In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-19-00266-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF A.N.
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On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CV1812859
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
B.N. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, A.N. 1, 2
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds exist
for termination of B.N.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in
A.N.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Appellant’s
1
We identify minors in appeals in parental-rights termination cases by using an
alias to protect the minor’s identity and all members of the child’s family. See Tex.
R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
2
R.N., A.N.’s father, did not appear at trial and does not appeal the termination
of his parental rights.
1
court-appointed counsel submitted a brief in which counsel contends there are no
meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005,
no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel
certified Appellant was served with a copy of the Anders brief filed on her behalf.
This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the
deadline for filing the response. B.N. filed a pro se letter in response to counsel’s
Anders brief but failed to raise any issues challenging the trial court’s termination.
We have independently reviewed the appellate record, counsel’s brief, and B.N.’s
pro se response, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable
error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State,
813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating B.N.’s parental
rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by B.N.’s court-appointed appellate
counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all
appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016). In the event B.N. decides to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Texas, counsel’s obligations to B.N. can be met “by filing a petition for review that
satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
2
AFFIRMED.
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CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on October 22, 2019
Opinion Delivered November 7, 2019
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
3