NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 27 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-50125
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
8:16-cr-00082-JLS-1
v.
JOHNNY MORALES CASTRO, AKA MEMORANDUM*
Heist,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,** District
Judge.
Johnny Castro appeals the supervised release conditions imposed by the
district court as part of his sentence for being a felon in possession of ammunition,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the
District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Rudd, 662
F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011), we affirm.
1. Castro argues that the district court’s imposition of gang-association
conditions of release was based on insufficiently reliable or false evidence.
Contrary to his assumption, the district court did not find that he had been a gang
member, and an officer’s alleged statement to the contrary was not “the sole basis”
for the district court’s determination that he had “ties to the Middleside Street
gang.” Castro himself acknowledged such ties when he represented that he “lived
in an area that has such gangs and/or has family members or friends/acquaintances
who are members of a gang.” Castro’s own admission provides “some minimal
indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation,” and the district court was entitled
to rely on it. United States v. Reyes, 772 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2009)).
2. Castro also argues that the gang conditions are overbroad because they
are not reasonably related to his offense or criminal history and because they
involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary. “The supervised release
conditions need not relate to the offense” so long as “they are reasonably related to
the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation” and “involve no
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” United States v. T.M.,
330 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting 18
2
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)). Castro admitted that his crime resulted from his hanging
around with a “bad crowd,” and the district court properly sought “to prevent
reversion into a former crime-inducing lifestyle by barring contact with old haunts
and associates.” United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991). The
conditions are neither overbroad nor vague, see, e.g., United States v. Soltero, 510
F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), and are “consistent with well-
established jurisprudence under which we presume prohibited criminal acts require
an element of mens rea.” United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.
2018) (quoting United States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2008)), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 133 (2018).
AFFIRMED.
3