United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT July 25, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10890
SANDRA J. BEASLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:03-CV-1430-G)
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sandra Beasley appeals the district court’s affirmance of a
benefits-denial by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA). In rejecting Beasley’s treating physician’s
opinion, the administrative law judge (ALJ) apparently failed to
apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (requiring the SSA to give
substantial weight to treating physician’s opinion or, in the
alternative, apply the factors listed in other subparts). VACATED
and REMANDED.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I.
In April 1997, Beasley filed for benefits under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act as a result of, inter alia,
depression, fibromyalgia, bipolar disorder, and hypertension, with
a 1 March 1996 disability onset date. (In February 2000, she
amended that date to 1 April 1999, as discussed infra.) After the
SSA in April 1999 denied her claims, Beasley requested de novo
review by an ALJ.
In February 2000, after conducting the five-step analysis for
determining whether a claimant has a disability, pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ found: (1) Beasley continued to work as
a child-care provider through August 1998, but did not meet the
criteria for substantial gainful activity; (2) she had severe
impairments of arthritis, fibromyalgia, and hypertension (did not
include depression); (3) these impairments did not meet or equal
listed impairments; (4) she retained “the residual functional
capacity to perform a light level of work” but could not perform
her past relevant work; and (5) she had the “capacity to perform a
significant number of ... jobs existing in the national and local
economies”. As a result, the ALJ denied benefits.
The Appeals Council denied Beasley’s timely request for
review. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s
final decision. E.g., Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 195 (5th
Cir. 1999).
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Beasley filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
claiming: (1) the ALJ’s finding that her mental impairments were
not severe was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the
ALJ failed to apply the appropriate legal standard under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2) to weigh the opinion of her treating psychiatrist,
Dr. Graves. In recommending that the ALJ applied the correct legal
standard to give little or no weight to Dr. Graves as Beasley’s
treating physician, the magistrate judge noted: the ALJ was
required to consider six factors provided in § 404.1527(d)(2); and
failure to consider them is grounds for reversal. But, because
“the ALJ understood the nature and extent of the treating
relationship” and “explicitly determined that Dr. Graves’s opinion
was not adequately supported by the medical record”, the magistrate
judge recommended: the ALJ gave proper weight to Dr. Graves’
opinion; and substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination
that Beasley’s mental impairment was not severe.
Beasley timely filed objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation. The district court overruled those
objections and adopted it.
II.
Like the district court, our court reviews the Commissioner’s
benefits-denial only to determine whether: (1) substantial
evidence supports the final decision; and (2) the proper legal
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standards were used to evaluate the evidence. E.g., Newton v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
Unlike in district court, Beasley does not claim the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Instead, as she
did in district court, Beasley claims the ALJ failed to apply the
required § 404.1527(d)(2) standards, resulting in the rejection of
the opinion of her treating specialist, Dr. Graves. Beasley
maintains: the ALJ relied exclusively on a state agency’s non-
examining medical consultant, who evaluated her medical records;
and this reliance was in error because that expert’s review was in
November 1998 — several months before April 1999, when Beasley
claimed she became disabled and had stopped working (the amended
disability onset date). (In November 1998, the SSA initially
denied her claims; in April 1999, it denied her request for
reconsideration.) Accordingly, Beasley contends: had the ALJ, in
2000, analyzed the § 404.1527(d)(2) factors, Dr. Graves’ opinion
would be entitled to more weight than the non-examining medical
consultant’s opinion; therefore, the ALJ would have to find
Beasley’s mental impairments were severe; and it is less likely
benefits could have been denied.
As noted, a claimant seeking Social Security benefits must
show: (1) she is not engaged in substantial gainful work activity;
(2) she suffers a severe impairment; (3) that impairment meets or
equals one listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations; and (4) it
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prevents the claimant’s performing her past work. Upon the
claimant’s doing so, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
the impairment does not prevent the claimant from doing other work
available in the national and local economies. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4); see also Newton, 209 F.3d at 453.
In making these findings, an ALJ must give a treating
physician’s opinion “controlling weight if it is ‘well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and is not inconsistent with ... other substantial evidence’”.
Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (alteration in original)). Furthermore, a
specialist’s opinion is afforded greater weight than a
generalist’s. See Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.
1994), overruled on other grounds by Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103
(2000). As reflected above, a treating physician’s opinion may be
given little or no weight “when the evidence supports a contrary
conclusion”. Newton, 209 F.3d at 455 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The ALJ must “always give good reasons ... for the
weight [it affords the opinion]”, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), and
must show good cause when giving that opinion little or no weight,
Newton, 209 F.3d at 455.
Pursuant to § 404.1527(d)(2), to determine how much weight to
afford such an opinion, the ALJ must consider: (1) the physician’s
length of treatment of the claimant; (2) the physician’s frequency
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of examination; (3) the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship; (4) the support of the physician’s opinion afforded
by the medical evidence of record; (5) the consistency of the
opinion with the record as a whole; and (6) the specialization of
the treating physician. See also id. at 456. Furthermore, Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 96-2p provides:
[A] finding that a treating source medical
opinion is not well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques or is inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in the case record means
only that the opinion is not entitled to
“controlling weight,” not that the opinion
should be rejected. Treating source medical
opinions are still entitled to deference and
must be weighed using all of the factors
provided in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527.
(Emphasis added.)
The ALJ properly placed the burden on Beasley to show: (1)
she was not working enough to meet the substantial-gainful-activity
standard; (2) she suffers a severe impairment; (3) it meets or
equals a recognized impairment, and (4) it prevents her from doing
her past work. In making these findings, the ALJ completed a
residual functional capacity analysis to determine whether Beasley
could perform her past relevant and/or some lesser level of work.
He found Beasley
retains the residual functional capacity to
perform a light level of work restricting her
to lifting and/or carrying no more than 20
pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently;
standing and/or walking no more than 6 hours
in an 8 hour day; sitting no more than 6 hours
6
in an 8 hour day; no limitations on pushing or
pulling ... ; and the non-exertional abilities
of understanding, remembering, and carrying
out simple instructions; making judgments that
are commensurate with the functions of
unskilled work — i.e., simple work-related
decisions; responding appropriately to
supervision, co-workers and usual work
situations; and dealing with changes in a
routine work setting.
The ALJ based his analysis on Beasley’s medical evaluations by her
treating physicians, Dr. Pearson (October 1998) and Dr. Graves
(December 1998 - March 2000; the ALJ erroneously stated the first
treatment date as August 1999, instead of December 1998), the
evaluation of Dr. Pearson’s examination notes by the state agency’s
non-examining medical consultant, and Beasley’s testimony before
the ALJ.
With respect to Beasley’s mental impairments, the ALJ found
she had “reported to [Dr. Pearson], that she could not work due to
mood swings ... and a long history of ‘bad nerves’ and anxiety”.
Additionally, Dr. Pearson’s November 1998 records reflect Beasley
reported she had suffered auditory hallucinations, but was able to
live alone and care for herself independently with minimal help.
On the other hand, the ALJ found Beasley had reported to Dr. Graves
in 1999 and 2000 that she had suffered no such hallucinations.
The ALJ rejected Beasley’s testimony that she has significant
daily pain and symptoms of depression, finding “the medical
evidence ... reflects a much higher level of daily functioning”.
Likewise, the ALJ disregarded Dr. Pearson’s February 2000
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supplemental letter opinion, based on his October 1998 examination
of Beasley, that her mental impairment created a “moderate to
marked restriction of activities of daily living, ... [and]
moderate limitations and a few marked limitations in certain
specific areas related to understanding and memory, sustained
concentration and persistence, social interaction and adaptation”.
Finally, the ALJ rejected Dr. Graves’ opinion that Beasley’s
depression prevented her from working, finding it was “inconsistent
with and unsupported by both [Dr. Graves’] own medical evidence and
the balance of the record”.
The ALJ adopted the evaluation of the state agency’s non-
examining medical consultant that Beasley’s mental impairments were
not severe and “caused only a slight restriction of activities of
daily living, ... and never caused episodes of deterioration or
decompensation in work or a work-like setting”. Furthermore, the
ALJ concluded Beasley’s claims about her functional limitations and
restrictions on her daily life were “exaggerated, lack
corroboration or substantiation ... and, as such, [were] not
credible”.
The ALJ cited SSR 96-2p for the requirement that Dr. Graves’
opinion must be given full consideration. But, in his decision,
the ALJ did not mention the § 404.1527(d) factors. Nor, based on
our review of that decision, do we share the confidence of the
8
district court that the ALJ included all of those required factors
in his analysis.
“[A]bsent reliable medical evidence from a treating or
examining physician controverting [Dr. Graves’ opinion], an ALJ may
reject the opinion of the treating physician only if the ALJ
performs a detailed analysis of the treating physician’s views
under the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)”.
Newton, 209 F.3d at 453 (second emphasis added). Dr. Pearson’s
opinion of Beasley’s depression does not controvert Dr. Graves’
opinion — indeed, it provides support that Beasley’s depression
impairs her ability to work. And, although the state agency’s
medical consultant’s opinion controverts Dr. Graves’ opinion, that
consultant never examined or treated Beasley.
In sum, the above requisite “detailed analysis” for the §
404.1527(d)(2) factors is lacking. Accordingly, Beasley’s
substantial rights were affected by the ALJ’s apparent failure to
perform that analysis. Id.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is VACATED and this
matter is REMANDED to district court for remand to the Commissioner
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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