FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 30 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANDOLPH FITCH, on behalf of No. 19-56119
himself, all others similarly situated and on
behalf of the general public, D.C. No.
2:19-cv-00590-RGK-MAA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SHAW INDUSTRIES, INC.; SHAW
INDUSTRIES GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 21, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, PAEZ, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Shaw Industries, Inc. (Shaw) appeals from the district court’s sua sponte
remand of Randolph Fitch’s putative class action against Shaw for allegedly not
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
properly paying its hourly non-exempt workers. The district court held that Shaw
had not made the requisite showing that the matter in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000.
This appeal is controlled by our recent decision in Arias v. Residence Inn by
Marriott, 936 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2019), which vacated a similar remand order. In
Arias we held “that when a notice of removal plausibly alleges a basis for federal
court jurisdiction, a district court may not remand the case back to state court
without first giving the defendant an opportunity to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 925. We
conclude that in this case Shaw’s notice of removal “plausibly alleges a basis for
federal court jurisdiction,” and accordingly we vacate the district court’s sua sponte
remand order.
On remand, should the district court again consider remanding this action to
the state court, it should follow our holdings in Arias that: (1) “a removing
defendant’s notice of removal ‘need not contain evidentiary submissions’ but only
plausible allegations of the jurisdictional elements”; (2) “when a defendant’s
allegations of removal jurisdiction are challenged, the defendant’s showing on the
amount in controversy may rely on reasonable assumptions”; and (3) “when a
statute or contract provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, prospective
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attorneys’ fees must be included in the assessment of the amount in controversy.”
Id. at 922 (quoting Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 755 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th
Cir. 2015)).
The district court’s order remanding this action to the state court is
VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the district court.
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