MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Nov 25 2019, 9:07 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna K. Weissmann Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Martell Williams, November 25, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-115
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1710-MR-41035
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Martell Williams (“Williams”) appeals his convictions for three counts of
Murder, felonies,1 and one count of Robbery, as a Level 5 felony.2 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Williams presents eight issues for review:
I. Whether he is entitled to discharge under Indiana
Criminal Rule 4;
II. Whether sufficient evidence supports his convictions;
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in evidentiary
rulings;
IV. Whether the trial court became an advocate for the State
to achieve admission of a video;
V. Whether the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences is an abuse of discretion;
VI. Whether his aggregate sentence is inappropriate pursuant
to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B);
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2).
2
I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
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VII. Whether his Robbery conviction must be vacated under
the continuous crime doctrine; and
VIII. Whether he, as an indigent defendant, is entitled to a
transcript at public expense.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In 2017, Sha-Lynn Poindexter (“Poindexter”), Jordan Wright (“Wright”),
Justin Crowder (“Crowder”), and Dominique Miller (“Miller”) shared an
apartment in Indianapolis. Crowder’s girlfriend, Zoe Radford (“Radford”) was
a frequent visitor.
[4] Crowder supplemented his income by selling marijuana. One of his regular
customers was a resident of the same complex, Sean Jones (“Jones”). Jones
became aware that Crowder kept a safe and a gun in his apartment, and Jones
suspected that the safe contained cash and marijuana. Jones and his friend,
Stanley Williams (“Stanley”), began to discuss robbing Crowder.
[5] On July 16, 2017, Jones contacted Devante Gilbert (“Gilbert”) to convey that
he “wanted to rob someone” and needed a driver. (Tr. Vol. IV, pg. 117.)
Gilbert agreed to be the driver. Jones also texted Stanley that he had been
“casing [Crowder’s apartment] all day” and needed “help [to] get some guns for
this robbery.” (Tr. Vol. V, pg. 209.) Stanley then called Williams, and
Williams called Troy Ward (“Ward”). Gilbert drove to pick up each of the
others; when Williams and Ward approached the vehicle, they were carrying
backpacks with weapons inside.
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[6] Gilbert drove back to Somerset Bay Apartments, where he had first picked up
Jones, and backed into a parking space near Crowder’s apartment. Gilbert and
Stanley remained in the vehicle. Jones used a code to access Crowder’s
apartment building3 and walked up the stairs, with Williams and Ward
crouching beside him. Jones knocked on the door and, when it was opened, the
trio pushed their way inside.
[7] In a bedroom, Poindexter heard gunshots. Wright armed himself with a sword
and told Poindexter to hide; he then left the room. Poindexter hid between two
dog crates, emerging when Radford came running into the room saying that
“everyone was shot.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 161.) In the dining room and living
room, Miller, Wright, and Crowder lay dead from gunshots wounds to the
head.
[8] Jones, Williams, and Ward returned to Gilbert’s vehicle. Jones had a wad of
cash and an assault rifle, which he placed in the trunk. Ward was carrying a
safe. Gilbert drove to a wooded area and everyone exited the vehicle with a
plan to open the safe. However, Gilbert and Jones soon left to seek assistance
because Jones had been shot and could not staunch the bleeding. Ward fired
shots at the safe and it eventually opened. It was empty. The empty-handed
trio walked to a nearby Target store and got rides to home and work.
3
Jones explained that he had learned the maintenance code that permitted access to multiple buildings, after
a family friend lost her key and was provided with the code.
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[9] In the ensuing police investigation, Radford identified Jones as one of the
intruders. Jones, who had been shot and was receiving treatment at Methodist
Hospital in Indianapolis, was arrested the following day. He confessed to his
involvement in the murders and robbery, and implicated Williams, Ward,
Gilbert, and Stanley. Ultimately, Gilbert, Stanley, and Jones each entered a
plea bargain with the State, agreeing to plead guilty to a felony other than
Murder and provide testimony in the prosecution of Williams and Ward.
[10] Williams and Ward were tried before a jury on October 9 through October 15,
2018, on charges of Murder, Robbery, and Carrying a Handgun without a
License. The jury convicted Williams as charged, but to avoid double jeopardy
concerns, the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction upon the latter
charge and entered the Robbery conviction as a Level 5 felony. Upon his
conviction for three counts of Murder, Williams received consecutive sentences
of fifty-five, forty-five, and fifty-five years. Upon his conviction for Robbery,
Williams received a concurrent sentence of five years, thus providing for an
aggregate sentence of 145 years. He now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Motion for Discharge – Criminal Rule 4
[11] Williams’s trial was initially set for June 25, 2018. At a June 19, 2018 pretrial
conference, the State and defense counsel made a joint motion to continue the
trial. The trial was set for August 20, 2018. At the same pretrial conference,
after a continuance was requested but the trial date had not been set, Williams
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requested a speedy trial. The trial court acknowledged that both defendants had
requested an early trial date pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) (requiring the
trial of an incarcerated defendant within seventy days) and noted “70th day
should be the 28th of August.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 12.)
[12] At a July 31, 2018 pretrial conference, the August trial setting was confirmed.
At a pretrial conference on August 17, 2018, the State moved for a continuance
to permit the Marion County Cyber Crimes Unit to conduct additional
investigation related to cell phone contact between some of the alleged co-
conspirators.
[13] The trial court granted the State’s motion for a continuance despite Williams’s
assertion of his speedy trial rights, finding that delay attributable to the jointly
requested continuance was chargeable to Williams. The trial court reasoned
that a defendant “cannot ask for a continuance and ask for a speedy trial
simultaneously” and the seventy-day computation as to Williams “does not go
to the day the request is made,” June 19, 2018, but rather began on the agreed-
upon trial date of August 20, 2018. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 47.) After providing its
reasoning, the trial court reset the trial for October 9, 2018.
[14] An accused’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 12 of the
Indiana Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Leek v. State, 878 N.E.2d 276, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Criminal
Rule 4 was adopted to implement this speedy trial right. Id. Williams
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unsuccessfully moved for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B)(1), which
provides in pertinent part:
If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall
move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to
trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such
motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on
his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where
there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70)
calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.
Williams claims that his June 19, 2018 motion started the seventy-day clock,
and he did not thereafter cause any delay but remained ready for the August
trial setting; thus, the October trial setting violated his speedy trial rights and he
is entitled to discharge.
[15] A trial court’s decision denying a motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4 is
reviewed for clear error, after according the trial court’s findings reasonable
deference. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 (Ind. 2013). Clear error is
that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Id. Where the issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the
review is de novo. Id. at 1039. Here, the parties do not dispute the facts.
Williams requested a continuance, the grant of which reset his trial to August
20, 2018. The same day, he requested a speedy trial.
[16] Criminal Rule 4(F) provides for an extension of time as follows:
When a continuance is had on motion of the defendant, or delay
in trial is caused by his act, any time limitation contained in this
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rule shall be extended by the amount of the resulting period of
such delay caused thereby.
[17] Williams focuses solely upon the timing of his motion for a speedy trial. In the
specific sequence of events, Williams requested a continuance before the trial
date was set, and before making his motion for a speedy trial. But Criminal
Rule 4 “makes no distinction regarding when the trial date is set” and “delays
caused by action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendant
regardless of whether a trial date has been set.” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064,
1067 (Ind. 2004). And Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) contemplates a “continuance
within said period” that is “had on [defendant’s] motion” and does not specify
that the motion must be made within the seventy-day period.
[18] The salient fact here is that Williams initiated the delay that took place after his
motion. Williams cannot receive a continuance without accountability. See
Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind. 2000) (“The objective of the rule is to
move cases along and to provide the defendant with a timely trial, not to create
a mechanism to avoid trial.”) The delay up until August 20, 2018 was
chargeable to Williams and the seventieth day thereafter was October 29, 2018.
Williams was tried within this period; therefore, he is not entitled to discharge.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[19] To convict Williams of murder, as charged, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams killed Wright, Crowder, and Miller
while committing or attempting to commit robbery. I.C. § 35-42-1-1. To
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convict Williams of robbery, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Williams knowingly or intentionally took a safe or
firearm from Crowder by the use or threat of force. I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
[20] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither
reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204,
210 (Ind. 2016). We view the “evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the conviction, and will affirm ‘if there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime
from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013)
(quoting Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004)).
[21] Williams does not claim that the State failed to present evidence to establish
any element of the charged crimes. Rather, he argues that much of the
testimony against him should be disregarded because the occurrence witnesses
– Jones, Stanley, and Gilbert – were motivated to falsely identify him. That is,
they needed to please prosecutors who had extended lenient plea offers.
According to Williams, Jones eventually received a sentence of thirty years
imprisonment, while Stanley and Gilbert each received a nine-year sentence.
[22] Williams also argues that the trio’s testimony contained discrepancies and was
inconsistent with a neighbor’s testimony that she had seen only two men fleeing
the apartment building. He contends that the testimony of Jones, Stanley, and
Gilbert “cannot withstand scrutiny.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. At bottom,
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Williams is asking that we judge witness credibility and reweigh evidence. We
cannot do so. Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210.
Evidentiary Rulings
[23] Williams argues that the trial court made “several serious evidentiary
mistakes,” including the failure to exclude, as a discovery sanction, “phone
records given to the defendants on the eve of their speedy trial date,” and the
exclusion of evidence that Jones and Gilbert had once before robbed a drug
dealer. Appellant’s Brief at 30.
[24] Questions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are entrusted to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015). We review the court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion.
Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the effect of
the facts and circumstances before it, or if it misinterprets the law. Id.
[25] Also, a trial court has broad discretion regarding discovery violations, and its
ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion involving clear error
and resulting prejudice. Berry v. State, 715 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind. 1999). In
general, the proper remedy for a discovery violation is a continuance. Id.
Exclusion of the evidence is an extreme remedy that is to be used only if the
State’s actions were deliberate and the conduct prevented a fair trial. Id.
[26] Jones, Stanley, and Gilbert testified regarding contacts on the day of the
murders among themselves and Williams and Ward, using Snap Chat, text
messages, and cellular phone calls. The testimony was that Jones and Stanley
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agreed to meet up, Jones contacted Gilbert, Stanley contacted Williams, and
Williams contacted Ward. Some of the testimony of the various
communications was corroborated by cell phone records. There was also
testimony that Jones, Gilbert, Ward, Williams, and Stanley traveled together to
the apartment where the murders took place. This was partially corroborated
by mapping cell phone tower locations nearest the cell phones of many of the
participants4 near the time of the murders.
[27] Williams’s description of the challenged records is vague. Apparently, the State
shared its discovery of cell phone records in stages and some materials were
provided to the defense shortly before trial. However, contrary to Williams’s
assertion that the State was merely admonished for a lack of diligence, our
reading of the record indicates that some records were excluded. Specifically,
the trial court ruled that the “Tuesday documents” were excluded and advised
the State that, due to late discovery, it had “lost the benefit of Troy Ward’s
phone records” as corroborative evidence. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 200.) With respect
to other phone records, Williams asserts that the State was neglectful because
four months passed before he received any documents. But he does not explain
how this pace prevented a fair trial. Indeed, the testimony and most of the
exhibits demonstrating contacts between the quintet were admitted without
objection. We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion here.
4
Jones was not in possession of a cell phone. His phone had been confiscated by his parents as a disciplinary
measure.
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[28] Additionally, Williams argues that the trial court should have allowed evidence
that Jones and Gilbert had previously robbed a drug dealer. According to
Williams, this would have aided his defense that he was not present at the
crime scene by showing that Jones and Gilbert were a team that did not need
assistance.
[29] In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel for Williams and
Ward recounted a revelation from Gilbert’s pre-trial deposition. When
deposed, Gilbert had purportedly admitted that he and Jones “once before”
committed a robbery when they “just pulled [off] from somebody” who had
intended to sell them marijuana. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 118.) Defense counsel could
not provide a specific time or name the victim; accordingly, the trial court ruled
that the evidence of a prior robbery was so vague as to lack probative value.
[30] Defense counsel suggested that the evidence was admissible to show Jones’s
character and reputation, “because he is known for robbing people.” Id. at 116.
The trial court advised counsel that admission of such evidence would promote
drawing a forbidden inference prohibited by Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b),
which provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]
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Traditionally, Rule 404(b) has been used to protect a defendant from being
convicted based on unrelated prior bad acts; that is, the jury should not be
permitted to “infer that the defendant is a bad person who should be punished
for other, uncharged misdeeds.” Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind.
2003). In Garland, our Indiana Supreme Court held that “the admissibility of
evidence about prior bad acts by persons other than defendants is subject to
Rule 404(b).” Id. at 430.
[31] Williams simply sought to show with sparse detail that, when Jones robbed
Crowder, he was acting in conformity with his past misconduct and his bad
character. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered
evidence.
Target Store Surveillance Video
[32] Jones, Gilbert, and Stanley testified that Ward was in possession of a safe when
he returned to Gilbert’s vehicle and Gilbert then drove the group to a wooded
area where they could attempt to open the safe. Gilbert and Jones soon left the
others because of the need to obtain assistance for Jones’s gunshot wound. This
testimony was partially corroborated by a surveillance video from a nearby
Target store. Target asset protection employee Kyle Hanephin (“Hanephin”)
testified as the keeper of the video.
[33] The State asked Hanephin a number of foundational questions, Williams’
counsel objected to the tape’s admission for lack of foundation, and the trial
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court asked a series of questions of Hanephin before admitting the video.
According to Williams,
[H]ad the court not taken on the role of advocate, the court
would not have had a basis to admit the video. The video stands
as the single piece of evidence, outside of the questionable
testimony of the co-defendants, that links [Williams] to the
crimes. The State used the video to aid Stanley in identifying the
three men walking from the woods as himself, [Ward], and
[Williams].
Appellant’s Brief at 34.
[34] Indiana law presumes that a trial court judge is unbiased and without prejudice.
Everling v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010). To rebut this presumption,
a defendant must establish from the judge’s conduct that the judge’s actual bias
or prejudice has placed the defendant in jeopardy. Id. “A trial before an
impartial judge is an essential element of due process.” Id. However, “[b]ias
and prejudice violate a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial only where
there is an undisputed claim or where the judge expressed an opinion of the
controversy over which the judge was presiding.” Id.
[35] The conduct and strategy of the parties is left to them and the ultimate decision
is to be left to the jury. Id. at 1289. But a trial judge may in any case, within
reasonable limits, interrogate a witness. Kennedy v. State, 280 N.E.2d 611, 620
(Ind. 1972). “The purpose of the judge’s discretionary power to examine
witnesses is to be an aid to the jury in its fact finding duties, however this must
be done in an impartial manner so that the judge does not improperly influence
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the jury with his own contentions.” Id. In Kennedy, the judge employed a
highly argumentative manner and repeatedly questioned an expert witness
about his credentials and ability to testify accurately. Id. at 613. In so doing,
the trial judge “lost his appearance of impartiality [and] removed his robes and
donned the cap of the prosecutor,” resulting in a reversal of the defendant’s
murder conviction upon appeal. Id. at 618. Williams claims that a similar
scenario ensued here.
[36] The State offered the Target surveillance video as a silent witness to several
young men, whom the State alleged to be Williams, Ward, and Stanley, leaving
a wooded area near the Target store together. The “silent witness” theory,
adopted by Indiana courts in 1979, permitted relevant photographs supported
by a proper evidentiary foundation to be considered substantive evidence rather
than merely demonstrative evidence. Wise v. State, 26 N.E.3d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015). The theory has since been extended to the use of video recordings.
Id. As applied to video recordings:
“[T]here must be a strong showing of authenticity and
competency” and … when automatic cameras are involved,
“there should be evidence as to how and when the camera was
loaded, how frequently the camera was activated, when the
photographs were taken, and the processing and changing of
custody of the film after its removal from the camera.”
McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind. 2005) (citing Edwards v. State, 762
N.E.2d 128, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). The standard is applicable because a
silent witness cannot be cross-examined. Wise, 26 N.E.3d at 141 (citing
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Edwards, 762 N.E.2d at 136). A trial witness need not testify that the depicted
image is an accurate representation of the scene when the image was taken;
rather, the witness must provide testimony identifying the scene that appears in
the images “sufficient to persuade the trial court … of their competency and
authenticity to a relative certainty.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1282 (Ind.
2014) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
[37] Here, Hanephin testified that he had created the video of events on July 16,
2017, the system was working properly, the system was checked daily, the
system was locked within the asset protection services office, and he was
familiar with the area under surveillance. He described State’s Exhibit 267 as
“a disk that I downloaded for [sic] the incident” and testified that it was an
accurate copy and he had not altered it. (Tr. Vol. V, pg. 144.) Williams’
counsel objected to admission of the exhibit:
I would object that this is not a proper foundation. This witness
testified he secures the outside, there’s a foot path. I’m sure
people walk that foot path often. So I’m not sure it’s a proper
foundation for playing a video. It’s out of context in my opinion.
Id. at 146.
[38] The trial court sustained the objection, concluding: “him making the bare bones
assertion that it was working is not sufficient for the silent witness foundation.”
Id. The prosecutor then questioned Hanephin as to how he knew the camera
was working properly and he responded that there “is a health monitor
function” at the top of the screen and “if that camera was down, I wouldn’t
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have been able to review video or save video.” Id. at 147. At this point, the
trial court began to question Hanephin, without additional objection from
defense counsel. The judge asked Hanephin about the method for time
tracking, whether the system was in-house or third party, how often the system
was checked, and whether there was periodic maintenance. Hanephin
responded that the system was third-party, and he checked it on each of his
shifts but was not involved in the third-party maintenance. He described for the
jurors a digital calendar and, at the State’s instance, re-affirmed his assessment
of accuracy.
[39] Williams’s counsel interjected that there was “nothing to show that [on] that
particular day that he had the ability to look at the accuracy of the time,” id. at
150, prompting the court to ask additional questions. The court inquired about
the frequency with which Hanephin checked the date and time, and asked
whether, if Hanephin found the time or date to be inaccurate, there was a
process for reporting the error to the third-party software programmer.
Hanephin testified that such an error-reporting process existed but he had not
experienced a problem of that nature during the relevant time frame. The trial
court admitted the challenged exhibit into evidence, stating that defense
counsel’s objections concerned the weight, not the admissibility of, the exhibit.
[40] Our review of the record indicates that the State elicited testimony to establish
that Hanephin was the creator and custodian of the video, he regularly checked
for accuracy of the system, and he had no reason to doubt the time and date
depicted. Hanephin described the setting, an outdoor area included in Target’s
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regular surveillance. He established the authenticity of the scene depicted and
the accuracy of the video equipment. In sum, the State met the foundational
requirements of McHenry apart from the trial court’s intervention. And
although the trial court took an active role in questioning a witness, the
questions and answers provided clarification. The trial judge did not suggest
answers, evince bias, or invade the province of the jury. Williams has identified
no conduct akin to that of the Kennedy trial court. Here, the appearance of
impartiality was never surrendered.
[41] Finally, with respect to evidentiary rulings, Williams claims that “cumulative
error” warrants reversal in a case where the “evidence was hardly
overwhelming.” Appellant’s Brief at 35. We disagree with Williams on both
points; that is, he did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion or error in
evidentiary rulings, and the evidence against him was strong – inclusive of
testimony from three occurrence witnesses.
Consecutive Sentences
[42] Williams claims that “concurrent sentences more properly reflect the
circumstances of the crimes” explaining:
[t]he imposition of consecutive sentences rests on shaky grounds
because the judge sent a teenager to prison for life to pay for
homicides he didn’t commit in an apartment he reasonably
thought would be empty, for a crime where no one was supposed
to die.
Appellant’s Brief at 40-41.
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[43] The argument presupposes that Williams fired none of the shots that killed any
of the three victims. There was evidence that both Ward and Williams entered
the apartment armed with guns, and three men died, but Jones disavowed
seeing Williams fire a kill shot. But even if the evidence does not definitively
establish that Williams fired a fatal shot, there is abundant evidence that he
acted in concert with Ward. Williams’s subjective expectations aside, he was
sentenced for the events that unfolded within the apartment. As to the sentence
for that criminal conduct, we reiterate what our Indiana Supreme Court has
observed: “when the perpetrator commits the same offense against [multiple]
victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the
fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one
person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003). And, “[a]lthough
consecutive sentences are not always a given when there are multiple murder
victims, concurrent sentences are undoubtedly the exception.” Lewis v. State,
116 N.E.3d 1144, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
[44] Williams suggests that we should employ a “single incident analysis” when
reviewing the consecutive sentences. Appellant’s Brief at 41. He directs our
attention to Beno v. State, 581 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. 1991). There, the Indiana
Supreme Court found the imposition of three maximum, consecutive sentences
for three drug dealing convictions based upon nearly identical State-sponsored
drug sales to be manifestly unreasonable. See id. at 923. The conduct of a
participant in a police sting, who was ultimately accorded some sentencing
leniency, bears no relevancy to the brutal and senseless murders here. Williams
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has identified no grounds for reversal of the order that his sentences be served
consecutively.
Appropriateness of Sentence
[45] Williams also asks that his murder sentences be reviewed for inappropriateness.
He claims that he received “almost the maximum sentence even though he was
not the shooter.” Appellant’s Brief at 43. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section
35-50-2-3, a person who commits murder is subject to a sentencing range of
forty-five years to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years.
Williams received a fifty-five-year sentence for Crowder’s murder, and two
forty-five-year sentences for the murders of Wright and Miller.
[46] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this “Court may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” In performing our review, we assess “the
culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of such review is
to attempt to leaven the outliers. Id. at 1225. The “considerable deference”
given to the trial court’s sentencing judgment “should prevail unless overcome
by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense
(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
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of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) (citing
Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222).
[47] Williams received one advisory sentence and two minimum sentences. At
bottom, his contention is that the aggregate sentence is inappropriate because
the individual sentences are to be served consecutively. In Cardwell, the Court
explained that it is the aggregate sentence under review:
In the case of some crimes, the number of counts that can be
charged and proved is virtually entirely at the discretion of the
prosecutor. For that reason, appellate review should focus on the
forest – the aggregate sentence – rather than the trees –
consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the
sentence on any individual count.
The circumstances do, however, bear on whether consecutive
sentences are appropriate. Whether the counts involve one or
multiple victims is highly relevant to the decision to impose
consecutive sentences if for no other reason than to preserve
potential deterrence of subsequent offenses.
895 N.E.2d at 1225.
[48] As for the nature of the offenses, Williams armed himself and invaded an
apartment for the specific purpose of robbing Crowder. Three young men were
fatally shot in their own home, without provocation or warning. The two
young women inside the apartment hid in terror and emerged to find Crowder,
Miller, and Wright dead of gunshot wounds to the head. The horrific crimes
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019 Page 21 of 25
netted the murderers a semi-automatic rifle, a few hundred dollars,5 and an
empty safe. Whether or not Williams fired a fatal shot, he was by all accounts a
willing participant.
[49] As for nineteen-year-old Williams’s character, these were his first felony
offenses. However, he had not remained a law-abiding citizen up until the
current offenses. At age sixteen, he was adjudicated a delinquent child for
having committed an act that would be burglary if committed by an adult. As
an adult, Williams had a misdemeanor conviction for theft. At the time of
sentencing, he also had pending charges for handgun and marijuana possession.
[50] Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that the trial court did not impose an
inappropriate sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), and the aggregate sentence
does not warrant appellate revision. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the
sentence imposed by the trial court.
Continuous Crime Doctrine
[51] The continuous crime doctrine provides, in essence, some actions sufficient in
themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may nonetheless be so
compressed in time, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action that they
constitute a single transaction. Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 703 (Ind. Ct.
5
Jones did not divide the cash with his cohorts.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019 Page 22 of 25
App. 2016). Application of the doctrine invokes a fact-sensitive inquiry. Id. at
704.
[52] Williams contends that the events inside the apartment were so compressed that
his independent conviction for Robbery cannot stand. According to Williams,
“because [Jones] stole items while [Ward] killed the three men, the continuous
crime doctrine applies.” Appellant’s Brief at 38.
The continuous crime doctrine is a rule of statutory construction
and common law limited to situations where a defendant has
been charged multiple times with the same offense. “The
continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double
jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, it
defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts
only to a single chargeable crime.” Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396,
400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)[.]
Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 2015). The continuous crime
doctrine may not be judicially extended to two distinct criminal offenses. Id. at
1220. “The continuous crime doctrine applies only where a defendant has been
charged multiple times with the same ‘continuous’ offense.” Id.
[53] Williams was convicted of three counts of Murder, for three separate deaths,
and he does not challenge those convictions under the continuous crime
doctrine. Murder and Robbery are distinct crimes, with distinct elements.
Williams was not convicted of multiple counts of Robbery. The continuous
crime doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019 Page 23 of 25
Transcript
[54] The final articulated issue concerns an order that Williams’s appellate counsel
partially reimburse the Indiana Public Defender’s Office for a transcript
prepared for Williams before he retained private appellate counsel. The State
responds that it is not a party to a collateral order for payment. It is unclear as
to whether there is an appealable final judgment against counsel. Nevertheless,
the order is not integral to the merits of the criminal conviction on appeal.
[55] To the extent that the controversy pertains to Williams, we observe that a party
who was permitted to proceed in the trial court in forma pauperis may proceed in
like manner on appeal without prior authorization from the trial court or the
appellate court. Ind. Appellate Rule 40(A)(1). If a party is granted in forma
pauperis status by this Court, the effect is that the party “is relieved of the
obligation to prepay filing fees or costs in either the trial court or the Court on
Appeal or to give security therefor[.]” App. R. 40(D)(1) (emphasis added).
Costs are defined, in relevant part, in the Appellate Rules as “the cost of
preparing the Record on Appeal, including the Transcript[.]” App. R. 67(B)(2).
Thus, a defendant who has been determined to be indigent is entitled to a
transcript on appeal at public expense. See I.C. § 33-40-8-5; see also Hollowell v.
State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 266-67 (Ind. 2014) (noting that, after the Court of Appeals
had granted him in forma pauperis status, Hollowell was entitled to a transcript
of his post-conviction relief hearing at public expense); Wright v. State, 772
N.E.2d 449, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“[C]riminal defendants in Indiana who
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019 Page 24 of 25
cannot afford to pay for a transcript are still entitled to one if they are found to
be indigent.”).
[56] Because Williams had been granted in forma pauperis status at the time the
transcript was prepared by the Public Defender’s Office, he is entitled to the
transcript at public expense.
Conclusion
[57] Williams is not entitled to discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4. Sufficient
evidence supports his convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
evidentiary rulings nor did the trial judge become an advocate for the State.
Williams has demonstrated no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion,
and his aggregate sentence is not inappropriate. He is not entitled to vacation
of his Robbery conviction under the continuous crime doctrine. As an indigent
criminal litigant, he is entitled to a transcript at public expense.
[58] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and May, J., concur.
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