NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 18 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIO JOSE RODRIGUEZ- No. 16-72425
ALVARADO,
Agency No. A206-736-731
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 16, 2019**
San Diego, California
Before: HURWITZ, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Mario Jose Rodriguez-Alvarado, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of a final removal order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Against Torture (“CAT”). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and deny the
petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Rodriguez-Alvarado failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Rodriguez-
Alvarado failed to present sufficient evidence that his proposed particular social
group of “young males from El Salvador taking concrete steps to avoid gang
recruitment” had “the requisite particularity and social distinction to be
cognizable.” To be cognizable, a “particular social group” must be “(1) composed
of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Reyes v.
Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016). Although this court has determined
that “persons taking concrete steps to oppose gang membership and gang
authority” may plausibly constitute a particular social group, “the agency must
make a case-by-case determination as to whether the group is recognized by the
particular society in question.” Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.
2014).
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Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Rodriguez-
Alvarado failed to meet the particularity requirement because he did not establish
that Salvadoran society recognizes his proposed group “as a discrete class of
persons.” Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1134 (citation omitted). Rodriguez-Alvarado’s
general evidence about gang violence does not compel the conclusion that
Salvadoran society considers “young males from El Salvador taking concrete steps
to avoid gang recruitment” as a distinct social group. See id. at 1138. Even if
Rodriguez-Alvarado had presented sufficient evidence that his proposed particular
social group were cognizable, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that he failed to meet the “nexus” requirement because he did not
show that the gangs targeted him based on his membership in that group, and not
simply for monetary gain or to increase gang membership. Id. at 1132 n.3.
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Rodriguez-
Alvarado’s refusal to join the gang or comply with their demands, standing alone,
did not constitute an imputed political opinion. See Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d
849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that he was persecuted
on account of a political opinion because, despite his refusal to join the gang, he
“failed to present evidence that he was politically or ideologically opposed to the
ideals espoused by the gang that recruited him (or to gangs in general), or that the
gang imputed to him any particular political belief”), abrogated in part on other
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grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
banc). Nor did the gang members’ purported belief that Rodriguez-Alvarado was
aligned with a rival gang constitute an imputed political opinion. Cf. Zetino v.
Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). In any event, Rodriguez-Alvarado
failed to meet the “nexus” requirement because he did not show that gang members
targeted him on account of any imputed political opinion. See Barrios, 581 F.3d at
856 (stating that rather than political opinion, “[t]he evidence instead supports the
conclusion that the gang victimized him for economic and personal reasons”); see
also Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (stating that a petitioner’s “desire to be free from
harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members
bears no nexus to a protected ground”).
2. Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Rodriguez-Alvarado does not qualify for CAT protection. Rodriguez-Alvarado
failed to show that he fears severe pain or suffering “inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity” if returned to El Salvador. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(1); see also Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir.
2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and
prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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