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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-11301
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cr-00051-JES-CM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LENIN MARTINEZ-ALVARADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 19-11309
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cr-00036-JES-MRM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LENIN MARTINEZ-ALVARADO,
a.k.a. Lenin Alvarado-Martinez,
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Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 25, 2019)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lenin Martinez-Alvarado (“Alvarado”) appeals his 54-month total sentence
for illegal re-entry into the United States and violation of his supervised release. On
appeal, Alvarado argues that the sentences are substantively unreasonable because
the district court did not appropriately weigh his personal history, circumstances,
and criminal history in determining the sentences’ length and in running the
sentences consecutively. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which
“merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
351 (2007)). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is
unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
In reviewing the “‘substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence imposed under
an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’”
Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). The
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district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to
comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1 The court must consider
all of the § 3553(a) factors, but it may give greater weight to some factors over others
-- a decision which is within its sound discretion. United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). However, a sentence may be substantively
unreasonable when a court unjustifiably relies on any single § 3553(a) factor, fails
to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on impermissible factors,
or selects the sentence arbitrarily. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191-92. A sentence that
suffers from one of these symptoms is not per se unreasonable; rather, we must
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the sentence’s
reasonableness. Id. at 1192. “[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof)
that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor . . . as long as the sentence
ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United
States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation, alteration and
emphasis omitted). We will vacate a sentence only if we “are left with the definite
and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
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The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191).
We consider as indicators of reasonableness whether the sentence is well
below the statutory maximum and whether it falls within the guideline range. See
United States v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding a sentence
was substantively reasonable because it was below the statutory maximum); United
States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming a within-guideline
sentence because sentences within the guideline range are expected to be
reasonable). In addition, the Guidelines advise that any term of imprisonment based
on the revocation of supervised release shall be consecutive to any sentence the
defendant is serving. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f).
Here, Alvarado has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. At the sentencing hearing -- which
dealt both with Alvarado’s illegal re-entry offense and the violation of his supervised
release -- the district court considered the personal struggles that Alvarado
highlighted, including his economic motivations, back problems, and alcohol abuse,
in conjunction with the other § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the need to
deter Alvarado and others from illegal re-entry and to provide just punishment. The
court acknowledged that Alvarado had accepted responsibility and that a number of
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his convictions were not serious, but the court balanced those offenses against his
repeat removal and re-entry violations, concluding that the need to deter and provide
just punishment outweighed the lesser offenses. As for its decision to run the
sentences consecutively, the court weighed Alvarado’s argument against the
guideline’s range and policy statements, ultimately following § 7B1.3(f) and running
the sentences consecutively. Notably, the court’s revocation sentence was lower
than the Bureau of Prison’s recommendation, and both sentences were within the
guideline’s range and below the statutory maximum. Nagel, 835 F.3d at 1377; Hunt,
526 F.3d at 746. On this record, we cannot say that district court imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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