J-A29005-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TIMOTHY M. SHILLING : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PAULA SUE SHILLING : No. 1760 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Dated November 9, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 12066-CD 2013
PAULA S. SHILLING : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TIMOTHY M. SHILLING :
:
Appellant : No. 761 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Dated November 14, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Domestic Relations at
No(s): 2013-00386, Pacses No. 120114392
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2019
Appellant, Timothy M. Shilling, appeals pro se from the court’s
November 9, 2018 and November 14, 2018 orders denying his two motions
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A29005-19
for recusal filed in the above-captioned cases.1 After review, we dismiss these
appeals.
This case presents a complex and tortured procedural history, due in
large part to Appellant’s incessant filing of pro se motions before the trial
court. From what we can glean from the certified record, a divorce decree
was entered on May 25, 2016, finalizing the divorce of Appellant and his
former wife, Paula Shilling. The parties’ support and custody issues were
bifurcated and litigated over the ensuing years. Pertinent to the present
appeal, on November 9, 2018, Appellant filed two motions for the trial judge
to recuse. The court issued orders denying those motions on November 9,
2018, and November 14, 2018.
Appellant appealed and, during the pendency thereof, he has inundated
this Court with at least twenty pro se petitions seeking various forms of relief.
He has also continued to file numerous pro se pleadings before the trial court,
thus further complicating the record before us. At this juncture, it is wholly
unclear to this Court what, if any, issues remain outstanding below. To the
extent the parties’ support and/or custody matters have been finally resolved,
Appellant’s challenge to the court’s November 2018 orders underlying his
present appeal have become moot. See Johnson v. Martofel, 797 A.2d 943,
946 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the
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1 It appears that the trial court consolidated Appellant’s cases below.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal at each docket number, and this Court sua
sponte consolidated his appeals by per curiam order entered on June 5, 2019.
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issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”).
Additionally, if any issues remain pending before the trial court, then the at-
issue orders are interlocutory, and to challenge the court’s recusal decision,
Appellant must appeal once a final order is entered. See In re Bridgeport
Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[A]n order on a motion
for recusal is an interlocutory order for purposes of appeal.”) (citing Rohm
and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 149 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“A motion for
recusal is an interlocutory order.”).
Therefore, because we conclude that Appellant’s appeals from the
court’s November 9, 2018 and November 14, 2018 orders are either moot or
interlocutory, we dismiss his appeals.2
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2 In any event, we observe that Appellant’s 149-page brief to this Court is
nearly incomprehensible and, at best, we discern only bald allegations of
improper conduct by the court. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 29 (“The
[judge] has engaged in [o]fficial oppression, oppression of evidence and
conduct that is prejudicial to the effect and [a]dministration of the business of
the courts, undermines public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary and create[d] a strong appearance of impropriety of excluding
an essential component of a fair and impartial system of justice to accord to
Appellant who has the legal interest and has not had the right to be heard in
front of the [court] in the preceding according to the judicial code of canons.”)
(emphasis omitted); id. at 44 (“The [court] in this case has denied all access
to the courts to be heard and to address [h]arm which demonstrates [t]he
[court’s] unwillingness to provide access to the courts to a pro se litigant
father.”); id. at 45 (“The inappropriate conduct by [t]he [court] such as willful
misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform duties, prejudicial to the
administration of justice and [c]onduct unbecoming of a judicial officer. The
[court’s] repeated failure to abide by the rules of procedures and the [court’s]
willful violation of the code of canons has continued throughout the entire
case.”). Appellant’s failure to explain what specific conduct the court
committed that warranted recusal would not establish that the trial court
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Appeals dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2019
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abused its discretion by denying his recusal motions. See Commonwealth
v. White, 910 A.2d 648, 657-58 (“Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear
and dispose of the case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will not be
overturned on appeal but for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted).
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