J-S51005-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
THOMAS E. YOST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AMY E. YOST :
:
Appellant : No. 495 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 5, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County
Civil Division at No(s): 17-0632
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2019
Amy E. Yost (“Wife”) appeals from the March 5, 2019 divorce decree
entered in the Union County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, Wife
challenges the order granting Thomas E. Yost’s (“Husband”) petition for
enforcement of agreement and contends, inter alia, that the agreement was
not a final resolution of the parties’ economic issues attendant to their divorce.
After review, we affirm.
In summary, Wife and Husband married on September 17, 1996, and
separated on April 15, 2007. Prior to separation, Wife drafted and the parties
executed a document titled “Agreement of Seperation [sic] of Property and
Financial Responsibility Between Thomas E. Yost and Amy E. Yost.” In that
document (hereinafter, “Agreement”), it delineates which party will take
possession of certain household items (e.g., a television, riding lawn mower,
and piano). Further, the Agreement identifies the proposed distribution of
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financial accounts and prospective financial support obligations. The
Agreement was signed by both parties and was notarized.
Husband filed a complaint in divorce on October 12, 2017. Wife filed an
answer and counterclaim to Husband’s complaint, asserting her alleged right
to equitable distribution of the marital estate, alimony pendente lite,
reasonable attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and alimony. Thereafter, Husband
filed a petition for enforcement of the Agreement. The trial court granted
Husband’s petition, finding that: 1) the Agreement was a valid and enforceable
contract between the parties; 2) the Agreement resolved all economic claims;
and 3) Wife was given full and fair financial disclosure of Husband’s assets.
The parties divorced by decree on March 5, 2019. Wife filed a timely
appeal and challenges the trial court’s grant of Husband’s petition. 1 See Trial
Court’s Opinion, 5/28/19, at 1-2.
Wife raises six questions for our review:
1) Did the trial court err in determining the Agreement was a
full and final resolution of the parties’ economic issues
attendant to the divorce?
____________________________________________
1 As the trial court’s order granting Husband’s petition is implicitly an order
that only seeks to distribute current property and allocate the burdens of
future support claims, it was interlocutory. See Wilson v. Wilson, 828 A.2d
376, 378 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted) (defining a final order as “one
which ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case” and indicating that
“settlement of economic and property claims is merely a part of the trial
court’s broader power to terminate the marriage”). Accordingly, the appeal is
properly before us as the trial court’s grant could not have been reviewed until
it had “been rendered final by the entry of a decree in divorce.” Id. (citation
omitted).
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2) Did the trial court err in denying Wife’s claims in equitable
distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs?
3) Did the trial court err in permitting parol evidence to
interpret certain aspects of the Agreement?
4) Did the trial court err in determining that Husband provided
Wife full and fair financial disclosure of his assets?
5) Did the trial court err in determining that Wife waived her
interest in Husband’s Federal Employees’ Retirement
System (“FERS”) Plan?
6) Did the trial court err in determining that the economic
issues between the parties that are not addressed in the
Agreement are resolved by the Agreement?
See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
“When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court is the
sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp
the trial court’s fact-finding function.” Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d
1251, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). With
that in mind, “we must decide whether the trial court committed an error of
law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
“[J]udicial discretion” requires action in conformity with law on
facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and
due consideration. Such discretion is not absolute, but must
constitute the exercises of sound discretion. This is especially so
where, as here, there is law to apply. On appeal, a trial court's
decision will generally not be reversed unless there appears to
have been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in
applying correct principles of law. An “abuse of discretion” or
failure to exercise sound discretion is not merely an error of
judgment. But if, in reaching a conclusion, law is overridden or
misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable
or lacking in reason, discretion must be held to have been abused.
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Id. (citation omitted). “Because contract interpretation is a question of law,
this Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation.” Id. (citation
omitted). Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and the
scope of our review is plenary. See id. (citation omitted). “However, we are
bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.” Id., at 1257-58.
Wife’s arguments can be distilled down into three categories: 1) the
Agreement was not a full and final resolution of all obligations attendant to
divorce; 2) the trial court erred by admitting parol evidence in its
interpretation of the Agreement; and 3) Husband did not provide Wife with a
full and fair financial disclosure of his assets. See Appellant’s Brief, at 7-20.
Given the large amount of overlap between these claims, all three can be
considered in tandem with one another.
“When interpreting an antenuptial agreement, the court must
determine the intention of the parties.” Sabad v. Fessenden, 825 A.2d 682,
688 (Pa. Super. 2003). “When the words of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be discovered from the express
language of the agreement. Where ambiguity exists, however, the courts are
free to construe the terms against the drafter and to consider extrinsic
evidence in so doing.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Wife argues that because there was no reference in the Agreement to
assets that were not enumerated nor language evincing an intent to resolve
outstanding statutory rights that Wife may have been entitled to, the
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Agreement only allocates those items specifically identified and nothing more.
See Appellant’s Brief, at 7-11. As such, Husband’s FERS plan as well as the
concepts of equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and
attorney’s fees should have been considered and adjudicated by the trial
court.
We note that the Agreement, while in the reproduced record, is not in
the certified record. See Reproduced Record, at 22, 26. Therefore, arguably,
Wife has waived all of her claims attacking the Agreement. See
Commonwealth v. Petroll, 696 A.2d 817, 836 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“When a
claim is dependent on materials not provided in the certified record, that claim
is considered waived.”) (citation omitted). However, even if we were to
address the merits of her claims based upon the document in the reproduced
record, we find them to fail.
First, Wife concedes that “she prepared the document,” id., at 8, so to
the extent the trial court found an ambiguity with the Agreement, the trial
court was free to construe its terms against Wife. See Windows v. Erie Ins.
Exch., 161 A.3d 953, 957 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Second, the sole case cited by Wife, Sabad v. Fessenden, holds, in
part, that a claim to alimony was not waived through the existence of a marital
agreement that was silent on the issue because the parties agreed that there
was no intent to waive alimony rights. See 825 A.2d at 691.
Here, Husband does not agree that there was no intention to waive
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alimony rights. As such, the intent of the parties is a disputed issue.
Instead, the more analogous case is our Supreme Court’s decision in
Stoner v. Stoner, which held that an uncounseled postnuptial agreement
does not have to contemplate or explicitly waive statutory rights, such as
alimony, to be valid and cause waiver of those statutory rights. See 819 A.2d
529, 534 (Pa. 2003). Instead, in assessing whether a postnuptial agreement
is enforceable, “the right balance is struck by requiring full disclosure of
financial assets, in conjunction with the protection of traditional contract
remedies for fraud, misrepresentation or duress.” Id., at 533. Therefore, if
full financial disclosure is provided and there is no allegation of fraud,
misrepresentation, or duress, the Agreement is enforceable.
Third, the trial court found the Agreement to be a full and final resolution
of all outstanding economic issues between the parties and thereafter received
testimony to ascertain whether Wife was provided with a full financial
disclosure of Husband’s assets. In accordance with the Stoner decision, we
conclude that the trial court was free to proceed in the manner that it did.
Although the Agreement does not mention statutory rights, Husband and Wife
did not need to explicitly waive all claims to equitable distribution, alimony,
alimony pendente lite, and reasonable attorney’s fees for the Agreement to
be enforceable and for the trial court to find waiver of those rights. As our
Supreme Court declined “to impose the additional inquiry as to whether the
parties were sufficiently advised of their statutory rights[,]” id., at 672, there
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has been no error of law nor abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when the trial
court found the Agreement to be valid, it was empowered to simultaneously
conclude that Wife waived her right to those potential statutory rights.
Here, the court found that the Agreement contemplated all outstanding
economic issues. The Agreement unequivocally identifies that “the total
financial obligation that [Husband] will pay [Wife] … is $56,100.” Agreement,
Reproduced Record, at 22 (emphasis added). To contradict the clear language
that this Agreement is anything but a complete and terminal distribution of all
financial and chattel property would be to override the intention of the parties.
Moreover, as there are no allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or
duress, the trial court was left to consider whether Wife received full financial
disclosure of Husband’s assets. Using extrinsic evidence, it concluded that
even if Wife was not cognizant that FERS and the Thrift Savings Plan were two
separate financial instruments, the evidence conclusively established that she
should have been aware of this distinction, and in any event, Husband
affirmatively disclosed the same. See Trial Court Opinion, at 4 (citations to
the record omitted). The trial court was within its power to consider this
extrinsic evidence because the Agreement did not assert that the inventory of
the parties’ assets was complete, nor does the document maintain that Wife
received full financial disclosure prior to signing it. As a result, the court was
required to consider extrinsic evidence.
In resolving whether the Agreement was enforceable as written, the trial
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court stated:
Wife offered no evidence that the documentation in Husband’s
possession regarding the FERS was not provided to her. Wife’s
testimony only related [to] her mistake of assuming the benefits
(TSP and FERS) were one individual benefit. Husband testified
Wife “took care” of the parties’ finances, including preparing the
parties’ tax returns. Wife provided the values the parties’ used for
Husband’s Thrift Savings Plan. Wife maintained the parties[‘] filing
system and label the file “FERS (TSP).” The Court found the
testimony of Husband credible. Husband testified the file
contained statements from both the TSP and FERS. Husband
testified the file was provided to him by Wife. Wife did not deny
having the FERS statements. Husband testified that FERS
documents included a numerical value to which he would be
entitled. . . . Husband has met his burden of providing an
affirmative disclosure of relevant financial information regarding
FERS.
Id.
As we are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations, see
Stamerro, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Husband had
sufficiently apprised Wife of his FERS pension. As Wife presented no other
basis to challenge the enforceability of the Agreement, we cannot conclude
the court erred in concluding the agreement is enforceable and that it
constitutes a complete resolution of the economic claims between the parties.
Having found none of Wife’s issues to be meritorious, we affirm the trial
court’s divorce decree.
Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/08/2019
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Yost, T. v. Yost, A.
Combined Opinion