
states counsel conducted a thorough review of the record and determined the
appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Father with a copy of the
brief and a letter explaining Father’s immediate right to retain new counsel or
proceed pro se to raise any additional issues Father deems worthy of this
Court’s attention. In the Anders brief, counsel provides a summary of the
facts and procedural history of the case. Counsel’s argument refers to
relevant law that might arguably support Father’s claims. Counsel further
states the reasons for his conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous.
Therefore, counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of
Anders and Santiago.
Counsel raises the following issues on Father’s behalf:
WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT THE YORK COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN,
YOUTH AND FAMILIES ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE STATUTORY GROUNDS
-4-
J-A20042-19
EXISTED TO JUSTIFY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS
OF THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. §
2511(A)(1)(2) AND (5)?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN ERROR OF LAW OR
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT AN
INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
NATURAL FATHER WOULD BEST SERVE THE NEEDS AND
WELFARE OF THE CHILD PURSUANT TO SECTION 2511(B)
OF THE ADOPTION ACT?
WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
CHANGING THE COURT ORDERED GOAL FROM
REUNIFICATION TO ADOPTION?
(Anders Brief at 4).4
The standard and scope of review applicable in goal change and
termination of parental rights cases are as follows:
On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of
discretion standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818,
822 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In order to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion, we must determine that the court’s
judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the
court did not apply the law, or that the court’s action
was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,”
as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial
court’s findings of fact that have support in the record.
The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with
the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the
witness[es] and resolving any conflicts in the
testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the
trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. When the trial court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence of record, we will
affirm, “even if the record could also support an
opposite result.”
____________________________________________
4 Father has not filed a reply brief pro se or with newly retained counsel.
-5-
J-A20042-19
Id. at 822-23 (internal citations omitted).
In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 345 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa.
648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010). Additionally:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision,
the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court
must accord the hearing judge’s decision the same
deference that it would give to a jury verdict. We must
employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of
fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses
and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder
of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking
termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the existence of grounds for doing so.
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even though the record could support an
opposite result.
In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
Before filing a petition for the termination of a parent’s
rights, the Commonwealth is required to make reasonable
efforts to promote reunification between a child and [his]
-6-
J-A20042-19
parents. The Commonwealth’s obligation in this regard is
not indefinite, however, because in addition to the parents’
interests the Commonwealth must also respect the child’s
right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment. When
reasonable efforts at reunification have failed, then the child
welfare agency must work towards terminating parental
rights and placing the child with adoptive parents. As we
have repeatedly acknowledged, [a] child’s life simply cannot
be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.
* * *
Under section 2511, the trial court must engage in a
bifurcated process. The initial focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies
at least one of the…statutory grounds delineated in section
2511(a). If the trial court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination under section 2511(a), then
it must engage in an analysis of the best interests of the
child…under section 2511(b), taking into primary
consideration the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs of the child.
* * *
[A] best interest of the child analysis under [section]
2511(b) requires consideration of intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability. To this end, this Court has
indicated that the trial court must also discern the nature
and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.
Moreover, in performing a “best interests” analysis[, t]he
court should also consider the importance of continuity of
relationships to the child, because severing close parental
ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider
whether a natural parental bond exists between child and
parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,
necessary and beneficial relationship. Most importantly,
adequate consideration must be given to the needs and
welfare of the child.
In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9-12 (Pa.Super. 2009) (internal citations and quotation
-7-
J-A20042-19
marks omitted).
Section 2511 outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care
that parents must provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will
not meet the requirements may properly be considered unfit and have his
parental rights terminated. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa.Super. 2001).
There is no simple or easy definition of parental
duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to
the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection,
guidance, and support. These needs, physical and
emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest
in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt
has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.
* * *
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his…ability, even in difficult circumstances. A
parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “a
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his…child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the child’s right to
have proper parenting and fulfillment of his…potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856. “Above all else[,] adequate
consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s
-8-
J-A20042-19
own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination
of parental rights.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(internal citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Todd Russell
Platts, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinions
comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented.
(See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed April 5, 2019, at 1-3; Adjudication Decision,
filed February 11, 2019, at 8-22) (examining all aspects of case in light of
relevant statutes and concluding Agency proved by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights, and goal changes from
reunification to adoption, are in Children’s best interests; Father made
minimal progress toward alleviating circumstances which necessitated
placement of Children; Father declined to be resource for Children; Father
offered no testimony in opposition to termination of his parental rights or
Children’s goal change; while attending first day of hearing, by phone, Father
was also shopping in department store and notably distracted from
proceedings). Following our independent review of the record, we agree the
appeal is frivolous and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. Accordingly, we
affirm on the basis of the trial court opinions.
Decrees and orders affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted.
-9-
J-A20042-19
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/25/2019
- 10 -
Circulated 09/10/2019 02:04 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
In the Interest of:
G.W.S. @P-67-DP·306-2017f
A.W.S. No.CP:67:0l'-307-2017
Minor Children Change of Goal
****************************•**********
In Re: Adoption of
')
G.W.S. No. 2018·0089
,.J A.W.S. No. 2018·0088
Minor Child Termination of Parental Rights
)
APPEARANCES: •- ' •' I •
......
Martin Miller, Esquire Sherry Myers, Esqui.1,:
For Children and Youth Services Counsel for the Mo.
Marc Semke, Esquire David Worley, Esq�
Counsel for the Father Guardian ad litem O !
Dorothy Miles
. i� -4
Caseworker �
ADJUDICATION
. Before this Court is a Petition to Change Court Ordered Goal {hereinafter, "COG")
and a Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental. Rights {hereinafter, "ITPR") filed by
York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (hereinafter, "Agency") on July 16,
2018, regarding G.W.S. and A.W.S. (hereinafter,'"the minor children") whose dates of birth
are ft\ O'\U((�\'. ZZ\lf, and June . , 2017, respectively.
Evidentiary hearings. were held on Tuesday, October 9, 2018, and Friday, November
16, 2018, to address testimony .and evidence relating to : E.V'f., (hereinafter,
"Motlier") and (hereinafter, "Father"). Mother appeared at the
evidentiary hearings represented by counsel, Attorney Sherry Myers. Father appeared at the
evidentiary'hearlngs via telephone and represented by counsel, Attorney Marc Semke.
The entire Dependency Records for the minor children, docketed at CP-67-DP-306-
2017 and CP-67-DP-307-2017, were incorporated into the hearing record. A Stipulation of
Counsel was filed on October 5, 2018, and was signed by counsel for the Agency, the·
guardian ad litem and legal counsel for the minor children, and counsel for Mother, while
counsel for Father verbally agreed to it on October 9, 2018. The Agency's exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 were admitted into the record. The Court took judicial
notice bf all dependency orders entered in this matter. The record for the Petition to Change
Court Ordered Goal and the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights was held
open by the Court until January 7, 2019� at which time Counsel for the parties endorsed and
filed a Supplemental Stipulation of Counsel. Said Supplemental Stipulation incorporated into
the record, without the need for additional testimony, Dr. Jonathan Gransee's Parenting
Capacity Assessment of Mother and Ryan Milley's Psychiatric Evaluation of Mother.
Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, as well as the history
of this case, the Petition to Change Court Ordered Goal and the Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Mother's and Father's Parental Rights are GRANTED as to G.W.S. and
A.W.S.
2
. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. · The minor children, O.W.S. and A.W.S., were born iri March . 1 2016, and June
) .
2017, respectively.
2. The natural Mother of the minor children is· f., \f.i· () ., whose current address
is _ . Pennsylvania
.J
3. The natural Father of the minor children is :, whose current
address is: Maryland -
4. A Petition to Change Court Ordered Goal and a Petition for Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights were filed by the Agency on July 16, 2018.
5. A Certification of Acknowledgement of Paternity for the minor children was filed on
July 19, 2018, which indicates that there is a claim or Acknowledgement of Paternity
on file for the minor children.
6. An Application for Emergency Protective Custody was filed by the Agency on August
25, 2017.
7. In· an Order for Emergency Protective Custody dated August 25, 2017, sufficient
evidence was presented that continuation or return of the minor children to the home
of Mother and Father was not in the best interests of the minor children. Legal and
physical custody of the minor children were awarded to the Agency. The minor
children were to be placed in kinship non-relative care.
3
8. In a Shelter Care Order dated August 28, 2017, sufficient evidence was presented to
prove that continuation or return of the minor children to the home of Mother and
. Father was not in the best interests of the minor children. Legal and physical custody
of the �inor children were awarded to the Agency. The minor children were to
remain in foster (kinship) care.
)
.J 9. A Dependency Petition was filed by the Agency on August 30, 2017. The allegations
contained in the Dependency Petition were consistent with the allegations contained in
)
the Application for Emergency Protective Custody.
10. On September 8, 2017, the minor children were adjudicated dependent. Legal and
physical custody were awarded to the Agency. The minor children were to remain in
kinship foster care. The goal initially established was return to a parent or guardian.
11. The minor children have remained dependent since September 8, 2017, and the minor
children have not returned to the care and custody of Mother or Father since August
25, 2017.
12. Family Service Plans were prepared and dated as follows:
a. Initial Family Service Plan dated February 1: 2017.
b. Revised Femily Service Plan dated August 7, 2017.
c. Revised Family Service Plan dated November 27, 2017.
d. Revised Family Service Plan dated February 12, 2018.
e. Revised Family Service Plan dated August 6, 2018.
4
13. In a Permanency Review Order dated February 6, 2018, the Court made certain
findings and conclusions including, but not limited to:
a. There had been moderate compliance with the Permanency Plan by Mother
and there had been minimal compliance with the Permanency Plan by Father.
· b. Reasonable efforts had been made by the Agency to finalize the Permanency
Plan.
c. Mother had made moderate progress toward alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated the original placement and Father had made minimal
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
d. Legal and physical custody of the minor children were confirmed with the
Agency ..
e. There continued to be a need for placement of the minor children outside the
care and custody of Mother arid Father.
14. In a Permanency Review Order dated July 19, 2018, the Court made certain findings
and conclusions including, but not limited to:
a. There had been minimal compliance with the Permanency Plan by Mother and
there had been minimal compliance with the Pennanency Plan by Father.
b. Reasonable efforts had been made by the Agency to finalize the Pennanency
Plan.
s
c. Mother had made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated the original placement and Father had made minimal
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
d. Legal and physical custody of the minor children were confirmed with the
Agency.
e. There continued to be a need for placement of the minor children outside the
care and custody of Mother and Father.
15. In a Permanency Review Order dated January 8, 2019, the Court made certain findings
and conclusions including, but not limited to:
a. There had been moderate compliance with the Permanency Plan. by Mother
and there had been minimal compliance with the Permanency
. .
Plan by Father.
b. Reasonable efforts had been made by the Agency to finalize the Permanency
Plan.
c. Mother had made moderate progress toward alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated the original placement and Father had made minimal
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
: d. Legal· and physical custody of the minor children were confirmed with the
Agency.
6
e. There continued to be a need for placement of the minor children. outside the
care and custody of Mother and Father.
16. A Catholic Charities Intensive Family Service Team 'opened for services with Mother
on October 13, 2017, and closed unsuccessfully on June 8, 2018. The team closed out
with services due to a lack of progress and consistency as well as non-compliance by
Mother.
17. Mother was admitted to the Roxbury Treatment Center on August 18; 2017, and was
discharged on August 25, 2017. At the time of discharge, Mother had been diagnosed
with major depressive disorder, recurrent severe without psychotic features; sedative
use disorder; alcohol use disorder; opioid use disorder; r/o borderline intellectual
functioning.
18. Mother is currently under supervision by Adams County Adult Probation and Parole.
19. The first Interstate Compact was performed on Father but was denied.
20. The minor child, G.W.S., initially participated in physical therapy but no longer
receives such therapy. The minor child, A.W.S., currently participates in physical
therapy.
21. A pre-adoptive resource has been identified for the minor children.
7
DISCUSSION
I. . Petition for Change of Goal
Before the Court can change the goal for a child in a juvenile dependency action, the
Agency must prove by cl ear and convincing evidence that the change of goal would be in the
child's best interest. In re Intel'est of M.B., 674 A.2d 702 (Pa. Super. 1996). In making a
disposition, the Court should consider what is best suited to the protection and physical:
mental, and moral welfare of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A §6351; In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 121, 465
A.2d 614, 619 (1983) ..In rendering a disposition "best suited to the protection and physical,
mental, and moral welfare of the child," the hearing court must take into account "any and all
factors which bear upon the child's welfare and which can aid the court's necessarily
imprecise prediction about that child's future well-being." In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 122, 465
A.2d 614, 620 (1983).
The purpose of the Juvenile Act is to preserve family unity and to provide for the care,
protection, safety and wholesome mental and physical development of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
630U'?Xl)-(l. l). The Juvenile Act was not intended to place children in a more perfect
home; instead, the Act gives a court the authority to "intervene to ensure that parents meet
certain legislatively determined irreducible minimum standards in executing their parental
rights." In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958 (Pa. Super. 1990) (emphasis added).
When a child is placed in foster care, the parents have an affirmative duty to make the
changes in their lives that would allow them to become appropriate parents. In re Diaz, 669
A.2d 372, 377 (Pa. Super. 1995). A family service plan is created to help give. the parents
some guidelines as to the various areas that need to be improved. In the Interest of M.B., 565
)
A.2d 804, 806 (Pa. Super. 1989), app. Denied, 589 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1990). By assessing the
)
") parents' compliance and success with this family service plan, the Court can determine if the
parents have fulfilled their affinnative duty. In re J.S.W., 651 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. Super.
1994).
Under Section 6351 of the Adoption Act, the Agency has the burden to show a goal
change would serve the child's best interests and the "safety, permanency, and well-being of
the child must take precedence over all other considerations." In re D.Pu 972 A.2d 1221, 1227
(Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 973 A.2d 1007 (Pa. 2009). Thus, even where the parent
makes earnest efforts, the "court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need
for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future." ln....m
Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In the present matter, the Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it
is in the minor children's best interests to change the goal to placement for adoption. From
September 8, 2017, when the minor children were adjudicated dependent, until the Agency's
filing of the Petition for ITPR on July 16, 2018, approximately ten (10) months later, Mother
and Father had made only minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances which '
necessitated the minor children's placement.
The Agency initially became involved with the family in December 2016, due to
concerns regarding Mother's mental health and environmental conditions of the home. A
Justice Works Team opened for services with Mother on January 11, 2017, to ensure that the
family's residence was stable and would not put the minor child, G.W.S., at risk. Mother
made moderate progress in maintaining an appropriate living environment for the minor child
but failed to change litter boxes. which caused the cats to urinate and defecate on the carpets
and floors. Mother also experienced a brief period of time during Justice Work's involvement
where her residence's electricity was turned off due to non-payment. The Justice Works
Team closed unsuccessfully due to Mother's noncompliance and inconsistency with
appointments and visits.
A Catholic Charities Intensive Family Services Team opened for services with Mother
on October 13, 2017, but closed unsuccessfully on June 8, 2018, due to a lack of progress and
consistency as well as non-compliance by Mother. A Pressley Ridge Team opened for
services with Mother on July 26, 2018, and was providing services to Mother at the time of
the hearings on the Petitions for COG and ITPR. Despite receiving services over
approximately twenty-five {25) months, including for approximately eight (8) months prior to
the Dependency Petition being filed, Mother never progressed to unsupervised visitation with
the minor children during the course of the adjudication of dependency.
Mother "received' a Patenting Capacity Assessment (hereinafter, "the Assessment") by
Dr. Jonathan· Gransee, dated October 10, 2018, to provide information regarding her
10
psychological functioning and to determine her capacity to parent the minor children. Dr.
Gransee indicated in the Assessment that Mother 'gave birth to the younger of the minor
children, A.W.S., ,.". June . 2017, and five (5) days later, overdosed as a result of taking too
many pills. The Agency was advised o� August 16, 2017, that Mother had again overdosed
on pills, was hospitalized, and in a coma. Mother overdosed a third time immediately prior to
a Permanency Review Hearing before this Court on May 3, 2018.
Dr. Gransee stated in the Assessment that Mother self-reported a history of depression
as well as various symptoms that are related to a trauma disorder. He stated that Mother
comes from an abusive background and seems to have emotional. and behavioral issues
stemming from a chaotic home environment during her childhood. Dr. Oransee stated that
Mother "seems to have grown into an adult with anger management issues, violent tendencies,
and pervasive problems in relationships." Mother has also been both a perpetrator and victim
of domestic violence on several occasions.
Mother has been arrested three (3) times since the adjudication of dependency and was
incarcerated in March 2018 for a conviction of harassment where her mother (hereinafter,
"Maternal Grandmother") was the victim. At the time of the hearings on the Agency's
Petition for ITPR, Mother insisted that Maternal Grandmother and she no longer live in the
same residence; however, the caseworker, Dorothy Miles, (hereinafter, "the Caseworker")
reported to Dr.· Gransee and testified at the hearings that she believes Mother and Maternal
Grandmother are in fact living together,
11
Dr. Gransee stated in the Assessment that "at this point ... [Mother] does not have
the capacity to ·manage herself, let alone another living being, ·and as such, her capacity
to parent a child is impaired." He suggested that Mother get herself stable by addressing
her emotional issues and issues with her employment, finances and housing. He further
recommended that Mother attend therapy to address her emotional and behavioral issues at
)
J least once per week and to participate in a domestic violence program, which would involve
treating Mother for being both a perpetrator and a victim. At the final day of the hearing on
)
the ITPR Petition, Mother had not yet scheduled her participation in such a program.
Since the adjudication of dependency> Mother has not performed any parental duties
on behalf of the minor children other than what has occurred during supervised visits. Mother
has not sent the minor children any birthday gifts or cards throughout the course of
dependency, and the Caseworker stated that Mother "never calls to check on the kids." When
Mother was notified that she had gifted the wrong size of clothing for the children, she failed
to replace those items with proper fitting clothes. The youngest of the minor children has
been out of Mother's custody since shortly after the child's birth, while the older of the minor
children was placed with the kinship mother when he was approximately sixteen (16) months
old. At this time, the oldest child, G. W.S .• has lived more than half of his life with kinship
mother and the youngest child. A. W.S., has lived. almost the entirety of her life with kinship
mother.
12
Since the adjudication of dependency, Father has made .minimal progress toward
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the minor children's placement.·. From the
beginning of the Agency's involvement with this family, Father stated that he was_ not a
resource for the minor children. When the first Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children (hereinafter, ''ICPC,,) referral was made, Father reiterated his unwillingness to be a
resource and the first ICPC was denied at Father's request. A second ICPC referral was made
but was never completed due to non-cooperation by Father.
)
Father has been hospitalized for mental health reasons two (2) times since the
adjudication of dependency and has not been fully compliant with providing documentation to
the Agency regarding his mental health treatment. Furthermore.Father has not visited with
the minor children since September 2018, and he only visited with the minor children a total
of seven (7) times between October 2017 and September 2018. · Since the adjudication of
dependency, Father has not performed any parental duties on behalf of the minor children and
has not attended any of the minor children's medical appointments. Father does not have any
type of bond with the minor children.
'Lastly, Father chose not to attend the two (2) days of testimony on the Petition for
ITPR in person but rather participated by phone. Father failed to offer any testimony in
opposition of his parental rights to the minor children being terminated. While participating
by phone on the first day of testimony, Father was in a department store and was clearly
distracted by his shopping instead of attentively participating in the hearing.
13
Overall, Mother has made minimal to moderate progress towards alleviating the
circumstances which caused the minor children to be placed and Father has made minimal
progress towards alleviating the circumstances which. caused the minor children to be placed.
Neither Mother nor Father have assumed any major parental duties for the minor children
since approximately August 2017, approximately eighteen (18) months ago. The minor
children have been in placement for approximately eighteen (18) months and adjudicated
dependent for approximately seventeen (17) months. The minor children need a permanent,
safe and stable environment. As such, the Court finds that the minor children's best interests
demand that the goal be changed from reunification with a parent to placement for adoption.
II. Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
The Agency argues that Mother's and Father's parental rights to the minor children
should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §25ll(a)(l), (2), and (5) of the Adoption Act.
The Agency has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that statutory
grounds exist to justify the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re. Child M., 681
A.2d 793, 797 (Pa. Super. 1996). The clear and convincing standard means that the evidence
presented by the· Agency is so "clear, direct, weighty, and convincing" that one can "come to
a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue," Matter of
�vlvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1202-04 (Pa. 1989). The Agency must also present evidence
proving that the termination of parental rights will serve the child's best interests. In the
Ivlatter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 92-3 (Pa. 1998). To determine
14
) . ' .
· whether termination is within the best interest of the minor children, the. court must examine
the possible effect the termination would have on the children's needs a.nd general welfare. In
re. Adoption ofGodzak, 719 A2d 365� 368 (1998).
THE AGENCY HAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE MINOR CHILD MUST:BE TERMINATED
PURSU�NT TO l3·Pa.C.S. §2511(a){l)
J To terminate parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(a)(l) of the Adoption Act, the
) Agency must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has either
)
demonstrated a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the child or has failed to
perform parental duties. In the Matter of AdQption of Charles E.D.M. III, 708 A.2d 88 (Pa.
1998). Once one (1) of the two (2) factors has been proven, the Court must examine the
following factors:
1. Parent's explanation for the conduct;
2. Post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and
3. Effect of termination on child. Id.
The Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that both Mother and Father
· have · failed to take responsibility for the circumstances which necessitated the minor
children's placement. Since the minor children's placement in August 2017, Father has
consistently stated his unwillingness to be a resource for the children, and Mother remained
uncooperative with the services deployed up until approximately July 2018, at which time the
Agency filed its Petition to Change Court Ordered Goal and its Petition for ITPR.
IS
While the Court noted in its January 8, 2019 Pennanency Review Heating Order that
Mother had made moderate progress, such progress was since the filing of the Petition for
ITPR, and the Court cannot statutorily take such progress into consideration under 23 Pa.C.S.
§2511 (a){l ). Even with such progress, Mother is not in a position to resume custody of the
minor children at this time, and it is unknown as to when Mother would be in such a position
to regain custody of the minor children.
The Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father have
failed to perform any significant parental duties for the minor children since approximately
August 2017. · Since that time, they have neither attended any school functions or
doctor/dental appointments for the minor children nor have they sent the minor children any
gifts, cards or letters.
The Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of
Mother's and Father's parental rights will have a positive effect on the minor children. The
minor children are strongly bonded with the kinship mother and look to the kinship mother as
a positive and loving parental figure. The Caseworker stated that the minor children call the
kinship mother "Mom" and appear safe and loved in the kinship mother's care.
Overall, the Court finds that the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights
will provide a benefit to the minor children in that the children will achieve stability, safety
and permanency in a loving and nurturing home. Therefore, for all the reasons stated above,
16
)
)
1
)
.)
the Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that tennination of parental rights to
)
the minor children is justified pursuant to Section 2511 (a)(l) of the Adoption Act.
THE AGENCY HAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
j
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE MINOR cnnn MUST BE TERMINATED
. PURSUANT TO 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(2�5), J.
The Agency has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights
._J to the mi-nor children should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 (a)(2) and (S) of the
Adoption Act. The mandates of these sections are as follows:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence. necessary for his or her physical or mental wellbeing and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six (6)
months, the conditions which led. to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions
within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the child.
The Court finds that the conditions which led to the minor children's placement .
outside the care and custody of Mother and Father continue to exist. The minor children have
been in placement for approximately eighteen (18) months and adjudicated dependent for
approximately seventeen (17) months. The minor children are safe, loved, and well-bonded
to the kinship mother.
17
Father has consistently stated his unwillingness to be a resource for the minor
children throughout the entirety of the Agency's involvement with the family; Father has not
performed any parental duties or obligations on behalf of the minor children since the
adjudication of dependency, and he has not made any progress in alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement of the minor children.
Subsequent to the filing of the Petition for ITPR on July 16, 2018, Mother became
more cooperative with the Agency and, as her attorney stated to Dr. Gransee, Mother began
working "very diligently" on the Permanency Plan. The Court acknowledges that, in
working with the current Pressley Ridge Team, Mother has been more dutiful in attending
visits and required appointments, and has begun forming a bond with the minor children. At
this time, Mother appears to have a stable housing situation, although the Caseworker.
provided testimony that directly conflicts with Mother's testimony, namely that the
Caseworker believes that Mother is still residing with Maternal Grandmother. Mother
provided testimony regarding her finances; however, it remained unclear to the Court how
much income Mother receives and the total amount she owes towards bills and other
exp�nditures each month. The Court finds that Mother's moderate level of progress in
recent months is due largely to an exceptional effort by her Pressley Ridge team and will not
be able to be independently sustained by Mother going forward.
While Mother cooperated in the psychiatric evaluation and the Parenting Capacity
Assessment on October 10, 2018, she was not fully compliant with following the
18
recommendations of such evaluations. Furthermore, the Caseworker expressed continued
concerns regarding Mother's potential dependence on prescription medications and her
mental health as it relates to her past overdoses.
Overall. Mother and Father have failed to remediate the conditions which led to the ,
minor children's placement and have failed to provide substantial parental duties on behalf of
the minor children. In consideration of this testimony, the Court finds that the Agency clearly
and convincingly established that tennination of parent.al rights is justified pursuant to
Sections 2511 (a)(2) and (S) of the Adoption Act.
IN CONSIDERATION OF §25ll(b), TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
WOULD BEST SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE MINOR CHILD
Having established the statutory grounds for the involuntary termination of the
parental rights of Mother and Father, the Court's final consideration is whether termination of
parental rights will best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the children. 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(b) .
. [T]he Court must carefully consider the tangible dimension, as well as the intangible
dimension - the love, comfort, security, and closeness - entailed in a parent-child
relationship. (citations omitted). The court must consider whether a bond exists
between the child and [parents], and whether termination would destroy an existing
beneficial relationship. In re: B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The Court has thoroughly evaluated the minor children's relationships in this matter.
The Court flnds that the minor children do not have a parental relationship with Mother or
; Father. The youngestof the minor children, A.W.S., has never lived with Mother, while the
oldest, G.W.S., has now lived more than half of his life with the kinship mother. The Court
19
finds that the minor children have a much stronger parental bond with the kinship mother and
that the minor children look to the kinship mother for safety and comfort, Additjonally, it is
the kinship mother who provides for the minor children's daily needs as well as any
specialized developmental, education, and medical needs.
The Court also finds that the bond between the minor children and kinship mother is
strong and healthy. Testimony established that the children arc happy and feel comfortable in
the kinship mother's care. The bond that the minor children have with the kinship mother can
provide safety, security and permanency for the children. Termination of Mother's and
Father's parental rights will best meet the needs of the minor children and permit the children
to achieve the stability they deserve.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The current placement of O.W.S. and A.W.S. continues to be necessary and
appropriate. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(l).
2. Mother and Father have not been able to fully meet the goals set forth in the family
service plans. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(£)(2).
3. The circumstances which necessitated the children's original placement have not been
alleviated. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(3).
4. The current goal for the children of reunification with a parent is no longer feasible
and appropriate because Mother and Father have failed to meet the irreducible
minimum requirements necessary to parent the children. 42 Pa.C.S. §635l(f)(4).
20
5. The minor children's best interests demand that the current goal of reunification with a
parent be changed to placement for adoption.
6. Mother and Father have failed to perform parental duties for a period well in excess of
six (6) months. 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(a)(l).
")
.J 7. The Agency has established by clear and convincing evidence that the inability and
..
.)
refusal of Mother and Father have caused the children to be without parental care,
'.)
control or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being and the
conditions cannot be remedied by Mother or Father. 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(a)(2).
8. The Agency has established by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions
which led to the children's removal from Mother's and Father's care continue to exist,
and Mother and Father cannot remedy these conditions within a reasonable time. 23
Pa.C.S. §25ll(aX5).
SUMMARY
In conclusion, the Court. believes that the termination of Mother's and Father's.
parental rights is clearly in the best interests of the minor children to promote their welfare
and allow them to achieve permanency. The Court is therefore executing a Decree
terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights with respect to G.W.S. and A.W.S., and an
Order directing-that the current goal of reunification with parent or guardian for G.W.S. and
21
A.W.S. is changed to placement for adoption. Said Order also establishes the concurrent goal
for G.W.S. and A.W.S. to be placement with a legal custodian (non-relative).
Dated: February 7, 2019 BY THE COURT,
)
J
22
(, Circulated 09/10/2019 02:04 PM
!):t
�·
-·
U'1
U'l
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
In the Interest of:
r�·,
..;.1
G.W.S. No. CP�67�DP-306-2017
·,,.J A.W.S. No.C"P-67-DP:307�2017
Minor Children Change of Goal
(.;,)
......1
·-·,,I ***************************************
In Re: Adoption of
U'l G.W.S. No. 2018-0089 c
A.W.S. No. 2018-0088 -·;,. ..,, f:/;.; ..:.
Minor Child Terminationof Parental Ri�'.8 :: ��·-):· :.
•• �· •• �.. : \
ft""lj
......... :.0 .
-..� CJ
CJ} G"
STATEMENT OF LOWER COURT PURSUANT TO
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii}.
AND NOW, this 2nd day of April, 2019, this Court is in receipt of notice that appeals
have been filed by . f: , w ' (hereinafter, "Mother") and T• [ � t (hereinafter,
"Father") in the above matters. While the undersigned delineated substantive reasons for the
February 7, 2019 Adjudication subject to appeal, this Court shall offer the following additional
insights and reasoning for said Adjudication.
From approximately August 2017, when G.W.S. and A.W.S. (hereinafter, "the minor
children") were placed into the care and custody of the York County Office of Children,
Youth, and Families, (hereinafter, "the Agency") until July 2018 when the Agency filed its
Petitions for Change of Court-Ordered Goal (hereinafter, "COG") and Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights (hereinafter, "ITPR"), both Mother and Father had made only
minimal progress in alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the minor children's
placement. In July 2018., the oldest of the minor children had been out of Mother's and
rt 11 '
(I
o:,
�.-··
v·,
ll'1
Father's care for more than half of his life while the younger of the minor children had never
lived with Mother or Father.
.
,:; .:, Subsequent to the filing of the Petitions for COG and ITPR on July 16, 2018, Mother
Q)
·, ..j began making progress towards the goals enumerated in the Permanency Plan. The Court
acknowledged that, in working with her Pressley Ridge Team, Mother made progress in
.....J
attending visits and required appointments, creating stability for herself, and forming a bond
with the minor children. However, the Court found that Mother's moderate level of progress
in those recent months was largely due to an exceptional effort by her Pressley Ridge team
and Mother would not he able to independently sustain such efforts by herself going forward.
On October 10, 2018, Mother received a Parenting Capacity Assessment (hereinafter,
"the Assessment") by Dr. Jonathan Gransee to provide information regarding her
psychological functioning and to determine her capacity to parent the minor children. In his
Assessment, Dr. Gransee reported that, "at this point... [Mother] does not have the capacity
to manage herself, let alone another living being, and as such, her capacity to parent a
�hild is impaired." Similarly, this Court found that, despite Mother's progress in recent
months, she was not prepared to regain custody of the minor children at the time testimony
was taken on the Agency's Petitions for COG and ITPR, approximately eighteen (18) months
ifter the minor children were originally placed in the Agency's care and custody. The Court
vas unable to determine when Mother would be physicaily, mentally, and financially prepared
p regain custody of the minor children.
Since the adjudication of dependency, Father had made only minimal progress toward
l
Ileviating the circumstances which necessitated the minor children's placement. From the
!.)."!
�1·1
a:::,
.[:,,
(,''
..!,.J
l)'l
beginning of the Agency's involvement with this family, Father stated that he was not a
resource for the minor children. When the first Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children (hereinafter, "ICPC") referral was made, Father reiterated his unwillingness to be a
resource and the first ICPC was denied at Father's request. A second ICPC referral was made
"·J
but was never completed due to non-cooperation by Father.
·-.,,
'.D Furthermore, Father chose not to attend the two (2) days of testimony on the Petitions
'•,,l
for COG and ITPR in person but rather participated by phone. Father failed to offer any
testimony in opposition of his parental rights to the minor children being terminated, While
participating by phone on the first day of testimony, Father was in a department store and was
clearly distracted by his shopping instead of attentively participating in the hearing.
Any further basis for the termination of parental rights for Mother and Father can be
found in the Court's Adjudication dated February 7, 2019, regarding said matter.
BY THE COURT,
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, JUDGE