NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 27 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL MOSHE PERRY, AKA Moshe No. 18-56530
Michael A. Perry,
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-08091-FMO-
Plaintiff-Appellant, MRW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PATRICK DALEE, COO, Dupure Int’l, Eco
Water; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Michael Moshe Perry’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket Entry
No. 3) is granted. The Clerk will file the opening brief submitted at Docket Entry
No. 4.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Perry appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying him in forma
pauperis status and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and
state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order), and we affirm.
In his opening brief, Perry fails to argue how the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Perry has thus waived his challenge to the district court’s dismissal.
See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s
opening brief.”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues
not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived); see also
Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture
arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim . . . .”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perry’s motion to
reassign his case to another judge because Perry did not demonstrate his case was
not randomly assigned. See Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015)
(standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perry’s motion for
reconsideration because Perry failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch.
2 18-56530
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.
1993) (standard of review and setting forth grounds for reconsideration).
In light of this disposition, we do not consider the merits of Perry’s
arguments regarding his claims or his remaining contentions.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-56530