In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-19-00224-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF J.F.C. AND J.T.C.
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On Appeal from the 418th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12-06-07018-CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a judgment that resulted in the termination of the
parental-rights of the appellants, Mother and Father, to their children J.F.C. and
J.T.C. Mother and Father filed separate briefs, and each parent argues the judgment
the trial court issued is void because it failed to commence the trial before the
statutory deadline that applies to suits filed by the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services to terminate a parent’s rights. 1 In its response, the Department
1
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401.
1
concedes the trial court failed to commence the trial by the required statutory
deadline. The Department “respectfully requests that this case be reversed.”
We reverse the judgment and dismiss the suit without prejudice to the
Department’s rights.
Background
The Department sued Mother and Father seeking to terminate their rights to
J.F.C. and J.T.C. on September 21, 2017. Less than three weeks later, the trial court
named the Department as J.F.C.’s and J.T.C.’s temporary managing conservator. For
the purpose of applying the statutory deadline, the record in this case shows the trial
on the merits commenced on May 21, 2019. By then, twenty months had passed
since the Department filed suit, exceeding the commencement deadline in the Family
Code. 2
Analysis
Generally, section 263.401 of the Family Code requires trial courts to
commence trials on the merits of suits filed by the Department affecting the parent-
child relationship within one year. 3 But upon finding “that extraordinary
circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing
2
Id.
3
Id. § 263.401(a).
2
conservatorship of the [D]epartment” is in the child’s best interest, the court may
retain the Department’s suit on its docket for a period not to exceed an additional
180 days. 4 If the trial court fails to commence the trial within the deadline, the “suit
is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order.”5
Extensions beyond the 180-day extension authorized by section 263.401 are not
allowed. 6
In this case, the trial did not commence within the period required by section
263.401. 7 Thus, the Department’s suit had already been dismissed by operation of
law by the time the trial occurred.8
We sustain Mother’s and Father’s issues. We reverse the June 26, 2019 order
terminating Mother’s and Father’s rights and render judgment dismissing the
Department’s suit without prejudice.9
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
4
Id. § 263.401(b).
5
Id. § 263.401(c).
6
Id.
7
Id. § 263.401.
8
Id.
9
See id. § 263.401(c); Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(c).
3
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on September 24, 2019
Opinion Delivered November 21, 2019
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
4