MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 09 2019, 10:39 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Megan Shipley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bradley Kay, December 9, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1523
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G01-0111-CF-217377
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1523 | December 9, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Bradley Kay appeals the revocation of his community corrections and
probation placements, asserting that he was denied fundamental due process at
his revocation hearing because the trial court did not ensure that he was advised
of the rights he was forfeiting before he admitted to committing a violation of
the terms of his placements. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for a
new hearing.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In September 2001, Kay went to Payroll Check Cashing and attempted to cash
a check in his name from Knight Transportation Administrative Services.
However, Kay had never worked for Knight Transportation and was not due
any type of financial compensation from it. In November 2001, the State
charged Kay with class C felony forgery and class D felony forgery. In March
2003, pursuant to a plea agreement, Kay pled guilty to the class C felony. In
April 2003, the trial court sentenced Kay to eight years, with three years to be
served on community corrections and five years suspended, with three of those
years to be served on probation.
[3] In September 2003, the State filed a notice of community corrections violation
alleging that Kay had left the community corrections residential facility on a job
search and failed to return. In October 2003, the State filed a notice of
probation violation based on the same allegation. A warrant was issued for
Kay’s arrest.
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[4] In May 2019, Kay was arrested. On May 30, 2019, the trial court held a
hearing on the community corrections and probation violations. At the
beginning of the hearing, Kay requested a public defender, and the trial court
determined that he was indigent and appointed a public defender to represent
him. Kay’s appointed counsel received copies of the notices of violation, and
the trial court read the allegation on the record. Then, the trial court discussed
Kay’s credit time with the representatives from community corrections and the
probation department and asked them what they would like to see as a sanction
for the violation, and each recommended revocation.
[5] The trial court asked Kay’s counsel for comment, and he informed the trial
court that Kay would like to make a statement. The trial court said, “Okay, I
have already sworn you in; where have you been for sixteen (16) years?” Tr.
Vol. 2 at 7. Kay replied that he had been in Colorado and Wyoming. The trial
court asked Kay if he left the community corrections facility and never came
back. Kay answered affirmatively, apologized for his actions, and noted that he
had turned himself in and had not been arrested or convicted of anything since
he left. The trial court then informed Kay that it was finding a violation. The
trial court revoked Kay’s community corrections placement and ordered him to
serve the remainder of the three-year sentence in the Department of Correction.
The trial court also revoked Kay’s probation and ordered him to serve one year
in community corrections and four years suspended to probation. This appeal
ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Kay argues that the trial court did not ensure that he was advised of the rights
he was forfeiting before he admitted to violating the terms of his placements,
resulting in fundamental error and requiring reversal and a new hearing. The
State agrees.
[7] Before a defendant’s probation or community corrections placement is revoked,
the defendant must be afforded certain due process protections. See Cox v. State,
706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999) (“We hold that the due process requirements
expressed by this court for probation revocations are also required when the
trial court revokes a defendant’s placement in a community corrections
program.”). These due process rights are codified in Indiana Code Section 35-
38-2-3, which provides in relevant part,
(e) A person may admit to a violation of probation and waive the
right to a probation violation hearing after being offered the
opportunity to consult with an attorney. If the person admits to a
violation and requests to waive the probation violation hearing,
the probation officer shall advise the person that by waiving the
right to a probation violation hearing the person forfeits the rights
provided in subsection (f)....
(f) Except as provided in subsection (e), the state must prove the
violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence shall
be presented in open court. The person is entitled to
confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.
[8] In Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), another panel of this
court addressed the same claim Kay raises. There, as here, the defendant had
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not been advised of the due process rights he was forfeiting as required by
subsection (e). In reviewing his claim of fundamental error, the Hilligoss court
reasoned as follows:
Indiana’s courts have recognized fundamental error in the
context of probation revocation proceedings before. For example,
it is well settled that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on
an alleged probation violation denies a probationer his due
process rights and constitutes fundamental error. [Dalton v. State,
560 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)]. Indeed, “[t]he
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
[Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)]. Further, “a
probationer’s admission that he violated the terms of probation
does not entitle him to less due process than a probationer who
contests the asserted violations.” United States v. Holland, 850 F.2d
1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1988).
…. [T]he statutory advisements applicable here insure that a
probationer’s admission “is given with full knowledge of the
consequences of such admission.” Gray v. State, 481 N.E.2d 158,
161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 1231-32. Accordingly, the Hilligoss court held that “a trial court’s failure
to ensure that a probationer who admits to a probation violation has received
the advisements as required under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(e)
constitutes a fundamental violation of the probationer’s due process rights.” Id.
at 1232.
[9] We agree with the reasoning in Hilligoss. Here, there is no dispute that Kay was
not advised of the rights he was forfeiting before he admitted to violating the
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terms of his placements. 1 The trial court’s failure to ensure that Kay was
advised as required by Section 35-38-2-3(e) constitutes fundamental error, and
therefore we reverse the revocation of Kay’s alternative placements and remand
for a new hearing. 2
[10] Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
1
The State does not suggest that the statutory requirement that the “probation officer shall advise” the person
of the rights being forfeited by admitting a violation relieved the trial court of its responsibility to ensure that
Kay was aware of his rights.
2
Because we are remanding for a new hearing, we need not address Kay’s argument that he was denied his
right to allocution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1523 | December 9, 2019 Page 6 of 6
Bradley Kay v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion