In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-17-00430-CR
_______________________
ALBERT WAYNE HEBERT III, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 313261
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2016, the State charged Appellant Albert Wayne Hebert III with Driving
While Intoxicated-2nd Offense. Hebert filed a motion to suppress in which he argued
that his stop and detention were without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and
all evidence subsequently obtained—including a blood draw—should be suppressed
as products of an illegal search. The trial court carried the motion to suppress under
consideration during the trial testimony presented by the State. After the State rested,
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Hebert again moved to suppress the evidence and he made a motion for an instructed
verdict. The court denied both motions. The defendant elected to testify and then the
defense rested, and the parties presented closing arguments to the jury. The jury
found Hebert guilty of driving while intoxicated-2nd offense and assessed a fine of
$4000. Hebert raises two issues on appeal: the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress, and the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the drug phencyclidine
(PCP) in the blood sample taken from him. The State raises a cross-issue that the
sentence imposed was illegal. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Evidence
Testimony of Officer Carson Burrell
Officer Burrell, a patrol officer with the Beaumont Police Department,
testified that in the early afternoon of April 2, 2016, he observed a white Camaro
drift from the left lane to the right lane and the officer had to stop and swerve to
avoid a collision. Burrell then stopped the vehicle and spoke with the driver who
was identified as Albert Wayne Hebert III. While talking with Hebert, Burrell
noticed “a very blank stare” on Hebert’s face and Hebert was “very slow and
unresponsive.” Burrell described Hebert’s speech as “[s]lurred and slow.” After
checking for warrants, Burrell asked Hebert to step out of his vehicle, and Burrell
immediately smelled a chemical odor that Burrell knew to be PCP. Burrell explained
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that he then put handcuffs on Hebert for safety because someone on PCP can be
highly aggressive. Burrell testified that he asked Hebert if he had taken PCP, and
Hebert denied it.
Officer Burrell then decided to give Hebert a standardized field sobriety test.
Burrell testified that one test is the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), which checks
for involuntary jerky eye movements caused by a foreign or controlled substance or
alcohol in the body. Burrell agreed that he gave Hebert three HGN tests, and Burrell
observed signs of intoxication or nystagmus in all three tests. Burrell testified that
when he gave Hebert the “walk and turn test,” Hebert used his arms for balance,
which can be a sign of intoxication. According to Burrell, Hebert refused to complete
the test, and Burrell then arrested Hebert. A video-recording taken from Burrell’s
dash cam was admitted as Exhibit B and published to the jury, and Burrell agreed it
was a fair and accurate depiction of what happened that day.
Burrell testified that he informed Hebert of his rights, and Hebert refused to
give a blood specimen. According to Burrell, he then sought a warrant for a blood
draw and filled out a probable cause affidavit and obtained a warrant. In his affidavit
for a search warrant for a blood draw, admitted at trial as Court’s Exhibit 1, Officer
Burrell alleged that “Albert was driving north bound on 11th St. and failed to
maintain a single lane, almost colliding with the front of my marked Beaumont
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Police Patrol Tahoe.” Burrell transported Hebert to Baptist Hospital for a blood
draw, and Burrell and his partner sealed the sample and submitted it to the police
evidence room. Burrell agreed that his initial report of the incident did not mention
PCP but that another report he made of the incident did mention PCP.
According to Burrell, when Hebert was driving, he weaved into Burrell’s lane
and that was the reason for the initial stop. Burrell agreed that he arrested Hebert for
failing to maintain a single lane and that another statute requires drivers to maintain
a sure and clear distance.
Testimony of Sarah Martin
Sarah Martin, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety
Crime Laboratory in Austin, testified that she recognized Exhibit C as the blood
sample she received and analyzed. According to Martin, she identified the presence
of PCP in the blood. Exhibit D was admitted into evidence, which Martin agreed
was a copy of the lab report that she produced for this case.
Testimony of Albert Hebert
Albert Hebert denied that PCP was in his system when he was stopped, but he
admitted that it had been in his system “over a week[]” or “possibly two weeks[]” or
“several weeks[]” before this date. According to Hebert, before the traffic stop, there
was enough distance between his vehicle and Burrell’s patrol vehicle so that he could
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have turned into the other lane safely. Hebert testified that there was nothing wrong
with his eyes at that time and he told Officer Burrell that it was possible he would
not pass a field sobriety test because of his prior injuries, including having twenty
screws and a metal plate in his knee and ankle. Hebert denied that Officer Burrell
ever asked him for a blood test. Hebert agreed that he was an “occasional user[]” of
PCP. Hebert denied that he smelled like PCP or that the officer smelled PCP on him.
Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion but review the
trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Turrubiate v. State, 399
S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In considering a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony,
and a trial court may choose to believe or to disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s
testimony. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999)); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When reviewing
a trial court’s ruling, the appellate court does not engage in its own factual review.
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St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost
total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, “especially if
those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor.” Crain v. State, 315
S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give the same deference to the trial
court’s conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or
demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review
purely legal questions de novo as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not
turn on credibility and demeanor. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011); Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48. We also review de novo “whether the
totality of [the] circumstances is sufficient to support an officer’s reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.” Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48-49.
When, as here, the trial court fails to make explicit findings, we infer a fact
finding to support the trial court’s ruling when the evidence supports the implied
finding. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We afford
the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563,
571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably
supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.
State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Arguellez v. State, 409
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S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Traffic stops require an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that the person
detained is, has been, or will soon engage in criminal activity. Jaganathan v. State,
479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308,
311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The standard is whether, based on facts articulated by
the officer and the totality of the circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer
would have developed suspicion that an offense was in progress or had occurred.
See Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247; Martinez v. State, 500 S.W.3d 456, 465 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492-93
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
Analysis
Hebert’s appellate brief argues that he committed no traffic offense and
Officer Burrell had no authority to stop him for any reason. According to Hebert,
Burrell’s stop of Hebert was “based entirely upon a mischaracterization of the facts
and the misconception that a violation of the Texas traffic law had occurred.” Hebert
argues that although Burrell testified that Hebert almost caused a collision, the video
made from the patrol vehicle’s dash cam revealed that no unsafe action by Hebert
occurred. Hebert further argues that because Burrell did not articulate specific facts
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to support a reasonable suspicion that Hebert committed a traffic offense, the trial
court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop,
citing Mahaffey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 908, 914-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The question is whether a reasonable officer based on the totality of the
circumstances would have believed that an offense occurred or was in progress. See
Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247. Officer Burrell testified that he observed Hebert
drift into his lane and that Burrell had to swerve to avoid a collision. He further
testified on cross-examination that Appellant’s vehicle crossed into his lane. This
uncontroverted testimony supports Officer Burrell’s concern that Appellant may
collide with another vehicle on the road. The video made from the patrol vehicle’s
dash cam was admitted into evidence and published to the jury, and when viewed in
a light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have concluded that it depicts
Hebert’s vehicle veer toward Burrell’s lane of traffic. Therefore, a reasonable officer
based upon the totality of the circumstances could have reasonably concluded that
Hebert was driving in an unsafe manner. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.060(a)
(West 2011).
Affording the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, the evidence
supports the trial court’s implied finding that a reasonable officer, based on the
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totality of the circumstances, would have believed that an offense had occurred or
was in progress. See Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 571; Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Martinez, 500 S.W.3d at 465. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and deferring to the trial court on
credibility determinations and determinations of historical facts, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to suppress. See Crain,
315 S.W.3d at 48.
We conclude that the record supports an inference, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that a reasonable officer would have believed that an offense had
occurred or may occur, and Hebert has not shown either the stop or the warrant to
be invalid. We also conclude that the blood sample was obtained with a valid
warrant. See State v. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(“‘[W]here police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample
can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the
Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.’”) (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U.S. 141, 152 (2013)). We overrule both of Hebert’s issues.
Cross-Issue About the Sentence
In a cross-issue, the State argues that the sentence imposed by the court is
illegal because Hebert was only assessed a fine and was not sentenced to
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confinement. 1 The State argues that because Hebert was not sentenced to
confinement, as required by statute, the sentence is illegal. See Mizell v. State, 119
S.W.3d 804, 805-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc) (sentences below the statutory
minimum are illegal and void).
At trial, Hebert pleaded “true” to a prior DWI conviction. An offense under
section 49.04 of the Penal Code (Driving While Intoxicated) “is a Class A
misdemeanor, with a minimum term of confinement of 30 days, if it is shown on the
trial of the offense that the person has previously been convicted one time of an
offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated[.]” See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04, 49.09(a) (West Supp. 2018). 2 “When a trial court
assesses punishment, it ‘must always be within the minimum and maximum fixed
by law; if the punishment assessed is less than the minimum provided by law, the
judgment of conviction is rendered a nullity.’” State v. Cooley, 401 S.W.3d 748, 750
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Mapes v. State, 187 S.W.3d
655, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d)). Because Hebert’s
1
“[O]nce a convicted defendant files a timely notice of appeal, the appellate
courts have jurisdiction to address any pertinent ‘cross-appeal’ or ‘rebuttal’ issues
raised by the State.” Pfeiffer v. State, 363 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
2
We cite the current versions of statutes because amendments after Hebert’s
offense do not affect our disposition.
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sentence was below the statutory minimum outlined in section 49.04, the sentence
Hebert received is a nullity.
This Court has no authority to reform an illegal or void sentence by adding a
punishment of any amount, “even in the interest of judicial economy and fairness or
even if the addition is de minimis.” Ibarra v. State, 177 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Scott v. State, 988 S.W.2d 947, 948
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Reed v. State, 795 S.W.2d 19, 19-
21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.)). The only remedy is a new
punishment hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(b) (West 2018);
Ibarra, 177 S.W.3d at 284; Scott, 988 S.W.2d at 948; Young v. State, 922 S.W.2d
676, 678 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref’d). We reverse the judgment only as
to the sentence and remand the cause to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(b).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED ON
PUNISHMENT ONLY.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
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Submitted on August 8, 2019
Opinion Delivered September 25, 2019
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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