IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-18-00075-CR
DALE DANIELS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 12th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 26508
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, appellant, Dale Daniels, challenges his conviction for murder. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2019). Specifically, Daniels contends that the trial
court erred when it: (1) allowed his confession to be heard by the jury; and (2) taped him
to his chair with a spit shield, violating his right to due process and the presumption of
innocence. Because we overrule both of Daniels’s issues on appeal, we affirm.
I. DANIELS’S CONFESSION
In his first issue, Daniels argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing the jury to hear his confession, which was allegedly the product of custodial
interrogation without Miranda warnings. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2019). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any
guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. Id.; see Powell v. State, 63
S.W.3d 435, 439-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). If the trial court’s ruling on the admission of
evidence is correct under any theory of law, the trial court’s decision should not be
disturbed, even if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its ruling. Johnson v. State,
490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
B. Applicable Law
Under Miranda, when a criminal suspect is placed in custody, law enforcement
personnel must comply with certain procedural safeguards to protect the suspect’s
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612.
Miranda and its progeny hold that incriminating statements made by the accused, if the
authorities have not given the requisite warnings and the accused has not waived these
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rights, are not admissible. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690,
64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).
The Miranda safeguards apply only when a suspect is placed in custody and
interrogated by police. See id. at 300, 100 S. Ct. at 1689; see also Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d
171, 174-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda
includes both express questioning and also words or actions that, given the officers’
knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the officer knows or reasonably
should know are likely to “have . . . the force of a question on the accused,” and therefore
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 601, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L. Ed. 528 (1990) (citations omitted); see Jones v. State,
795 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The latter part of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. Innis,
446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90.
However, not all post-arrest police questioning can be classified as an
interrogation. See Jones, 795 S.W.2d at 174 n.3. Statements given freely and voluntarily
are admissible in evidence. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. In
distinguishing situations which require safeguards to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination from those that do not, the Miranda court pointed to isolation and
intimidation as key aspects of an interrogation that undermines an individual’s ability to
speak voluntarily. Id. at 449-51, 86 S. Ct. at 1615-16; see Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-
Daniels v. State Page 3
09, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012) (noting that custodial interrogation is a
“term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious
danger of coercion”). When an accused in custody spontaneously volunteers information
that is not in response to earlier interrogation by authorities, the statement is admissible
even though not recorded because it is not the product of custodial interrogation. Stevens
v. State, 671 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure codifies both Miranda’s system of
protecting a suspect against self-incrimination and its distinction between voluntary
statements and compelled confessions. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2,
3, 5 (West 2018). Specifically, article 38.22 prohibits the admission of a written or oral
statement made as a result of custodial interrogation by an accused in a criminal
proceeding without the warnings required by Miranda. See id. art. 38.22, §§ 2, 3. However,
section five of article 38.22 states that nothing in the article precludes the admission of a
statement that is either (1) res gestae of the arrest or offense, (2) a statement that does not
stem from custodial interrogation, or (3) a voluntary statement, whether or not the result
of custodial interrogation. See id. art. 38.22, § 5; see also Galloway v. State, 778 S.W.2d 110,
112 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.). If statements are not made as a result
of custodial interrogation, the requirements of Miranda and article 38.22 do not apply. See
Waldrop v. State, 7 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.); see also Gruber v.
State, 812 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d) (holding that a
Daniels v. State Page 4
statement which is volunteered and not the product of custodial interrogation is
admissible). Thus, if Daniels’s statements were not the result of custodial interrogation,
they are admissible. See Waldrop, 7 S.W.3d at 839; see also Gruber, 812 S.W.2d at 371.
C. Discussion
The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the
admissibility of statements made by Daniels to Steven Miller, the senior warden at the
Byrd Unit. The statements were made when Daniels was being transported from the
holding cell to the sally port, where the transportation vans and buses drop off and pick
up offenders. During this hearing, Miller stated that he did not intend to speak with or
interrogate Daniels while transporting Daniels from the holding cell. However, without
prompting, Daniels asked whether the State was going to kill him. Miller responded by
asking why would the State want to kill Daniels, especially considering Daniels had been
“hollering all morning that [he had not] even done anything.” Daniel volunteered that
he “killed that gay mother fucker [his cell mate, Aaron Spurling].” Miller told Daniels
that he “could look at a capital offense, which could be subject to the death penalty,”
because Daniels was doing a life sentence for aggravated kidnapping and he admitted to
killing Spurling. Daniels then explained that he used his hands, rather than a weapon,
when he killed Spurling. At this point, Miller and Daniels were “almost to the van,” so
Miller advised Daniels that “it’s probably best that he stop talking to me.” Miller denied
soliciting the conversation with Daniels.
Daniels v. State Page 5
At the end of the hearing, the trial court concluded that the statements made by
Daniels to Miller were made freely and voluntarily and, thus, were admissible. In
support of its decision, the trial court stated that Daniels,
was obviously in custody, but in custody of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. He was not in custody as part of an investigation or an
arrest for purposes of an investigation of this particular incident; that he
was not under interrogation, was not being interrogated, and it was not a
custodial interrogation.
Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting Miller’s testimony regarding the statements Daniels made while
being transported from the holding cell. See Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669; see also Powell, 63
S.W.3d at 439-40. The record demonstrates that, when he was being transported from the
holding cell to the van, Daniels was not subject to a custodial interrogation, as the
necessary isolation and intimidation elements were missing. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 508-
09, 132 S. Ct. at 1189; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1630; see also Jones, 795 S.W.2d
at 174 n.3. Indeed, Daniels spontaneously volunteered incriminating statements that
were not coerced and were not in response to earlier interrogation by law enforcement.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 5; see also Stevens, 671 S.W.2d at 520; Galloway,
778 S.W.2d at 112. Therefore, because Daniels’s statements were volunteered and not the
product of a custodial interrogation, Miranda and article 38.22 do not apply, and the
statements are admissible. See Waldrop, 7 S.W.3d at 839; see also Gruber, 812 S.W.2d at 371.
Daniels v. State Page 6
And even if the trial court erred in admitting the complained-of statements made
by Daniels to Miller, we note that Daniels testified to the same information at trial without
objection. Any error in admitting evidence is cured when the same evidence is admitted
elsewhere without objection. See Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);
see also Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, because the
complained-of statements were admitted through Daniels’s testimony without objection,
any error in admitting the evidence was cured. See Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 193; see also Leday,
983 S.W.2d at 718. Accordingly, we overrule Daniels’s first issue.
II. RESTRAINING DANIELS DURING THE PUNISHMENT PHASE OF TRIAL
In his second issue, Daniels asserts that the trial court violated his right to due
process and the presumption of innocence when it ordered that he be handcuffed,
shackled, and taped to a chair with a spit guard placed over his head with a blanket to
hide his arms during the punishment phase of trial.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to shackle a defendant in two stages. See Long v.
State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 282-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Clark v. State, 717 S.W.2d 910,
919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). First, we determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering the defendant shackled. Id. at 282. Next, if we conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion, we determine whether the defendant suffered reversible
harm. Id. at 283. Because the use of shackles implicates constitutional rights, in
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conducting a harm analysis, we must “reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment
unless [we] determine[] beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] did not contribute
to the conviction or punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see Wynn v. State, 219 S.W.3d 54,
60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).
B. Applicable Law
The United States Supreme Court has held that shackling a defendant is
“inherently prejudicial.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345, 89 L.
Ed. 525 (1986). And although the presumption of innocence generally does not apply at
the punishment phase, the trial court must still maintain the defendant’s due-process
right to a meaningful defense and conduct dignified proceedings. Deck v. Missouri, 544
U.S. 622, 632, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2014, 161 L. Ed. 953 (2005). Therefore, courts may not
routinely require defendants to appear in shackles before a jury during either the guilt or
punishment phase of trial; however, exceptional circumstances may demand that a trial
court shackle a defendant. See id. at 628-29, 125 S. Ct. at 2011-12; see also Long, 823 S.W.2d
283. “Examples of exceptional circumstances warranting shackling include situations in
which the accused has a history of escape, expressed an intent to escape, threatened
physical violence, assaulted persons in the courtroom, and repeatedly interrupted court
proceedings.” Keith v. State, 294 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.).
Under such exceptional circumstances, it is within the discretion of the trial court to
require the defendant to be tried in restraints. See Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.
Daniels v. State Page 8
Crim. App. 2013). But the record must manifest the trial court’s reasons for placing the
defendant in restraints. Id.; see Deck, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S. Ct. at 2014-15; Long, 823 S.W.2d
at 282.
C. Discussion
During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, Daniels took the stand to testify in his
own behalf. In his testimony, Daniels admitted to killing Spurling to prevent Spurling
from sexually assaulting him. During cross-examination by the State, Daniels became
combative. At one point, he left the witness seat until his attorney stopped him. Daniels
also decided to quit answering the State’s questions, though his attorney told him he had
to answer. Eventually, the trial court admonished Daniels to answer the State’s questions.
Thereafter, Daniels informed the prosecutor that he would not answer any further
questions, which prompted another admonishment from the trial court. Despite this
admonishment, Daniels refused to answer the prosecutor’s questions, stating that he did
not want to talk to the prosecutor. Another admonishment from the trial court followed.
Next, Daniels answered all of the prosecutor’s questions with, “I don’t know” and
“I don’t remember nothing.” Daniels refused to look at exhibits, and his responses
devolved into “Oh man, get out of my face. I don’t want to talk to you,” followed shortly
by “I’m not talking shit.” At this point, Daniels began repeatedly showing his middle
finger to the prosecutor, answering every question with, “Whatever,” and offering
responses, such as “Fuck you” and “Fuck you, pussy.” Daniels’s attorney asked for a
Daniels v. State Page 9
break to calm Daniels down. The trial court granted the request and removed the jury.
After the break, Daniels remained calm. Ultimately, the jury unanimously found Daniels
guilty of murder, and the court reconvened for the punishment phase of trial four days
later.
At the beginning of the punishment hearing and outside the presence of the jury,
the State asked that Daniels be fingerprinted. When the trial court ordered Daniels to
submit to the fingerprinting, Daniels refused. As the correctional officers fingerprinted
Daniels, a physical altercation ensued. Daniels complained that a correctional officer
broke his finger, and a correctional officer complained that Daniels had spit on him. The
trial court noted that it was taking five officers to restrain Daniels and ordered Daniels
shackled. During this whole ordeal, Daniels was cursing and ordering officers to take
their hands off of him. After being shackled, Daniels proclaimed, “All of you are going
to have a—that’s the only way you’re going to handle me, mother fucker. Yeah. It’s the
only way you’re going to handle me.” In response, the trial judge noted the following:
All right. Mr. Daniels. I do not want you to be in shackles and be . . . your
mouth taped shut . . . in front of the jury, but you don’t leave me any choice,
sir. You have caused a disturbance. It[‘]s obvious that you’re going to cause
a disturbance in the courtroom in its proceedings and make it difficult for
these proceedings to continue unless you are shackled and unless . . . you
are also taped.
During the trial judge’s admonishment, Daniels interrupted repeatedly. Nevertheless,
the trial judge offered to immediately remove all restraints if Daniels would cooperate.
He refused.
Daniels v. State Page 10
The trial judge then stated:
Because of the conduct, because of your spitting on individuals, you’re
going to be required during this proceeding to have that [a spit guard]
placed on your head. It’s not going to be removed. You’re not going to be
allowed to remove it. All right.
In addition to that, sir, your arms are going to be taped to that chair
so that you cannot reach that mask and remove it from your face. And
you’ll not be able to remove yourself from that chair. . . .
If you cooperate, it would not be necessary for us to do that, but
apparently you are not going to cooperate.
Before bringing the jury back in the courtroom, the trial judge described the scene
as follows: “Go ahead and let the record reflect that we are putting like bags over the
defendant’s arms and his hand in order to be able to mask some of the effects of the
shackles and the duct tape.” Daniels’s appointed counsel also took pictures of the
shackling, and the trial court admitted them into evidence. As indicated in the pictures,
when the jury was brought back into the courtroom, Daniels had a blanket draped over
him to hide the effects of the shackles and duct tape, though the spit guard was visible to
the jury.
It is important to note that the restraints complained of by Daniels were placed on
him after the jury returned a guilty verdict, but before the punishment phase of trial
began. Furthermore, it was Daniels’s disruptive and potentially dangerous behavior that
made the restraints necessary during the punishment phase of trial. In that vein, the trial
court assessed the need for restraints for Daniels. The trial court did not merely express
Daniels v. State Page 11
generalized safety concerns. Cf. Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283 (holding that the trial court erred
where no particularized finding articulating the reason for shackling the defendant was
made, only “a generalized concern for courtroom safety” and no justifiable reasons were
clear from the record). Rather, the trial court specifically referenced Daniels’s vulgar
outbursts, failure to cooperate, spitting on officers, and the fact that it took five officers to
restrain Daniels so that his fingerprints could be taken. Moreover, the record
demonstrates that Daniels refused to follow the trial court’s repeated verbal instructions
and admonishments from the time the State closed its case-in-chief and into the
punishment phase of trial. Additionally, on two occasions, the court offered to remove
the restraints if Daniels cooperated, but Daniels refused. Daniels threatened that his
shackling was the “only way you’re going to handle [him].”
We, therefore, conclude that the record establishes that Daniels was disruptive and
physically and verbally abusive towards others, including the trial judge and correctional
officers. Given the evidence outlined above, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his
discretion by ordering that Daniels be shackled with a spit guard placed over his head.
See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628-29, 125 S. Ct. at 2011-12; Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 281; Long, 823 S.W.2d
at 282-83; see also Keith, 294 S.W.3d at 355; Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676, 681-82 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion by shackling the defendant during voir dire because of his outbursts). And
because we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we need not
Daniels v. State Page 12
address the second step, which involves a constitutional harm analysis under Rule
44.2(a). Accordingly, we overrule Daniels’s second issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
JOHN E. NEILL
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed September 25, 2019
Do not publish
[CRPM]
Daniels v. State Page 13