NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4852-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent, October 28, 2019
APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
JOE D. NICOLAS, a/k/a JOSE
D. NICOLAS, and DIMITRI
JOE NICOLAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted September 18, 2019 – Decided October 28, 2019
Before Judges Whipple, Gooden Brown and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 15-09-
1200.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public Defender
II, of counsel and on the brief).
Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief; John J. Scaliti, Legal
Assistant, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WHIPPLE, J.A.D.
Defendant Joe D. Nicolas pled guilty to third-degree possession of 100
grams of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) called alpha-
pyrrolidinopentiophenone (alpha-PVP), also known as "flakka," in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). He appeals from a March 23, 2018, judgment of
conviction, arguing the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss
the indictment because the substance defendant possessed was not illegal
under New Jersey law. We affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record. On April 23, 2015,
narcotics officers arrested defendant after a successful undercover buy-bust
operation in Fort Lee. Defendant was charged with second-degree possession
of CDS (alpha-PVP), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(4), and
third-degree possession of CDS (alpha-PVP), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1).
Defendant appeared before the trial judge on a motion to dismiss the
indictment, and argued alpha-PVP was not illegal to possess under New Jersey
law. On May 25, 2017, the judge denied the motion with a written decision.
On January 26, 2018, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the third -degree
charge. On March 23, 2018, he was sentenced to a three-year term of
probation, and the second-degree charge was dismissed. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
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POINT I
THE INDICTMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED BECAUSE POSSESSION OF ALPHA-
[PVP] WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW ON APRIL
23, 2015.
POINT II
THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED,
AND THE CHARGES DISMISSED, BECAUSE
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW BY A STATUTORY- AND
ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW SCHEME SO VAGUE
THAT PEOPLE OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE
MUST GUESS AT ITS MEANING. (Not Raised
Below).
We first address whether defendant waived his right to appeal from the
May 25, 2017 denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Question 4(e) of
defendant's plea form states defendant intended to enter a conditional plea,
reserving his right to appeal "[the] [m]otion to [d]ismiss [and] [m]otion to
[r]eveal [c]onfidential [i]nformant[.]" However, during the plea colloquy, the
plea judge did not acknowledge defendant's reservations. Instead, the plea
judge asked defendant whether he understood he was "giving up [his] right to
file an appeal or any pretrial motion, with exception of a motion to suppress
physical evidence, or enter a pretrial intervention program," to which
defendant answered, "Yes." Later in the colloquy, defendant admitted alpha-
PVP was a controlled dangerous substance in New Jersey.
A-4852-17T1
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On appeal, the State acknowledges defendant's plea was conditional and
the parties failed to correct the plea judge. Ordinarily, a guilty plea
conditioned on the reservation of the right to appeal must be approved by the
plea judge and the reservation "must be placed 'on the record.'" State v.
Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 586 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting R. 3:9-3(f)). Here,
the State concedes that denying defendant appellate review of his failed
motion to dismiss the indictment would effectively thwart the "reasonable
expectations" on which he pled guilty. State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 134-35
(2003).
Fairness dictates we address defendant's Point I because he anticipated
as much when he agreed to plead guilty. See Davila, 443 N.J. Super. at 586.
"Notions of fairness apply to each side in the plea bargaining process."
Bellamy, 178 N.J. at 134 (quoting State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 443 (1989)).
However, for the same reason, we decline to address defendant's Point II
because the void-for-vagueness argument was neither reserved in defendant's
guilty plea nor raised in his motion to dismiss the indictment.
A judge should dismiss an indictment "'only on the "clearest and plainest
ground,"' and only when the indictment is manifestly deficient or palpably
defective." State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 228-229 (1996) (quoting State v.
Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 168 (1991)). "We will not disturb the denial of such a
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motion 'unless [the judge's discretionary authority] has been clearly abused.'"
State v. Saavedra, 433 N.J. Super. 501, 514 (App. Div. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51, 60 (App. Div.
1994)). However, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. State
v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540-41 (2013).
Adhering to this standard of review, we reject defendant's argument that
alpha-PVP was not considered a Schedule I CDS at the time of his arrest. The
New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (CDSA) both affords and
restricts the authority of the Director of Consumer Affairs in the Department of
Law and Public Safety (Director) to schedule and control certain hazardous
substances. On one hand, N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a) permits the Director to control a
substance after considering eight factors concerning the substance's potential
for abuse, the scientific evidence and knowledge of the substance's effects, and
the risk to public health. However, "[i]f any substance is designated,
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled dangerous substance under federal law
and notice thereof is given to the [D]irector, the [D]irector shall similarly
control the substance . . . after the expiration of [thirty] days from the
publication in the Federal Register[.]" N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c). Should the
Director "object" to the federal government's "inclusion, rescheduling, or
deletion[,] . . . the director shall cause to be published in the New Jersey
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Register and made public the reasons for his objection and shall afford all
interested parties an opportunity to be heard." Ibid.
In 2014, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) temporarily placed alpha-PVP in Schedule I. Schedules of Controlled
Substances: Temporary Placement of 10 Synthetic Cathinones into Schedule I,
79 Fed. Reg. 12,938 (Mar. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). A
substance's temporary designation lasts two years, and the DEA may, as it did
in alpha-PVP's case, extend the temporary scheduling for up to one more year.
21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(2); Schedules of Controlled Substances: Extension of
Temporary Placement of 10 Synthetic Cathinones in Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 11,429 (Mar. 4, 2016) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). The Director declined to object to the DEA's
designation of alpha-PVP in Schedule I. Thus, at the time of defendant's 2015
arrest, alpha-PVP was a Schedule I drug under both federal and New Jersey
law.
Defendant argues alpha-PVP's designation as such by the federal
government does not necessarily mean the substance was in Schedule I under
the CDSA. Rather, defendant contends that once the federal government
schedules a substance, N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) requires the Director to either
update the list of controlled substances through publication in the New Jersey
A-4852-17T1
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Register or file an objection to the federal government's scheduling of the
substance. Because the Director never formally recognized alpha-PVP as a
controlled substance after the federal government did so, defendant argues his
possession of alpha-PVP was not contrary to New Jersey law at the time of his
arrest.
We disagree. When the federal government schedules a substance,
N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) gives the Director thirty days to do one of two things: (1)
control the substance consistent with the federal government's scheduli ng, or
(2) file an objection in the New Jersey Register. Absent is a requirement that
the Director give notice when he or she intends to control the substance as
directed by federal law. Thus, if the Director fails to file an objection to the
federal government's scheduling within thirty days, as was the case with alpha-
PVP, the Director must control the substance consonant with federal law.
The regulations promulgated by the Director confirm that substances
scheduled by the federal government automatically receive the same
designation under the CDSA, unless the Director objects. N.J.A.C. 13:45H-1.7
provides:
regulations promulgated pursuant to the United States
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, which designate, reschedule or delete a
substance as a controlled substance under Federal
Law, shall be deemed to be effective under [the
CDSA] [thirty] days after their effective date of the
A-4852-17T1
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Federal regulation, unless the Director, within that
[thirty] day period, shall object to inclusion,
rescheduling or deletion, which objection shall
thereafter be published in the New Jersey Register.
And N.J.A.C. 13:45H-10.1(b) notes that "[a]ny reference in this chapter to
controlled dangerous substance Schedules I, II, III, IV and V shall mean the
Federal schedules promulgated at 21 C[.]F[.]R[.] [§§] 1308.11 through
1308.15 . . . unless the Director objects . . . in accordance with . . . N.J.S.A.
24:21-3 and N.J.A.C. 13:45H-1.7." Therefore, alpha-PVP was automatically
included in Schedule I because the Director did not object to the federal
government's designation.
Defendant's reliance on Kadonsky v. Lee, 452 N.J. Super. 198 (App.
Div. 2017) does not compel a different conclusion. In that case, an inmate
filed a petition with the Director seeking to have marijuana reclassified from
Schedule I to Schedule IV in light of the New Jersey Compassionate Use
Medical Marijuana Act. Id. at 200. The Director rejected the petition,
claiming he had no authority to reschedule marijuana in a manner inconsistent
with federal law. Id. at 200-01. We reversed the Director, explaining that
N.J.S.A. 24:21-3 permits the Director to diverge from the federal schedule
after weighing the factors in N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a). Id. at 208-09. Although
there appears to be tension between subsection (a), which affords the Director
the authority to schedule substances, and subsection (c), requiring the Director
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to control substances coextensively with federal law, the statute does not
prohibit the Director from revisiting a classification and departing from the
federal government's schedule. Id. at 209 ("[W]e conclude that the Director
erred in determining he lacked the authority to reclassify marijuana without a
change in existing federal law."). Therefore, while federal regulation provides
a CDS scheduling baseline, N.J.S.A. 24:21-3 does not prohibit the Director
from either objecting to a federal classification or rescheduling a substance.
Notably, the Kadonsky court did not suggest the Director must republish
updated CDS schedules each and every time the federal government revises its
own schedules. Rather, the Director need only provide notice when he or she
"objects to [the federal government's] inclusion, rescheduling, or deletion" of a
CDS and to "periodically" "update and republish the schedules" in N.J.S.A.
24:21-5 to -8.1. N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) & (d). In this case, the Director was not
obligated to provide notice that alpha-PVP was added to Schedule I the
moment it became a CDS. And, for that reason, the judge properly denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.
Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOE D. NICOLAS (15-09-1200, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
Combined Opinion