NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2377
__________
BRANDON L. FAKE,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA;
JUDGE DIANE R. THOMPSON; JUDGE MARGARET T. MURPHY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-03636)
District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 18, 2019
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 18, 2019)
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O P I N I O N*
___________
PER CURIAM
In 2004, Brandon L. Fake was party to divorce, child support, and custody
proceedings in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. He later filed suit in federal
court alleging a conspiracy against him in the Philadelphia courts. The District Court
dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and we
affirmed. Fake v. City of Philadelphia, 704 F. App’x 214 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(not precedential).
Fake then filed a second suit in federal court, again complaining of a conspiracy in
his state-court proceedings and various rulings made by the judges involved. The District
Court dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Fake
moved for reconsideration, arguing, as relevant here, that District Judge Pappert should
have recused himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 because he had improper personal and
financial ties to certain defendants in Fake’s first federal suit. Judge Pappert denied
reconsideration, explaining that he did not maintain any relationships with the defendants
that warranted recusal. Upon review, we determined that nothing in the record suggested
that Judge Pappert had acted with partiality and affirmed the District Court’s rulings.
Fake v. Pennsylvania, 753 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (not precedential).
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
Fake returned to the District Court and sought reopening under Rules 60(b) and
(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fake raised the same allegations that he
raised in his prior motion, once again arguing that District Judge Pappert should have
recused himself from his case because of his connections to the defendants in Fake’s
prior suit. The District Court denied the motion and Fake appealed. 1
We will affirm. Given that this Court already considered, and rejected, Fake’s
recusal claim, his remedy was to pursue a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court—not return to the District Court and file another Rule 60(b) motion. See
Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a request for relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal); Reform Party
of Allegheny Cty. v. Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (noting that a petition for certiorari is the proper means to challenge a court of
appeals ruling). To the extent that Fake asserted that he had new evidence to support his
recusal claim, we have reviewed the record and conclude that this evidence, even if
somehow “new,” did not advance his claim. Therefore, the District Court did not err in
denying Fake’s motion to reopen.
Accordingly, we will affirm.
1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3