NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 26 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARANJEET SINGH, No. 16-73387
Petitioner, Agency No. A201-013-019
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 6, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,*** BYBEE, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Charanjeet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’s (the BIA) decision denying his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
(CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
With respect to Singh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims,
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Singh could safely and
reasonably relocate to one of the Sikh communities outside of Haryana to avoid
future persecution based on his membership in and political activism with the Indian
National Lok Dal Party (INLD). On appeal, Singh first argues that the BIA erred
when it failed to identify a specific location in India to which he could safely
relocate. However, we recently rejected that argument in Singh v. Whitaker, 914
F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2019), and do so again here.
Next, Singh contends that the BIA failed to engage in a sufficiently
individualized analysis as to whether he would be safer in a new location. In Singh
v. Whitaker, we held that the BIA’s failure to make an individualized determination
into whether there was a location in the country where the petitioner would not be
persecuted for proselytizing for his preferred political party was error. Id. at 661.
Nevertheless, the case before us is distinguishable because the BIA did consider
whether Singh would be at a significant risk of persecution if he continued his
political activity with the INLD outside of Haryana. Relying on the government’s
changed country conditions evidence, the BIA found that Singh, a low-level INLD
Party member, would likely not face persecution for his political beliefs in other
parts of India. Substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA’s conclusion.
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See Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We review de novo the
BIA’s . . . determinations of purely legal questions. We review factual findings, on
the other hand, for substantial evidence.” (internal citation omitted)).
Additionally, Singh challenges the BIA’s determination that he could
reasonably relocate within India. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) governs the inquiry into
whether internal relocation is reasonable. The regulation requires the BIA to
consider a nonexhaustive list of factors and decide whether any of them makes
relocation unreasonable. Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.
2005). Here, the BIA noted that Singh could reasonably relocate due to his young
age; good health; ability to speak Hindi, the official language of India, and Punjabi;
and his education level. Substantial evidence in the record supports the finding that
Singh can reasonably relocate within India.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. To be
entitled to protection under CAT, a petitioner has to demonstrate that it is more likely
than not he will be tortured by or with the acquiescence of government officials if
removed to the proposed country. Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th
Cir. 2001). Consistent with its determination that Singh could safely and reasonably
relocate within India, the BIA determined that Singh had not met his burden of
showing that it is more likely than not he will be tortured if he is returned there. See
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). The record does not compel a contrary conclusion. See
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Nguyen v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We will reverse, under the
substantial evidence standard, if ‘the evidence in the record compels a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the BIA’s decision is incorrect.’” (quoting Tampubolon
v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010))).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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