[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
______________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-12330 December 13, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
______________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-03106-CV-JTC-1
JAMES M. CARROLL,
JIMMY FARIST,
ROBERT V. VITALE,
CARL MASON,
JIM C. WEST,
RONNIE C. BRUCE,
MARK GALLMAN,
RICHARD UNDERWOOD
Plaintiff-Appellants,
ROGER D. GOSSAGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS
AND AEROSPACE-WORKERS,
R. THOMAS BUFFENBARGER,
ROBERT THAYER,
WARREN L. MART,
RONALD A. ELDRIDGE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_______________________
(December 13, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a dispute between an international labor union, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”), and former officers
and representatives of the union’s affiliated local union, Local Lodge 709 (“Local
709"), over which the IAM exercises supervisor authority conferred on it by its
Constitution. The dispute centers on the IAM’s discipline of sixteen former Local
709 officers and representatives, including nine plaintiffs, pursuant to the IAM
Constitution based on their acceptance and retention of travel allowances for first-
class air travel on union business when they did not fly first-class or did not fly at
all. The dispute also centers on the IAM’s imposition of a trusteeship on Local
709.
Five counts of the complaint are before us in this appeal; as to each, the
district court granted the IAM defendants summary judgment. Counts I and II are
brought under Title III of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
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(“LMRDA”) and allege that the IAM improperly imposed a trusteeship on Local
709. Counts III and IV are retaliation claims brought under § 101(a)(2) of Title I
of the LMRDA. These counts allege that the purported misuse of funds, i.e., the
improper retention of travel allowances for first-class air travel, was a pretext for
plaintiffs’ suspensions under the IAM Constitution. According to plaintiffs, they
were suspended not for improper retention of travel allowances, but because they
had disagreed with the IAM over Local 709's collective bargaining negotiations
with Lockheed Marietta in 2002. Count VI consists of pendent state law claims
for defamation based on written and oral statements by defendants accusing
plaintiffs of misappropriating union funds.
The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in an order
entered March 15, 2006. The court rejected Counts I and II on the grounds that
the claims therein asserted are moot; the IAM’s trusteeship over Local 709 had
ceased to exist, thus precluding a grant of equitable relief, and that Title III of the
LMRDA precluded an award of damages. The court disposed of Counts III and
IV on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that the alleged retaliation was
“causally connected” to plaintiffs’ exercise of free speech. Eighteen months
passed between plaintiffs’speech and their suspensions, making the requisite
causation difficult for them to prove. The court indicated that they might have
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overcome this problem by pointing to other evidence of causation, but as the court
properly observed, they cited none. The court ruled against plaintiffs on Count VI
on the ground that their defamation claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.
In this appeal, plaintiffs contend that the court misapplied the law in
granting summary judgment on Counts I and II. We disagree. These claims are
moot for the reasons the court cited in its order. Plaintiffs argue that a fact issue
exists regarding the causation element of their Counts III and IV retaliation claims.
We find none. The court correctly held that plaintiffs failed to show that they
were disciplined on account of their speech. As for Count VI, plaintiffs find error
in the court’s preemption analysis in rejecting their state law defamation claims.
We find no error.
The district court’s judgment is, accordingly,
AFFIRMED.
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