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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
RALPH RICHARD RUPRECHT, : No. 333 WDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 23, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0012197-2016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019
Ralph Richard Reprecht appeals from the August 23, 2017 judgment of
sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County following
appellant’s conviction of numerous sexually based offenses. After careful
review, we affirm.
On August 23, 2017, appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea in
which he pled guilty to 21 offenses, including, inter alia, one count each of
rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), IDSI person less than
16 years of age, sexual assault, sexual exploitation of children, and statutory
sexual assault, and two counts of unlawful contact with a minor – sexual
exploitation.1 Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3123(a)(7), 3124.1, 6320(a),
3122.1(b), and 6318(a)(6), respectively.
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sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 8-16 years’ imprisonment, to be
followed by 20 years’ probation. Appellant did not file any post-sentence
motions, nor did he pursue a direct appeal.
Appellant requested the reinstatement of his rights to file a
post-sentence motion and direct appeal, which the trial court granted on
September 24, 2018. On October 3, 2018, appellant filed a motion to
modify/reduce sentence or, in the alternative, a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, alleging the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made.
The trial court denied appellant’s post-sentence motions by operation of law
on February 15, 2019.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 28, 2019. The trial
court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and appellant timely complied. The trial
court subsequently filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[I.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion
in failing to grant [appellant’s] motion to
withdraw guilty plea in that [appellant] was
under duress at the time of the plea and the
[trial c]ourt specifically failed to inform
[appellant] of the fines he would face upon
pleading guilty, thereby rendering the plea
unknowing, involuntary and unintelligent, and
the failure to allow for the plea to be withdrawn
has resulted in a manifest injustice[?]
[II.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion
in failing to grant [appellant’s] motion for
modification or reduction of sentence where the
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sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and
an abuse of discretion and additionally, the
[t]rial [c]ourt failed to make a meaningful
inquiry into the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721, et seq[?]
Appellant’s brief at 7.2
In his first issue, appellant contends that his guilty plea was not entered
into voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently because he was not informed that
he would be liable for court costs prior to the entry of his guilty plea. (Id. at
23.)
“The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests
with the trial court’s discretion, and we will not disturb the court’s decision on
such motion unless the court abused that discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Gordy, 73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 318 (Pa.
2014), citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 748 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa.Super.
2000).
“[A] defendant who attempts to withdraw a guilty plea
after sentencing must demonstrate prejudice on the
order of manifest injustice before withdrawal is
justified.” Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d
1267, 1271 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). A
showing of manifest injustice may be established if the
plea was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or
unintelligently. Id.
Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Pa.Super. 2011).
Indeed, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that guilty pleas
2 For ease of discussion, we have re-ordered appellant’s statement of
questions involved.
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be taken in open court and that the trial court determine that, inter alia, “the
defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines for the
offenses charged[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
This court has further summarized:
In order for a guilty plea to be
constitutionally valid, the guilty plea
colloquy must affirmatively show that the
defendant understood what the plea
connoted and its consequences. This
determination is to be made by examining
the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus,
even though there is an omission or defect
in the guilty plea colloquy, a plea of guilty
will not be deemed invalid if the
circumstances surrounding the entry of
the plea disclose that the defendant had a
full understanding of the nature and
consequences of his plea and that he
knowingly and voluntarily decided to
enter the plea.
[Commonwealth v.] Fluharty, 632 A.2d [312] 314-
315 [(Pa.Super. 1993)] (citation omitted).
Finally, we apply the following when addressing an
appellate challenge to the validity of a guilty plea:
Our law presumes that a defendant who
enters a guilty plea was aware of what he
was doing. He bears the burden of
proving otherwise.
***
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, [523
(Pa.Super. 2003)] (citations omitted).
Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1047.
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Throughout his argument, appellant appears to be equating the
imposition of fines with the imposition of costs. We find that appellant has
drawn a false equivalency.
Often following a criminal conviction, the trial court
places a monetary imposition on the defendant. The
imposition of costs and restitution are not considered
punishment. Both costs and restitution are designed
to have the defendant make the government and the
victim whole. Restitution compensates the victim for
his loss and rehabilitates the defendant by impressing
upon him that his criminal conduct caused the victim’s
loss and he is responsible to repair that loss. See
Commonwealth v. Runion, [] 662 A.2d 617, 618
([Pa.] 1995). Costs are a reimbursement to the
government for the expenses associated with the
criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). Costs
and restitution are akin to collateral
consequences. Conversely, fines are considered
direct consequences and, therefore, punishment. See
Parry [v. Rosemeyer], 64 F.3d [110] at 114 [(3d
Cir. 1995)] (quoting [United States v.] Salmon, 944
F.2d [1106] at 1130 [(3d Cir. 1991)]); see also
Commonwealth v. Martin, [] 335 A.2d 424
([Pa.Super.] 1975) (requiring an indignent to pay a
$5,000.00 fine was per se manifestly excessive and
constituted too severe [a] punishment). The [General
Assembly] authorized fines for all offenses and
intended to relate the amount of the fine to the gravity
of the offense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1101 . . .
Historically, fines are punishment. A fine is a
monetary amount equal to the severity of the crime
and has been used to ensure that a person does not
receive a pecuniary gain from the offense.
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 95 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa.Super. 2014) (emphasis
added), quoting Commonwealth v. Wall, 867 A.2d 578, 583 (Pa.Super.
2005). This court has also previously stated that a defendant’s not being
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informed of the potential collateral consequences of a guilty plea does not
undermine the validity of the guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Brown, 680
A.2d 884, 887 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 689 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1997).
Here, the record reflects that the trial court ascertained that appellant
was aware of the permissible range of sentences for the offenses to which he
pled guilty. (See notes of testimony, 8/23/17 at 5-15.) Accordingly, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.3
In his second issue, appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Specifically, appellant claims that his sentence was manifestly
excessive. As noted above, the trial court sentenced appellant to 8-16 years’
imprisonment, followed by 20 years’ probation, pursuant to the terms of a
negotiated guilty plea agreement.
The entry of a guilty plea is tantamount to the waiver of any issues on
appeal with the exception of challenges pertaining to the jurisdiction of the
court, the validity of the guilty plea, and the legality of the sentence.
Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2006), citing
3 In his statement of questions presented, appellant also averred that he was
under duress at the time he entered into his guilty plea. (Appellant’s brief
at 7.) Appellant failed to include any discussion in his brief as to how he was
under duress at the time he entered into the guilty plea, therefore, any claim
relating to duress is waived on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Freeman,
128 A.3d 1231, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015); Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (holding that failure
to develop an argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim
on appeal).
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Commonwealth v. Messmer, 863 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa.Super. 2004).
“Where[, as here,] the plea agreement contains a negotiated sentence which
is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no authority to
permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence.”
Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa.Super. 1991).
In his second issue, appellant does not challenge the legality of his
sentence; rather, his claim solely addresses the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. (See appellant’s brief at 17-22.) Pursuant to our holding in
Reichle, we do not have authority to review the discretionary aspects of
appellant’s sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Shogan, J. joins this Memorandum.
McLaughlin, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/22/2019
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