NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NOV 27 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JAYANTIBHAI PATEL, DBA Princess No. 18-55738
Inn; DAKSHA PATEL, Individual and all
others similarly situated and Plaintiff D.C. No.
Tenants, 2:08-cv-02806-AB-GJS
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
CITY OF LONG BEACH, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 7, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Jayantibhai Patel, et al. (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in
district court in 2008 alleging that Defendant-Respondent City of Long Beach
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
violated their state law and constitutional rights in proceedings surrounding and
including revocation of their business license. In 2009, the district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state law claims. In the first appeal, our Court reversed as to Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claim, and asked the district court to consider the effect of this
reversal on the state law claims. 564 F. App’x 881, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2014). The
district court then ruled that there was “no basis for reinstating” the state law
claims in federal court. After the parties settled the Fourth Amendment claim,
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s refusal to reinstate the state law claim for
writ of mandate.
We conclude that the district court had ample discretion to decline
jurisdiction over the state law claim for writ of mandate. We affirm on the basis
that, as of the time of the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction,
Plaintiffs’ state law claims substantially predominated over their only non-
dismissed federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). The remaining Fourth
Amendment claim was “a slender reed on which to base jurisdiction.” Patel v.
Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds
as recognized by Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2007).
There remained significant work to be done by the court and the parties to resolve
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Plaintiffs’ state law claims, that work would not overlap significantly with what
was required to resolve the narrow Fourth Amendment damages issue, it was not
unfair to the parties to require the state law claims to be litigated in state court, and
comity weighed against exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
administrative review claim against a local government. See United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Thus, the district court’s action was
plainly appropriate under section (c)(2).
AFFIRMED.
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