NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEC 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NEVADA RESTAURANT SERVICES, No. 18-15507
INC., DBA Dotty’s,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:16-cv-00238-GMN-NJK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CLARK COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 4, 2019
Seattle, Washington
Before: D.W. NELSON, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Nevada Restaurant Services, Inc. doing business as
Dotty’s (Dotty’s) appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
favor of Defendant-Appellee Clark County (Clark County). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the district court’s grant of summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
judgment de novo, asking whether the moving party has met its burden to prove the
absence of genuine issues of material fact. . . .” ABS Entm’t, Inc. v. CBS Corp.,
908 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir. 2018), as amended (citation omitted).
1. The district court correctly concluded that Dotty’s failed to raise a
material issue of fact regarding its procedural due process claim. Specifically,
Dotty’s failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding the existence of a
“constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). Obtaining a license to engage in the “operation of [a] gambling facility”
in Clark County is a “privilege” and is “subject to regulations.” Clark County
Code of Ordinances (CCC) § 8.04.020(A). Under Clark County’s regulatory
scheme, the County possesses “broad final discretion in all licensing matters” and
may “grant or deny applications for licenses” and “impose conditions, limitations
and restrictions upon a license.” Id. § 8.04.020(C).
The wide latitude afforded the County to impose conditions or restrictions,
coupled with the fact that the licenses were not revoked, persuades us that Dotty’s
did not raise a material issue of fact regarding its asserted property interest. See
Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (“Our cases
recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may
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grant or deny it in their discretion.”); see also Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082,
1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Only if the governing statute compels a result upon
compliance with certain criteria, none of which involve the exercise of discretion by
the reviewing body, does it create a constitutionally protected property
interest. . . . ”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
The contention that Dotty’s established a cognizable property interest
through reliance on correspondence from the Director of Business License fails.
The Director’s interpretation of the ordinance was not binding on the Clark County
Commissioners who enacted the ordinance. See CCC § 2.03.020(g) (providing that
the Department of Business License enforces the ordinances adopted by the
County Commissioners); see also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa
Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006) (relying on municipality’s adopted
amendments as the “authoritative interpretation”).
2. Summary judgment was also properly entered on the substantive due
process and equal protection claims. The parties agree that rational basis review
applies to these claims. Clark County articulated a legitimate economic interest for
enacting the challenged ordinance, based on its concern that restricted licensees
such as Dotty’s were engaged in unfair competition and, consequently, were
paying proportionally less taxes. See United States v. Padilla-Diaz, 862 F.3d 856,
3
862 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Classifications that do not implicate fundamental rights or a
suspect class are permissible so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
request to reopen discovery. See Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 921
F.3d 803, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2019) (articulating the standard of review). Because
Dotty’s failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding a protected property
interest, any new evidence regarding the purported disparate treatment aimed at
Dotty’s would not affect the inability to raise a material issue of fact regarding this
pivotal issue. See Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Discovery
is only appropriate where there are factual issues raised. . . .”).
AFFIRMED.
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Nevada Restaurant Servs., Inc. v. Clark County
Combined Opinion