J-A27008-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
:
ALEATHEA GILLARD, :
: No. 3390 EDA 2018
Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002546-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
FILED DECEMBER 18, 2019
I join the Majority’s holding that, under the circumstances of this case,
Appellant has failed to establish that her sentencing claim warrants relief from
this Court. I write separately to express my disquiet about the nearly
unfettered discretion given to trial courts in sentencing a defendant.
Our appellate courts have consistently
reinforced the notion that a trial court has broad discretion in
sentencing a defendant, and concomitantly, the appellate courts
utilize a deferential standard of appellate review in determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning an
appropriate sentence. The reason for this broad discretion and
deferential standard of appellate review is that the [trial] court is
in the best position to measure various factors and determine the
proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27008-19
of the individual circumstances before it. Simply stated, the [trial]
court sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of
sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
used upon appellate review. Moreover, the [trial] court enjoys an
institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to its
decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not
be lightly disturbed.
Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27 (Pa. 2014) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[t]he imposition of consecutive as
opposed to concurrent sentences is solely within the discretion of the trial
court, and does not in and of itself even rise to the level of a substantial
question.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 873 A.2d 704, 709 at n.2 (Pa.
Super. 2005).
I am mindful of these principles. I am also aware that Appellant’s actions
in this case were horrific. However, I believe the inconsistent application of
the sentencing factors and limited appellate review results in similarly situated
defendants being treated disparately with no recourse.1 I believe this is a
situation our jurisprudence cannot countenance. Accordingly, I respectfully
concur.
____________________________________________
1 Appellant was given the maximum sentence on each of three counts.
Because the sentences were ordered to run consecutively, the aggregate
sentence was 22½ to 45 years. Had the sentences been ordered to run
concurrently, the aggregate sentence would have been 10 to 20 years. Given
our deferential standard of review, we cannot reverse the sentence in either
case. Nor can we reverse because the maximum sentence is far greater than
the guidelines suggest.
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