In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 17-445C
(Filed: November 8, 2019)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
)
ELLEN P. BULLOCK, )
) RCFC 59; Reconsideration; Breach of
Plaintiff, ) Alleged Oral Settlement Agreement
) Before the EEOC
v. )
)
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
On September 25, 2019, this court granted summary judgment to the United States
in this breach of contract action arising from a claim filed by the plaintiff, Ellen P.
Bullock, against the United States Army (Army), before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Bullock v. United States, No. 17-445C, 2019 WL
4668062, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 25, 2019). The court determined that any alleged oral
settlement agreement between Ms. Bullock and the Army for, among other terms, the
payment of $70,000 to resolve the EEOC proceedings was not enforceable because it was
not reduced to writing. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the
applicable Army regulation, Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 5-13.g, and EEOC regulation, 29
C.F.R. § 1614.603, require that a settlement agreement before the EEOC must be in
writing and signed by the parties to be valid. Bullock, 2019 WL 4668062, at *4-*5. In
this case, it was not disputed that the parties had not executed a written settlement
agreement. Id. at *4. The court further concluded that the circumstances within which
the Federal Circuit has recognized the validity of oral settlement agreements were not
present in this case. Id. at *1, *4-*5. The court noted that oral settlement agreements
have been accepted by the Federal Circuit where the settlement negotiations occurred
before the administrative judge actually adjudicating the case and where the terms of the
settlement agreement were read into the record before the administrative judge. Id. at *4.
On October 22, 2019, Ms. Bullock filed the pending motion for reconsideration
under Rule 59 of this court’s rules (ECF No. 83), arguing that the court erred in failing to
construe the facts to find the existence of an oral settlement agreement and in holding that
the Army and EEOC regulations precluded an oral settlement agreement. Mot. for
Recons. at 3-10. For the following reasons, Ms. Bullock’s motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.
Under Rule 59 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, the
court, “in its discretion, ‘may grant a motion for reconsideration when there has been an
intervening change in the controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a need to
correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest injustice.” Biery v. United States,
818 F.3d 704, 711 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Young v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 671, 674
(2010)). The Supreme Court has noted that motions for reconsideration “may not be used
to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485
n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
2
Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)); see also Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. United States, 111
Fed. Cl. 257, 259 (2013) (“A Rule 59 motion ‘must be based upon manifest error of law,
or mistake of fact, and is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an additional chance to
sway the court.’” (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300
(1999))); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 555, 557 (2002) (holding that a court
will not grant a motion for reconsideration if the movant merely reasserts arguments
previously made); Lee v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 243, 252 (2017), aff’d, 895 F.3d
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the court will not grant a motion for reconsideration
based on “new arguments that could have been raised earlier”). Rather, “the movant
must point to a manifest (i.e., clearly apparent or obvious) error of law or a mistake of
fact.” Ammex, 52 Fed. Cl. at 557; Lucier v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 793, 798-99
(2018).
Applying these standards, Ms. Bullock’s reconsideration motion must be denied.
Ms. Bullock has not identified an intervening change in the controlling law, newly
discovered evidence, or a need to correct clearly apparent factual or legal error. Rather,
Ms. Bullock first contends that the court should have inferred from the facts presented
that Ms. Bullock and the Army had entered into a binding agreement. Mot. for Recons.
at 3-6. This argument “merely reasserts” arguments previously made in her summary
judgment briefing and cannot serve as grounds for reconsideration. Ammex, 52 Fed. Cl.
at 557 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Ms. Bullock also argues that various precedents preclude the court from applying
regulations, such as the Army’s and EEOC’s, to render the alleged oral settlement
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agreement unenforceable. Mot. for Recons. at 6-10. However, Ms. Bullock’s mere
disagreement with the court’s conclusion that the representations exchanged between the
parties before the EEOC mediator did not give rise to a binding agreement under the
Army and EEOC regulations is not grounds for reconsideration. In her original motion
and reply Ms. Bullock failed to address the applicable Army and EEOC regulations
establishing the requirements for a valid EEOC settlement agreement. Bullock, 2019 WL
4668062, at *4. The government in its cross motion for summary judgment expressly
raised the argument that these regulations precluded an enforceable oral settlement
agreement, and Ms. Bullock could have addressed the argument in her reply but did not.1
See id. at *3 (citing Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 9-10, 29-30). Ms. Bullock’s contention on
reconsideration that these regulations cannot bar the enforcement of an oral settlement is
therefore a new argument that should have been raised earlier and cannot serve as a basis
for reconsideration now. See Lee, 130 Fed. Cl. at 252.
Moreover, besides being forfeited, Ms. Bullock’s argument is without merit. As
the court explained in its opinion, the Federal Circuit has addressed the specific
circumstances when it will enforce an oral settlement agreement, including one arising
from an employment dispute. Bullock, 2019 WL 4668062, at *4-*5 (citing Tiburzi v.
Dep’t of Justice, 269 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Brown v. Dep’t of Army, 157 F. App’x
1
Ms. Bullock’s suggestion in her reconsideration motion that this court’s “guidance” led her to
focus her summary judgment briefing on the issue of “actual settlement authority” – rather than
the other arguments raised by the government – is unsupported. Mot. for Recons. at 1. As
discussed above, the government expressly raised the argument regarding the Army and EEOC
regulations in its cross motion for summary judgment, but Ms. Bullock failed to address that
argument.
4
295 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Gray v. Dep’t of Defense, 91 F. App’x 137 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Ms.
Bullock does not address these cases in her motion for reconsideration. Her general
contention that other courts in other circumstances have enforced oral contracts, see, e.g.,
Mot. for Recons. at 6 (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996)
(addressing the “sovereign acts doctrine”)), are not relevant where the Federal Circuit has
identified the limited circumstances when it will accept an oral settlement agreement
involving an employment dispute and the subject facts do not match those circumstances.
For these reasons, the court DENIES Ms. Bullock’s motion for reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy B. Firestone
NANCY B. FIRESTONE
Senior Judge
5
Bullock v. United States
Combined Opinion