IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SEAN MICHAEL DORAN, No. 79003-0-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent. FILED: November 18, 2019
CHUN, J. — Ten years after Sean Doran pleaded guilty to Assault 4
Domestic Violence in municipal court, he filed a petition to restore his firearm
rights in superior court. The State opposed the petition, claiming that Doran had
not completed the treatment and education conditions of his sentence. But
Doran believed that the municipal court had waived those conditions when it
sanctioned him with additional jail time for failing to comply with the original
sentence. A superior court commissioner denied both Doran’s petition and his
motion for reconsideration. Because we determine that, on reconsideration,
Doran presented clear and uncontested evidence that the municipal court waived
the conditions, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2006, Doran pleaded guilty in Everett Municipal Court to
Assault 4 Domestic Violence, which caused him to lose his firearm rights.
Additionally, the court sentenced Doran to 365 days of jail time with 335 days
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suspended; Doran was to serve the remaining 30 days on electronic home
detention (EHD). The court further sentenced Doran to two years of active
probation including mandatory conditions of Domestic Violence Treatment and
Victim Awareness Education.
Doran failed to appear for his review hearing on January 12, 2007, and the
court issued a bench warrant. At that time, Doran had not completed his 30 days
of EHD, the Domestic Violence Treatment, or the Victim Awareness Education
and had failed to appear at probation.
On August 12, 2007, Doran was served with the bench warrant. The
following day, the court reviewed Doran’s compliance with his original sentence
as well as a new charge. The court set a show cause hearing for two days later,
but Doran again failed to appear.
Another review hearing occurred on April 9, 2008. The court ordered 90
days of confinement—30 days for the EHD that Doran never completed and 60
days for failing to comply. Doran completed his 90 day commitment on June 6,
2008. The court closed the case on July 31, 2008.
Ten years later, on February 26, 2018, Doran petitioned the Snohomish
County Superior Court to restore his firearm rights. By this time, the municipal
court had destroyed all of its records relating to the 2006 conviction except for
the docket. In his petition, Doran stated that had completed all the terms and
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conditions of his 2006 conviction because he believed the court had ordered jail
time in lieu of the mandatory conditions:
Because the # CR0067207 docket does not explicitly say that the
treatment condition was removed in lieu of jail time, I appeared in
person at the probation window and spoke with Keith Osborn,
probation officer. He informed me that that was how the court would
have handled a case where the defendant did not do [Domestic
Violence] treatment the court would have the defendant do jail time
-
in lieu of the treatment, which would remove treatment as a condition
of sentence.
The State opposed Doran’s petition because it believed that he had not
completed all of the terms and conditions of his sentence. The State argued that
the 90-day commitment was not an alternative sentence relieving Doran of
having to complete his treatment and education conditions, but contained an
additional sanction imposed for failing to complete his original sentencing
requirements.
On May 23, 2018, Doran filed a Motion to Clarify the Docket in Everett
Municipal Court. On June 4, 2018, entries were made on the docket providing
that the treatment and education conditions were “terminated.”
A superior court commissioner held a hearing on Doran’s petition on
July 3, 2018. The commissioner, determining that terminated does not mean
waived, denied Doran’s petition:
Well, from this Court’s view words matter. And effectively the
argument being made is that terminated—terminated equals
completed equals waived, and I think that those three words have
different meanings. They have different meanings in context, and
they have different meanings in reality.
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So, I—I don’t believe that he has completed the terms of his
sentence. He was noncomplipnt with the terms of his sentence and
was sanctioned for it and the—but he did not complete his sentence.
And—and the word “waived” was not used, and I don’t believed
“terminated” equates under this Court’s understanding of the
definition of the word. They are not the same. So, motion would be
denied; petition would be denied.
Doran filed a motion for reconsideration on July 13, 2018.1 Doran claimed
that the court should vacate its original order because (1) there was no evidence
or reasonable inference from the evidence to justify the decision, and
(2) substantial justice had not been done.
A month later, on August 15, 2018, Doran filed a motion before a separate
pro tern judge in municipal court “for an order, nunc pro tunc, that the conditions
of sentence ([Domestic Violence] Treatment/Victim Awareness Education) were
waived on 04/09/2008 when the defendant was ordered to serve 60 days jail
instead.” The judge granted Doran’s motion. Doran filed a copy of that order
with the Snohomish County Superior Court Clerk that same day.
On August 28, 2018, the trial court took Doran’s motion for reconsideration
under advisement without oral argument. Later that day, the court issued a
written order denying Doran’s motion for reconsideration. Doran appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Neither party’s briefing addresses the standard of review for an order on a
petition to restore firearm rights. Though the State says that we review issues of
1 The State did not participate in the motion for reconsideration.
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statutory interpretation de novo, this case does not require us to interpret
RCW 9.41.040.
Because RCW 9.41.040(4) “does not expressly grant the restoring court
any discretion. . . but does set forth several requirements that must be satisfied
before an individual petitions for restoration . . . the restoring court serves a
ministerial function . . . once the petitioner has satisfied the enumerated
requirements.” State v. Swanson, 116 Wn. App. 67, 69, 65 P.3d 343 (2003).
Accordingly, whether Doran satisfied the requirements of RCW 9.41.040(4)
constitutes a question of law that we review de novo. See Maloney v. State, 198
Wn. App. 805, 807, 395 P.3d 1077 (2017) (“We review questions of law and
conclusions of law de novo.”).
A. Petition to Restore Firearm Rights
Doran argues that the trial court erred when it denied his petition by
determining that “terminated” and “waived” have different meanings. The State
asserts that the court correctly concluded that Doran did not complete all the
conditions of his sentence. We determine the court did not err by denying
Doran’s original petition. V
RCW 9.41 .040(4)(a)(ii)(B) provides that an individual may petition the
court to restore their firearm rights:
If the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was for
a nonfelony offense, after three or more consecutive years in the
community without being convicted or found not guilty by reason of
insanity or currently charged with any felony, gross misdemeanor, or
misdemeanor crimes, if the individual has no prior felony convictions
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that prohibit the possession of a firearm counted as part of the
offender score under RCW 9.94A.525 and the individual has
completed all conditions of the sentence.
The State claims that Doran fails to satisfy the statutory requirements only
because he has not completed all the conditions of his sentence—specifically, the
treatment and education conditions.
Before the superior court, Doran claimed that he was not required to
complete the treatment and education conditions because the municipal court
had waived them. As evidence for this argument, Doran cited the docket stating
that the conditions were ‘terminated.”2 But “terminate” means “to end formally
and definitely.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2359 (2002).
This does not indicate that the court no longer required Doran to complete the
treatment and education conditions or that it waived3 them. As the State points
out, LFOs are sometimes “written off” if the court loses jurisdiction. Though
these LFOs are thus “terminated” in the sense that they can no longer be
collected upon, an individual who did not pay their LFOs did not complete their
sentence. Furthermore, though Doran claimed he talked to several people who
stated that the court imposed the additional 60-days of confinement in lieu of the
conditions, he did not provide any evidence other than his own testimony to
2 Doran cites two cases to argue that terminating a condition is equal to waiving it, but
neither case addresses the issue. State v. Foster held only that imposing a no-contact order on a
father to protect the mother did not impermissibly interfere with the father’s parental rights over
their shared child. 128 Wn. App. 932, 940, 117 P.3d 1175 (2005). State v. Gossage determined
that the expiration of a legal financial obligation pursuant to a statute constituted a satisfaction of
that sentencing requirement. 165 Wn.2d 1, 8, 195 P.3d 525 (2008). Neither case addressed
whether a terminated condition qualifies as completed for purposes of restoring firearm rights.
~ In contrast to “terminate,” “waive” means “to refrain from pressing or enforcing.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2570 (2002).
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support these contentions. Because Doran failed to offer any evidence that the
court had waived the conditions, we determine the trial court did not err by
denying Doran’s petition to restore his firearm rights.
B. Motion for Reconsideration
Doran next argues the trial court should have granted his motion for
reconsideration based on the additional evidence he offered to show that the
court had waived the conditions. The State says that it has limited knowledge of
the motion for reconsideration. We decide that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the motion.
“Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court; we will not reverse the court’s ruling absent a showing
of manifest abuse of discretion.” Hook v. Lincoln County Noxious Weed Control
Bd., 166 Wn. App. 145, 158, 269 P.3d 1056 (2012). A trial court abuses its
discretion if no other reasonable trial court would have made the same ruling, or
if the court ruled unreasonably or based its ruling on untenable grounds. State v.
Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244, 256, 394 P.3d 348 (2017).
At the original hearing, Doran presented evidence only that the court had
terminated the conditions. For his motion for reconsideration, however, Doran
produced a Municipal Court order providing that “the conditions of sentence
([Domestic Violence] Treatment/Victim Awareness Education) were waived on
04/09/2008 when the defendant was ordered to serve 60 days jail instead.” The
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State did not respond. Given this clear and uncontested evidence that the court
had waived the treatment and education conditions, the denial of the motion for
reconsideration was based on untenable grounds.
Reversed.
1•
WE CONCUR:
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