NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADRIAN ARMANDO CHAPARRO, No. 19-15012
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-03831-LHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NNENNA IKEGBU, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Adrian Armando Chaparro appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Chaparro
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Chaparro’s Hepatitis C disease. See id. at 1060-61
(holding deliberate indifference is a “high legal standard” requiring a defendant be
aware of and disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health; medical
malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of
treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90
F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (for a difference of opinion to amount to deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose
was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and “that they chose this
course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health”
(internal citations omitted)); see also Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086-87
(9th Cir. 2014) (reliance on the decisions of qualified providers does not constitute
deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chaparro’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Chaparro failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
2 19-15012
Chaparro’s motion for counsel, set forth in Docket Entry No. 7, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 19-15012